United States v. Terrence McNeill

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4902
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRENCE MAURICE MCNEILL, a/k/a Lil’ Fred,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00031-BR-1)
Submitted: April 22, 2013 Decided: July 5, 2013
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeffrey William Gillette, GILLETTE LAW FIRM, PLLC, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrence Maurice McNeill appeals the district court’s
amended judgment resentencing him to the mandatory minimum sixty
months in prison after he pled guilty to distributing fifty
grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006). McNeill’s attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting, in his opinion, that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but raising the issue of whether the district court’s
judgment was “unreasonable, imposing a sentence of 60 months to
run consecutively to Mr. McNeill’s sentence upon the revocation
of his supervised release.” McNeill has filed a pro se
supplemental brief raising the additional issue of whether he
“should [have been] charge[d] for the actual amount” of cocaine
base rather than the total weight of the mixture. We affirm.
We review a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The first step in this review requires us to ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or
failing to adequately explain the sentence. United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). If the sentence is
procedurally reasonable, we then consider the substantive
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reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We
presume that a sentence within or below a properly calculated
Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v.
Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). Moreover, a
statutorily required sentence is per se reasonable. United
States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
McNeill’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable,
and the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in
sentencing him. The district court did not err in finding that
McNeill was accountable for 54.7 grams of cocaine base. See
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 459 (1991). To the
extent that McNeill seeks to challenge the drug quantity that he
was charged with distributing or his conviction, we conclude
that he has waived the right to raise this issue. See United
States v. Pileggi, 703 F.3d 675, 680 (4th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644 (4th Cir. 2004).
We further conclude that the district court did not
err or abuse its discretion in denying McNeill’s request to run
his mandatory minimum sentence concurrently with his previous
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release in
another criminal case based on the new criminal conduct to which
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he pled guilty in this case. The district court recognized that
it had the authority to grant McNeill’s request, but reasonably
determined that it was not warranted in this case. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3(c) & cmt. n.3(C) (2011);
United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 1996).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We deny McNeill’s motion for leave to file supplemental material
as an attachment to his brief.
This court requires that counsel inform his or her
client, in writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If the client
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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