Smith v. Apfel

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA SMITH,SSN: XXX-XX-XXXX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 97-1749
KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.
James P. Jones, District Judge.
(CA-96-100-A)
Submitted: November 18, 1997
Decided: December 8, 1997
Before ERVIN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Joseph E. Wolfe, WOLFE & FARMER, Norton, Virginia, for Appel-
lant. James A. Winn, Chief Counsel, Region III, Patricia M. Smith,
Deputy Chief Counsel, Margaret J. Krecke, Assistant Regional Coun-
sel, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINIS-
TRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United
States Attorney, Julie C. Dudley, Assistant United States Attorney,
Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Sandra K. Smith appeals the district court judgment and
order affirming the Commissioner's decision denying her application
for disability insurance benefits. Appellant, a high school graduate
who worked for ten years as a cashier, challenges whether substantial
evidence supported the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") decision.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Our review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence
supported the ALJ's decision and whether he applied the correct law.
See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). It is the
ALJ's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence; not the
reviewing court's. See Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir.
1996).
In the present case, we find that the district court properly deter-
mined that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision and that
he applied the correct law. There was sufficient evidence to find that
Appellant's degree of mental impairment did not meet the required
severity under 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,§ 12.04 (1997).
Dr. Eden's report was not entitled to controlling weight because it
was not supported by clinical or laboratory findings. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (1997). On the other hand, Dr. Sav-
age's assessment was based upon clinical and laboratory findings
considered in conjunction with the Appellant's developmental history.
Furthermore, there was no evidence to support a finding that Appel-
lant's diabetes was disabling. Finally, in setting out the hypothetical
for the vocational expert, the ALJ listed Smith's limitation with
regard to her ability to engage in nothing greater than light work and
her emotional limitations as reported by Dr. Savage. The discussion
concerning alternative occupations with the vocational expert was
premised on a profile that included both physical and psychological
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elements. Furthermore, the ALJ's conclusion that Smith had a resid-
ual functional capacity to perform certain jobs was based upon a com-
bination of Smith's physical and psychological limitations.
Accordingly, we find that there was substantial evidence to support
the ALJ's determination.
We therefore affirm the order of the district court. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the material before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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