United States v. Christian Bowles

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4910
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTIAN RYAN BOWLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:19-cr-00122-1)
Submitted: December 17, 2021 Decided: January 3, 2022
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian D. Yost, HOLROYD & YOST, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Michael
B. Stuart, United States Attorney, Courtney L. Cremeans, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christian Ryan Bowles appeals his conviction and 121-month sentence pursuant to
a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In his plea agreement, Bowles
reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Bowles contends
on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because
exigent circumstances did not exist to render the warrantless search and seizure of his
property reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review factual
findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d
370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and “must also give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges and law enforcement officers.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We
“particularly defer to a district court’s credibility determinations” and will only “reverse a
lower court’s finding of fact” if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. While warrantless searches and seizures are therefore presumptively
unreasonable, “the exigencies of the situation [may] make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (brackets and internal quotation
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marks omitted). “What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding
the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.” United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). “[T]he permissibility of a particular
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983). However, while the application
of this doctrine requires a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, only a few
emergent situations rise to the level of exigent circumstances, namely, the need to “pursue
a fleeing suspect,” “protect individuals who are threatened with imminent harm,” and
“prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2223 (2018) (citing King, 563 U.S. at 460 & n.3).
The third situation allows officers to conduct a warrantless search and seizure
“where [the] officers (1) have probable cause to believe that evidence of illegal activity is
present, and (2) reasonably believe that evidence may be destroyed or removed before they
could obtain a warrant.” United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To successfully assert this exception to the warrant requirement,
police need to “possess a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that such circumstances exist at the time
of the search or seizure in question.” Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2002).
Police “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Some of the factors to consider in determining whether an exigent
circumstance reasonably justifies a warrantless search include:
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(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to
obtain a warrant; (2) the officers’ reasonable belief that the contraband is
about to be removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to police
guarding the site; (4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband
are aware that the police are on their trail; and (5) the ready destructibility of
the contraband.
United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Turner,
650 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1981)).
Based on these factors and the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the
district court did not err in finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
search and seizure of Bowles’ property. When the officer seized the evidence, he had
probable cause to believe that illegal activity was afoot that involved Bowles, including the
flight of a suspect involved in an ongoing drug investigation immediately after he
completed a controlled sale of methamphetamine. Also, Bowles had just retrieved mason
jars—objects that the investigating officers immediately identified as potential vessels for
methamphetamine—from the residence of another suspect in the drug investigation and
had attempted to hide them. Additionally, it was reasonable for the officer to believe that
the evidence would have been imminently destroyed or removed but for his warrantless
seizure of the evidence, given that the drug suspect had fled into the woods where Bowles
had hidden the jars and could have retrieved them during his flight. Thus, we discern no
error in the district court’s conclusion that Bowles’ Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated and, on that basis, denying Bowles’ motion to suppress.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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