United States v. Reid

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4405
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ALEXANDER REID, a/k/a Batman,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (2:97-cr-00577)
Submitted: November 19, 2007 Decided: December 11, 2007
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Kevin Holmes, THE STEINBERG LAW FIRM, LLP, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney,
Alston C. Badger, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alexander Reid appeals the district court’s order
imposing a thirty-seven month sentence following revocation of his
supervised release. Reid contends the district court improperly
classified his failure to stop for a blue light as a Class A
violation. Finding no error, we affirm.
Reid was charged with violating his supervised release in
various ways, including driving under the influence, failure to
report as instructed, and failing to stop for a blue light, in
violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-750 (2006). The district court
found Reid guilty of violating the conditions of his supervised
release by being charged with new criminal conduct and sentenced
him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment, a term within the
guidelines range. The district court based its guidelines
calculation in part upon the Government’s representation that
failing to stop for a blue light was a Grade A violation under USSG
§ 7B1.1. Reid argues that the district court erred in its
calculation because failure to stop for a blue light is not a crime
of violence and thus is not a Grade A violation.
The sentencing guidelines for supervised release
violations provide that a Grade A violation is comprised of:
conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, or
local offense punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year that (i) is a
crime of violence, (ii) is a controlled
substance offense, or (iii) involves
possession of a firearm or destructive device
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of a type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); or
(B) any other federal, state, or local offense
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding
twenty years.
USSG § 7B1.1(a)(1) (2006). Failing to stop for a blue light in
South Carolina is punishable by a maximum of three years’
imprisonment. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-750(B)(1).
Chapter seven of the guidelines, governing probation and
supervised release violations, notes that § 4B1.2 defines a “crime
of violence.” USSG § 7B1.1, cmt. n.2. Section 4B1.2 provides:
The term “crime of violence” means any offense
under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
that –-
(1) has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another,
or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to
another.
USSG § 4B1.2(a) (2006).
Failing to stop for a blue light does not have as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against another person. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-750; see also
United States v. James, 337 F.3d 387, 390 (4th Cir. 2003). Nor is
the crime one specifically enumerated as a crime of violence; thus
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the question becomes whether it “involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
This question is determined by a “categorical approach,”
in which the court looks at the statutory definition of the
offense, “‘and not to the underlying facts of a specific
conviction.’” James, 337 F.3d at 390 (quoting United States v.
Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1993)). In other words, the
sentencing court must ask “whether that crime, ‘in the abstract,’
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” United States v. Dickerson, 77 F.3d 774, 776
(4th Cir. 1996). In the abstract, failing to stop for a blue light
constitutes a crime of violence, as the statute “generally
proscribes conduct that poses the potential for serious injury to
another.” James, 337 F.3d at 390-91. Therefore, the district
court properly classified failing to stop for a blue light as a
Grade A violation, as it is a crime of violence punishable by a
maximum term of more than one year.
Reid argues that a categorical approach is not
appropriate for classifying conduct under the guidelines, because
the sentencing guidelines differ from the armed career criminal
enhancement, which was at issue in James. However, we have adopted
such a categorical approach in determining whether a crime is one
of violence under the guidelines when the indictment contained
“very few facts” specifying the circumstances surrounding the
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charge. Dickerson, 77 F.3d at 776 (holding that felony attempted
escape from custody constitutes a crime of violence under the
sentencing guidelines). As the petition for warrant or summons for
Reid similarly does not detail the specific circumstances
surrounding his arrest for failure to stop for a blue light, the
district court properly applied a categorical approach and
refrained from engaging in a fact-specific analysis.
For these reasons, the district court properly classified
Reid’s failure to stop for a blue light as a Class A violation
under the sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, we affirm Reid’s
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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