Bintou Jawara v. Eric Holder, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1997
BINTOU JAWARA, a/k/a Ide Nji, a/k/a Awa Sillah,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: March 28, 2013 Decided: April 25, 2013
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas V. Massucci, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Stuart
F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas
B. Fatouros, Senior Litigation Counsel, Julie M. Iversen, Office
of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bintou Jawara, a native and citizen of The Gambia,
petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the immigration
judge’s order denying her applications for asylum and
withholding of removal. 1 We deny the petition for review.
“Withholding of removal is available under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) if the alien shows that it is more likely than not
that her life or freedom would be threatened in the country of
removal because of her race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Gomis v.
Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “This is a more stringent standard than that
for asylum . . . . [and], while asylum is discretionary, if an
alien establishes eligibility for withholding of removal, the
grant is mandatory.” Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d
351, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted)
(alteration added).
A determination regarding eligibility for withholding
of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on
1
Jawara has affirmatively waived her challenge to the
finding that her asylum application was frivolous. In addition,
before the immigration judge, Jawara withdrew her application
for relief under the Convention Against Torture.
2
the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of fact,
including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the
[Board’s] interpretation of the INA and any attendant
regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th
Cir. 2008). This court will reverse the Board only if “the
evidence . . . presented was so compelling that no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of
persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v.
INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
Credibility findings are reviewed for substantial
evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony
on credibility grounds must offer a “specific, cogent reason”
for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Examples of specific and
cogent reasons include inconsistent statements, contradictory
evidence, and inherently improbable testimony[.]” Tewabe v.
Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Likewise, “the immigration judge
cannot reject documentary evidence without specific, cogent
reasons why the documents are not credible.” Kourouma v.
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Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 2009). An adverse
credibility determination based on minor discrepancies or
inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of an applicant’s
claim cannot constitute substantial evidence. 2 Dankam v.
Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2007); see also
Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
adverse credibility claims as it relates to Jawara’s contention
that she was the victim of female genital mutilation (“FGM”).
The immigration judge found that Jawara’s testimony regarding
the events leading up to the FGM procedure was not consistent
with her written statement. We conclude that the immigration
judge’s findings in this regard were not minor discrepancies but
go to the core of Jawara’s claim. See Dankam, 495 F.3d at 122(details that surround the event that is the basis for the claim
for relief are more than minor or trivial details). Other
evidence in the record, such as the whereabouts of Jawara’s
husband, whether he was missing and when he first arrived in the
United States, as well as evidence that raised questions about
Jawara’s true identity, are also not minor details and lend
support to the adverse credibility finding.
2
Jawara’s application was filed prior to the effective date
for The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231.
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We also conclude that Jawara’s independent evidence
did not support her claim. The immigration judge provided
specific and cogent reasons for questioning the reliability of
the doctor’s letter that diagnosed Jawara as having FGM Type II.
In addition, The State Department’s Report on Female Genital
Mutilation for The Gambia was not conclusive evidence that
Jawara was the victim of FGM. Kourouma, 588 F.3d at 242.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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