United States v. Jackson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4342
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LANDIS LAMAR JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00143-JAB)
Submitted: February 21, 2008 Decided: February 26, 2008
Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and Irene M. KEELEY, Chief
United States District Judge for the Northern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scott L. Wilkinson, SCOTT L. WILKINSON & ASSOCIATES, PC, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Landis Lamar Jackson pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a weapon. The district court increased Jackson’s
offense level by four, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) (2005), because it found that he possessed the gun in
connection another felony--here, distribution of cocaine. On
appeal, Jackson alleges that this enhancement was error. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a district court’s findings at sentencing for
clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United States v.
Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989). Jackson argues
that the district court clearly erred by finding that the
Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence, see United
States v. Garnett, 243 F.3d 824, 828 (4th Cir. 2001) (providing
standard), that his possession of the weapon was related to his
felony possession of crack cocaine. While the district court’s
finding that the cocaine and small amount of cash found on Jackson
revealed he was distributing the drug may be clearly erroneous, we
find that Jackson’s admitted possession of cocaine, a felony under
North Carolina law,* was sufficiently connected to his gun
possession to support the enhancement. United States v. Regans,
125 F.3d 685, 686-87 (8th Cir. 1997). We may affirm a sentence
enhancement “on the basis of ‘any conduct [in the record] that
*
See N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(3).
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independently and properly should result in an increase in the
offense level’ by virtue of the enhancement.” United States v.
Garnett, 243 F.3d 824, 830 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting United
States v. Ashers, 968 F.2d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1992)).
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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