United States v. Wood

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4814
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BRENT EARL WOOD,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00044-BO)
Submitted: July 9, 2009 Decided: August 14, 2009
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George Edward Bell Holding, United States Attorney, Ann Margaret
Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Brent Earl Wood, Cary, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
The United States appeals from a judgment of acquittal
and conditional new trial granted to Brent E. Wood after a jury
convicted him of eight charges relating to fraudulent
misrepresentations made to investors in a venture capital fund.
The district court found that, despite the jury’s verdict, the
Government’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain Wood’s convictions. The district court granted Wood a
judgment of acquittal and, in the event of a reversal of this
judgment, a new trial. For the following reasons, we reverse
the district court’s order, and remand for sentencing.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides that a
district court “must enter a judgment of acquittal [when] the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29(a). We review a judgment of acquittal de novo,
determining whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, a rational fact-finder could have
found the essential elements of the charged offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 246
(4th Cir. 2008).
The elements of substantive mail fraud are: (1) the
existence of a scheme to defraud, and (2) the use of mails to
perpetrate the scheme. United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320,
326 (4th Cir. 2001). To establish the first element, the
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Government must prove that Wood “acted with the specific intent
to defraud, which ‘may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.’”
United
U States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir.
1993)).
To prove a conspiracy to commit mail fraud, the
Government must prove (1) the existence of an agreement to
commit mail fraud, (2) the defendant’s willing participation,
and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. United
States v. Edwards, 188 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 1999). The
Government must show that the defendant acted with a specific
intent to defraud, which may be proven with circumstantial
evidence. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
To establish a conspiracy to commit money laundering,
the Government must prove (1) the existence of an agreement to
commit money laundering, (2) the defendant knew the money
laundering proceeds were derived from illegal activity, and
(3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the
conspiracy. Singh, 518 F.3d at 248.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, we find that the Government presented evidence
more than sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that Wood
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acted with specific intent to defraud investors and launder
money. The district court therefore erred in granting a
judgment of acquittal.
The Government also argues that the district court
erred in conditionally granting Wood a new trial. We review a
district court’s grant of a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 237 (4th
Cir. 1997). The district court should exercise its discretion
to award a new trial “sparingly,” and should only grant a new
trial when the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict
that to deny a new trial would be contrary to the “interest of
justice.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33; see United States v. Smith, 451
F.3d 209, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Campbell, 977
F.2d 854, 860 (4th Cir. 1992). In deciding a motion for a new
trial, the district court may consider the credibility of
witnesses and is not required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government. Campbell, 977 F.2d at 860.
Here, the district court failed to explain its
decision to grant a new trial, stating only that “the evidence
in this case weighs heavily against the verdict.” It appears
that the court granted a new trial based on its finding that the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Because we
have concluded that the evidence was sufficient, we must find
the grant of a new trial an abuse of discretion.
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For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district
court’s judgment of acquittal and its conditional grant of a new
trial. We deny Wood’s motions to amend the informal brief and
for oral argument, and dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process. We remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
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