Z. W. v. Smith

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1201
Z. W., a minor, by his parents and next
friends G. and J. W.; G. W.; J. W.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
ERIC J. SMITH, officially as Superintendent;
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(1:05-cv-00501-WDQ)
Argued: October 27, 2006 Decided: December 21, 2006
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Duncan joined.
ARGUED: Michael Jeffrey Eig, MICHAEL J. EIG & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
Chevy Chase, Maryland, for Appellants. Eric Charles Brousaides,
Columbia, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Haylie M. Iseman,
MICHAEL J. EIG & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Chevy Chase, Maryland, for
Appellants.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This case considers whether the Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA” or “Act”), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1487 (1997),1
requires Appellee, the Anne Arundel County Public Schools
(“AACPS”),2 to reimburse Appellants, the parents of a learning-
disabled student, for tuition the parents paid to a non-state-
approved private school during the 2002-2003 school year. Because
we believe that AACPS offered the student a free appropriate public
education (“FAPE”) at a state-approved school for the 2002-2003
school year, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny the
parents tuition reimbursement and award AACPS judgment as a matter
of law.
I.
Seventeen-year-old Z.W. has learning disabilities and
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Accordingly, he is a
“child with a disability” to whom the IDEA guarantees a free
appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400(d), 1401(3)(A).
Z.W. attended Maryland’s Anne Arundel County public schools through
1
Because the administrative and district court decisions in
this case were decided under the 1997 Act, before Congress’s
reauthorization of the IDEA in 2004, our opinion cites to the 1997
Act.
2
More specifically, Appellees are (1) Eric Smith,
Superintendent of AACPS, and (2) the Board of Education of Anne
Arundel County, which operates AACPS.
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the end of the 1999-2000 school year but encountered academic and
emotional problems there. These problems led his parents to enroll
him, at their own expense, in a non-public day school, The Lab
School of Washington, Baltimore Campus (“Baltimore Lab”), for the
2000-2001 school year. Subsequently, his parents and AACPS entered
into a settlement agreement by which AACPS agreed to provide public
funding for Z.W. to attend Baltimore Lab the next year—the 2001-
2002 school year—as well.
On May 6, 2002, a team including Z.W.’s parents met to develop
an individualized education program (“IEP”) for him. The team
discussed Z.W.’s progress at Baltimore Lab and determined his
placement for the 2002-2003 school year. At the meeting, AACPS
confirmed that it did not have an appropriate public school
placement for Z.W. and agreed to fund his education at a non-public
day school. The parents requested that AACPS maintain Z.W.’s
current placement at Baltimore Lab, but AACPS informed them that
Baltimore Lab had not yet received approval from the Maryland State
Department of Education (“MSDE”) as a fundable non-public special
education school. AACPS instead referred Z.W. for admission to
High Road Academy (“High Road”), a non-public special education
school in Maryland that was approved by the MSDE. High Road
accepted Z.W. on June 10, 2002.
The parents visited High Road that summer but feared that a
change in placement would impair Z.W.’s social, emotional, and
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academic progress. They therefore, at their own expense, continued
his placement at Baltimore Lab for the 2002-2003 school year.
During the summer of 2003, MSDE approved Baltimore Lab as a
fundable non-public special education school. AACPS then agreed to
place Z.W. at the Baltimore Lab for the 2003-2004 school year.
Z.W. now attends Baltimore Lab with public funding from AACPS.
On April 16, 2004, the parents requested a due process hearing
on the grounds that AACPS failed to provide Z.W. with a FAPE for
the 2002-2003 school year, when AACPS attempted to send Z.W. to
High Road. The parents sought reimbursement for their placement of
Z.W. at Baltimore Lab that year. After a hearing on June 24, 2004,
the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision concluding
that AACPS was not obligated to reimburse the parents because: (1)
AACPS had offered Z.W. a FAPE at High Road for the 2002-2003 school
year, and (2) the parents had not given proper notice to AACPS of
their intent to enroll Z.W. at Baltimore Lab rather than High Road
for the 2002-2003 school year.
The parents appealed, and the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland. On January 5, 2006, the district court ruled
in AACPS’s favor, upholding the ALJ’s decision that the parents
were not entitled to reimbursement because they did not comply with
the IDEA’s notice requirements. The district court did not reach
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the question of whether AACPS had offered a FAPE to Z.W. for the
2002-2003 school year.
II.
Ordinarily, this Court reviews a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo. In IDEA cases, however, this Court
conducts “a modified de novo review, giving ‘due weight’ to the
underlying administrative proceedings.” MM ex rel. DM v. Sch.
Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)).
Administrative findings of fact in IDEA cases “are entitled to
prima facie correctness;” when the district court does not follow
those findings, it must explain why not. Doyle v. Arlington County
Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991). “After giving the
administrative fact-findings such due weight, if any, the district
court then is free to decide the case on the preponderance of the
evidence, as required by the statute.” Id.; see also 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1415(i)(2)(B).3
3
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(B) provides in full: “In any action
brought under this paragraph, the court—(i) shall receive the
records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear
additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its
decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such
relief as the court determines is appropriate.”
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III.
