United States v. Donte Baker

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4431
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DONTE BERNARD BAKER, a/k/a Tay, a/k/a Donnie,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00426-JKB-1)
Submitted: October 22, 2014 Decided: October 29, 2014
Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stuart O. Simms, Matthias L. Niska, BROWN, GOLDSTEIN & LEVY,
LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein,
United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donte Bernard Baker pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
participate in racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d) (2012); conspiracy to commit murder in aid of
racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (2012); and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). The
district court sentenced Baker to 480 months of imprisonment and
he now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Baker first argues on appeal that the district court
erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We
review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dyess,
478 F.3d 224, 237 (4th Cir. 2007). A defendant seeking to
withdraw his guilty plea bears the burden of demonstrating that
withdrawal should be granted. Id.
In deciding whether to permit a defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea, a district court should consider:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible
evidence that his plea was not knowing or otherwise
involuntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has
been a delay between entry of the plea and filing of
the motion; (4) whether the defendant has had close
assistance of counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will
cause prejudice to the government; and (6) whether
withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste
judicial resources.
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United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000).
“To prevail on [the fourth] factor, [a defendant] must
demonstrate (1) that his counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.” United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 416 (4th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have thoroughly
reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s denial of Baker’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.
Baker argues that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying
an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2009); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d
330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009). Based upon our review of the record
and the district court’s statements at sentencing, we conclude
that Baker has failed to demonstrate that the sentence is
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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