United States v. Jenkins

FILED: February 17, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 07-4117
(1:04-cr-00255-BEL)
___________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
JERRY LEE JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant
___________________
O R D E R
___________________
The Court amends its opinion filed February 17, 2009, as
follows:
On the title page, the district court case number is
amended by substituting “cr” for “cv.”
For the Court--By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4117
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JERRY LEE JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District
Judge. (1:04-cr-00255-BEL)
Submitted: January 30, 2009 Decided: February 17, 2009
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Raymond J. Rigat, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, James G. Warwick, Tonya
Kelly Kowitz, Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jerry Lee Jenkins was convicted by a jury of one count
of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (f)
(2006), and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment. On
appeal, he argues that the district court erred in failing to
order sua sponte a mental competency hearing. Finding no error,
we affirm.
Whether the district court should have sua sponte
ordered a competency hearing is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 396 (4th
Cir. 2002). A district court must determine if “[the defendant]
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . and whether he
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960). The defendant shall be considered incompetent if
the district court finds, “by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease
or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that
he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006). The defendant bears the burden of
establishing his incompetence. United States v. Robinson, 404
F.3d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 2005).
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Jenkins’ statements indicate that he is among a
growing number of prisoners adhering to a “flesh and blood”
sovereign man philosophy. See United States v. Mitchell, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 602, 603-06 (D. Md. 2005) (describing the theory, its
sources, and its anti-government movement predecessors).
Adherence to an ill-advised, self-defeating legal strategy does
not indicate incompetence to stand trial. United States v.
Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 743 (4th Cir. 2007). Competency
determinations turn only on the defendant’s capacity to
understand the proceedings, the capacity to assist in his
defense, and the capacity to communicate with counsel, and not
on his willingness to do so. See Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421,
432 (4th Cir. 1995).
Jenkins’ filings with the court and statements to the
court indicate that Jenkins was able to articulate his, albeit
unconventional, legal strategy. His choice to pursue the flesh
and blood defense was not indicative of a mental defect or
incompetence. Although the court strongly recommended that the
Bureau of Prisons assess Jenkins for suspected bipolar disorder,
nothing in the record indicates that such illness rendered
Jenkins incompetent to stand trial or be sentenced. Further,
although Jenkins highlights his drug and alcohol abuse as a
contributing factor to incompetence, there is no evidence
demonstrating that the abuse rendered him incompetent.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s
failure to hold a hearing sua sponte on Jenkins’ mental
competency was not an abuse of discretion and affirm the
judgment. We deny Jenkins’ motion for a competency
determination on appeal and pro se motion to dismiss counsel.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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