United States v. Robert Stewart

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4237
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT STEWART,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge.
(1:13-cr-00262-ELH-1)
Submitted: October 14, 2014 Decided: October 24, 2014
Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Julie L.B. Johnson,
Appellate Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L. Dwyer, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raishay Lin, Student Law Clerk,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Stewart appeals the 180-month armed career
criminal sentence imposed by the district court pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012) following his guilty plea to possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Stewart contends that the
district court erred in imposing a statutory mandatory minimum
sentence because such sentences conflict with the mandate of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) to impose a sentence that is “sufficient
but not greater than necessary.” Stewart also contends that the
court increased his statutory maximum sentence based on facts
that were not charged in the indictment or submitted to a jury,
in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Stewart first contends that the § 924(e) mandatory
minimum conflicts with the sentencing mandate of § 3553(a). We
disagree. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2012), courts must
sentence a defendant in accordance with § 3553(a) “[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a). “Thus,
the general sentencing provisions in § 3553(a) give way to
specific mandatory sentencing provisions elsewhere in the
criminal code.” United States v. Carter, 696 F.3d 229, 232 (2d
Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526, 529
(8th Cir. 2010). Moreover, “[c]ourts have uniformly rejected
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the claim that § 3553(a)’s ‘no greater than necessary’ language
authorizes a district court to sentence below the statutory
minimum.” United States v. Cirilo-Munoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st
Cir. 2009) (collecting cases); see United States v. Robinson,
404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005) “([A] district court has no
discretion to impose a sentence outside of the statutory range
established by Congress for the offense of conviction.”).
Second, Stewart contends that the district court
violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by increasing his
statutory maximum term of imprisonment based on prior
convictions that were neither alleged in the indictment nor
submitted to a jury. This claim is, however, foreclosed by
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–35 (1998).
See United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 124 (4th Cir. 2014)
(stating that “Almendarez–Torres remains good law”), petition
for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13–
10640); United States v. Graham, 711 F.3d 445 (4th Cir.) (“[W]e
are bound by Almendarez—Torres unless and until the Supreme
Court says otherwise.”), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 449 (2013).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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