United States v. Renauld Curtis

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4280
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RENAULD SYLVESTER CURTIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:04-cr-00050-BR-1)
Submitted: September 26, 2014 Decided: October 16, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Renauld Sylvester Curtis appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
eighteen months’ imprisonment. Curtis contends that his
sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable
because the court considered an impermissible sentencing factor.
Because Curtis did not raise this issue in the district court,
review is for plain error. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638,
640 (4th Cir. 2013). Under plain error review, Curtis must show
that (1) the court erred, (2) the error was clear and obvious,
and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. Id. at 640-
41. Even if Curtis meets his burden, we retain discretion to
recognize the error and will deny relief unless the error
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 641 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Finding no error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” Webb, 738 F.3d
at 640. We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory
maximum and not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining
whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, this
court first assesses the sentence for unreasonableness,
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following the procedural and substantive considerations that are
at issue during its review of original sentences. Id. at 438-
39. In this initial inquiry, we take a more “deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.”
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In exercising its discretion, the district court “is
guided by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal
Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory factors applicable
to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).”
Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. “Chapter Seven instructs that, in
fashioning a revocation sentence, ‘the court should sanction
primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into
account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying
violation and the criminal history of the violator.’” Id.
(quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b)
(2012)). In determining the length of a sentence imposed upon
revocation of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012)
requires a sentencing court to consider all but two of the
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). One of the excluded
factors is the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
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just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A),
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court properly
calculates the Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statement
range and explains the sentence adequately after considering the
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors it is
permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation case.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
states a proper basis for concluding the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we “then decide
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439. A
sentence is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously
unreasonable. Id.We have recognized that “[a]lthough § 3583(e)
enumerates the factors a district court should consider when
formulating a revocation sentence, it does not expressly
prohibit a court from referencing other relevant factors omitted
from the statute.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. As long as a court
does not base a revocation sentence predominately on the
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§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations
does not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable
when those factors are relevant to, and considered in
conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at
642.
We conclude that the district court imposed the
eighteen month sentence predominately on permitted factors and
referenced “respect for the law” in conjunction with the need to
sanction Curtis for his breach of trust and to deter him and
others from violating conditions of release in the future. See
Webb, 738 F.3d at 642 (references to omitted sentencing factors
were related to references to permissible sentencing factors).
Accordingly, we find no procedural or substantive error with the
sentence. Even if there was error, Curtis has not shown that
the district court would have imposed a sentence below the low
end of the Chapter Seven Guidelines sentence.
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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