United States v. Pineda-Salas

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4066
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL PINEDA-SALAS, a/k/a Gerardo Iruegas,
a/k/a Miguel Angel-Salas, a/k/a Fidencio
Damian-Alcayo,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00151-FWB-1)
Submitted: February 26, 2007 Decided: April 2, 2007
Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Leslie Carter Rawls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Clifton Thomas Barrett,
Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Miguel Pineda-Salas appeals the district court’s order
sentencing him to 198 months’ imprisonment following his guilty
plea to a single count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine
hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)
(2000). Pineda-Salas’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 396 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that she
finds no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning the
validity of Pineda-Salas’s guilty plea, the effectiveness of his
counsel, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The Government
did not file an answering brief. Although informed of his right to
file a supplemental brief, Pineda-Salas did not file a brief. We
have reviewed the record and, finding no reversible error, affirm
Pineda-Salas’s conviction and sentence.
Appellate counsel first questions whether the district
court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Pineda-Salas’s
guilty plea. Because Pineda-Salas did not move to withdraw his
guilty plea, we review any challenge to the adequacy of the Rule 11
hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517,
525 (4th Cir. 2002). We find no plain error in the district
court’s acceptance of Pineda-Salas’s guilty plea.
Pineda-Salas also argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are not cognizible on direct appeal unless the record conclusively
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establishes ineffective assistance. United States v. Richardson,
195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). To allow for adequate
development of the record, a defendant generally must bring his
ineffective assistance claims in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(2000). United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997).
An exception exists where the record conclusively shows ineffective
assistance. Id. Here, the record on its face does not
conclusively demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
Pineda-Salas also contests the reasonableness of his
sentence. A sentence imposed in a system of advisory sentencing
guidelines must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and
. . . reasonable.” United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47
(4th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). A sentence imposed
within a correctly calculated guideline range is presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006).
We find Pineda-Salas’s sentence of 198 months’
imprisonment was reasonable because it “was selected pursuant to a
reasoned process in accordance with the law, in which the court did
not give excessive weight to any relevant factor, and which
effected a fair and just result in light of the relevant facts and
law.” Green, 436 F.3d at 457. Accordingly, because the sentence
was within the advisory guideline range and was determined
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according to a reasoned process, the challenge to its
reasonableness fails.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Pineda-Salas’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Pineda-Salas, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Pineda-Salas requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Pineda-Salas. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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