Tracy Russell v. Commissioner of Social Sec

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2348
TRACY BRUNER RUSSELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00005-jpj-pms)
Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 22, 2011
Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hugh F. O’Donnell, CLIENT CENTERED LEGAL SERVICES OF SOUTHWEST
VIRGINIA, Norton, Virginia, for Appellant. Eric P. Kressman,
Regional Chief Counsel, Victor Pane, Supervisory Attorney,
Jordana Cooper, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tracy Bruner Russell appeals the district court’s
order granting the Commissioner of Social Security’s summary
judgment motion in Russell’s action seeking review of the
Commissioner’s decision denying her disability insurance and
supplemental security income benefits under the Social Security
Act (“the Act”). On appeal, Russell raises only one issue–
whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in rejecting
the opinion of her treating rheumatologist regarding her ability
to work. Finding no error, we affirm.
“[W]e review de novo the district court’s award of
summary judgment, viewing the facts and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th
Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Additionally, we review the denial of benefits under
the Act to ensure that the ALJ’s findings of fact “are supported
by substantial evidence and [that] the correct law was applied.”
Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402
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U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
will not reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations
because those functions are left to the ALJ. Johnson v.
Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005). “Where conflicting
evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a
claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls
on the [ALJ].” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
An ALJ is required to weigh medical opinions based on:
“(1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the
treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant,
(3) the supportability of the physician’s opinion, (4) the
consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the
physician is a specialist.” Id. at 654 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527 (2005)). While “[c]ourts often accord greater weight
to the testimony of a treating physician,” id. (internal
quotation marks omitted), the ALJ is not required to do so “if a
physician’s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if
it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence.” Craig v.
Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 1996); see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2). If the ALJ does not give the treating
physician’s opinion controlling weight, she must “give good
reasons in [her] notice of determination or decision for the
weight [she] give[s] [the] treating source’s opinion.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
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Upon review, we conclude that the ALJ did not err in
discounting the opinion of Russell’s treating rheumatologist.
In her decision, the ALJ noted that Russell saw the
rheumatologist, Dr. Morris, infrequently, and had not seen him
for six months prior to his filling out the disability
assessment. The decision further explains that Dr. Morris’s
opinion about Russell’s disability was not supported by his
treatment notes or by other information in the file. Although
his assessment form precluded Russell from working due to
limited use of her hands, his notes indicate that she was
improving with treatment and his opinion is unsupported by
medical tests or other evidence. On Russell’s last visit to Dr.
Morris prior to his assessment of her ability to work, Dr.
Morris noted that Russell had no active synovitis and had the
full range of motion in her hands. These notes constitute
substantial evidence sufficient to allow the ALJ to discount Dr.
Morris’s disability assessment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for the Commissioner. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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