United States v. Fredrick McBride

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4078
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FREDRICK LAMAR MCBRIDE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-01223-PMD-1)
Submitted: July 9, 2013 Decided: July 15, 2013
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jessica Salvini, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Nicholas Bianchi, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Nathan S. Williams, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Fredrick Lamar McBride appeals the 188-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea on remand to possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006). * On appeal, McBride’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether the sentence imposed by the district court on remand was
reasonable. McBride was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but did not file one. Finding no error, we
affirm.
The sole issue raised in the Anders brief is whether
McBride’s sentence on remand was reasonable. In reviewing a
sentence, we must first ensure that the district court did not
commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to
properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United States, 552
*
We previously affirmed McBride’s conviction for possession
of a firearm or ammunition by a convicted felon but vacated his
sentence on that conviction; we also vacated his convictions for
the instant § 841(a)(1) charge and a charge of possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and remanded
for additional proceedings. See United States v. McBride, 676
F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2012). The “possession in furtherance”
charge was dismissed on remand pursuant to a plea agreement
between McBride and the Government.
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U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Once we have determined that there is no
procedural error, we must consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. If the sentence imposed is
within the appropriate Guidelines range, we consider it
presumptively reasonable. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d
210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008). The presumption may be rebutted by a
showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Upon review, we conclude that the district court
committed no procedural or substantive error in imposing the
188-month sentence on remand. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d
572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s amended judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform McBride, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If McBride requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on McBride. We dispense with oral argument because
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the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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