United States v. Zwede Smith

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4164
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ZWEDE Y. SMITH, a/k/a Zwede Yohannes Smith,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00134-REP-1)
Submitted: August 29, 2014 Decided: September 15, 2014
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Robert J.
Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney,
Michael A. Jagels, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Zwede Y. Smith appeals his conviction after pleading
guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Smith filed a motion
to suppress evidence found during a search of the backpack he
was carrying when approached by police officers at the bus
station. The district court denied the motion. On appeal,
Smith challenges only the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress. We affirm.
Smith argues first that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), does not allow for a full search of an item incident to
a Terry detention, rather it permits only a frisk or patdown—a
limited search for weapons or evidence that may be destroyed.
In the alternative, he argues that there was no reasonable
suspicion to support the detention and that a reasonable person
would not have felt free to leave when the officers first
approached, thus he was seized when the officers first
approached him at the front of the bus. The Government argues
that once Smith sprinted away from the officers, they had
reasonable suspicion to believe that he was armed and were
justified in searching the backpack to determine whether it
contained a weapon or contraband.
We review the district court’s factual findings
regarding the motion to suppress for clear error, and the
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court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Burgess,
684 F.3d 445, 452 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 490(2012); United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 882 (4th Cir.
2011). When, as here, a motion to suppress has been denied, we
view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir.
2013). The court also “defer[s] to the district court’s
credibility findings, as it is the role of the district court to
observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial
motion to suppress.” United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148,
150-51 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In general, we apply a “particularly strong clear error standard
to factual determinations when they are based on oral
testimony.” United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650–51
(4th Cir. 1996).
We have reviewed the joint appendix, including the
district court’s order denying the motion to suppress, and the
parties’ briefs. Finding no error in the district court’s
determination that the search of Smith’s backpack was lawful, we
affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United States v.
Smith, No. 3:13-cr-00134-REP-1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 30, 2013).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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