Richard Peamon v. Verizon Corp.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1591
RICHARD PEAMON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
VERIZON CORP.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
(1:14-cv-00549-GLR)
Submitted: August 7, 2014 Decided: August 20, 2014
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard Peamon, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Peamon appeals the district court’s orders
dismissing his civil complaint without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and denying his motion for leave to
amend, which the court construed as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible
error. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint
for the reasons stated by the district court. See Peamon v.
Verizon Corp., No. 1:14-cv-00549-GLR (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2014).
Turning to Peamon’s motion for leave to amend, we note
that the district court correctly recognized that it could not
grant the post-judgment motion without first vacating the
judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See
Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
Rather than analyzing Peamon’s motion under the legal standards
set forth in Rule 59(e), however, the court should have
“evaluate[d] [Peamon’s] postjudgment motion to amend the
complaint ‘under the same legal standard as a similar motion
filed before judgment was entered — for prejudice, bad faith, or
futility.’” Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462,
471 (4th Cir. 2011). Because it is clear that, in seeking to
amend his complaint, Peamon merely sought to artificially
inflate his damages in order to obtain subject matter
jurisdiction, we conclude that Peamon’s motion to amend was
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filed in bad faith and any resulting error by the district court
was harmless. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial
of Peamon’s motion for leave to amend.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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