Congress enacted the IDEA largely “to ensure that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education” to meet their unique needs. 20 U.S.C.A. §
1400(d)(1)(A). See generally id. § 1400(d) (describing purposes of
the IDEA). The statute defines the term “free appropriate public
education” as special education and related services that (1) have
been provided at the public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge; (2) meet the standards of the state
educational agency; (3) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the state; and (4)
conform with the IEP required by the statute. Id. § 1401(8).
States qualify for federal funds under the IDEA by adopting
policies and procedures consistent with the statute. Id. §
1412(a). A major condition for federal funding is that state and
local education agencies develop an IEP for each eligible child
before the beginning of each school year. Id. § 1412(a)(4). The
statute also requires that state or local educational agencies pay
for a child’s private school tuition when the agencies place the
child in, or refer the child to, a private school to comply with
the IDEA. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i). When parents unilaterally
place a child into private school, a court or hearing officer may
require the agency to reimburse the parents if “the agency had not
made a [FAPE] available to the child in a timely manner” before the
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parents enrolled the child in private school. Id. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The IDEA limits, however, parents’ right to
reimbursement:
The cost of reimbursement . . . may be reduced or denied—
(I) if—
(aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the
parents attended prior to removal of the child
from the public school, the parents did not
inform the IEP Team that they were rejecting
the placement proposed by the public agency to
provide a free appropriate public education to
their child, including stating their concerns
and their intent to enroll their child in a
private school at public expense; or
(bb) 10 business days (including any holidays
that occur on a business day) prior to the
removal of the child from the public school,
the parents did not give written notice to the
public agency of the information described in
item (aa) . . . .
Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).
IV.
Although the district court ruled on the issue of whether
Z.W.’s parents had complied with the IDEA’s notice requirements, it
did not address the ALJ’s finding that AACPS was not obligated to
reimburse the parents because High Road would have provided Z.W.
with a FAPE. It is on this latter ground, however, that we affirm
the district court’s decision to grant AACPS judgment as a matter
of law. See Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir.
2003) (“We are, of course, entitled to affirm on any ground
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appearing in the record, including theories not relied upon or
rejected by the district court.”).
The IDEA’s requirements regarding a FAPE are “modest.” A.B.
ex rel. D.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 325 (4th Cir. 2004). A
school system satisfies its statutory obligation when it provides
sufficient personalized instruction and support services to “permit
the child to benefit educationally.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
Otherwise stated, “a FAPE must be reasonably calculated to confer
some educational benefit on a disabled child.” MM, 303 F.3d at 526(emphasis added); see also Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927
F.2d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 1991) (“In essence, an appropriate
education is one which allows the child to make educational
progress.”). The IDEA’s requirements are this modest, according to
the Supreme Court, because Congress intended the IDEA to increase
access to public education more so than to “guarantee any
particular level of education once inside.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at
192. Thus, the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hatever Congress
meant by an ‘appropriate’ education, it is clear that it did not
mean a potential-maximizing education.” Id. at 197 n.21.
In reviewing administrative proceedings to decide whether a
school system has provided a FAPE, courts “by no means [have] an
invitation . . . to substitute their own notions of sound
educational policy for those of the school authorities they
review.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. This Court “must defer to
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educators’ decisions as long as an IEP provided the child the basic
floor of opportunity that access to special education and related
services provides.” Tice v. Botetourt County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d
1200, 1207 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the administrative hearing, Z.W.’s stepmother and two IEP
team members confirmed that the parents and AACPS agreed on the
substance of the IEP. They merely disagreed on whether Baltimore
Lab or High Road was the appropriate school at which to implement
the IEP. Three experts in special education testified on behalf of
AACPS that placement at High Road would have provided Z.W. with an
educational benefit. These experts were the executive director of
High Road, who had reviewed Z.W.’s record before hosting his
parents’ visit to High Road during the summer of 2002; the
chairperson of the IEP, who had placed students successfully at
High Road in the past; and Z.W.’s case manager, who had observed
Z.W. at Baltimore Lab and had observed the program at High Road.
Two witnesses testified on behalf of the parents that
Baltimore Lab would have been the appropriate placement. They were
Z.W.’s stepmother and the principal of Baltimore Lab. The
principal conceded that she did not know the program at High Road
well enough to comment upon its appropriateness for Z.W. Moreover,
the principal explained that she did not participate in the IEP
team meeting because she had just assumed her position. The
principal merely testified that she felt Baltimore Lab was an
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appropriate placement for Z.W. because he was making progress
there. Neither the principal nor Z.W.’s stepmother testified that
High Road would be unable to provide Z.W. with an educational
benefit. Z.W.’s stepmother testified that High Road could provide
Z.W. with some level of educational benefit and that the school was
not inappropriate per se. She and her husband simply thought High
Road “didn’t seem to be the type of total educationally [sic]
program that we think is best for [Z.W.]” because the school lacked
a strong focus on the arts and appeared to afford students less
social interaction. J.A. 51. Z.W.’s stepmother also testified
that she and her husband opposed placement at High Road because
Z.W. would resist the transition.
After reviewing this and other testimony about Z.W., High
Road, and Baltimore Lab, the ALJ concluded that, despite the
schools’ slight differences (namely, High Road is state-approved
and aspires to mainstream students whereas Baltimore Lab was not
approved at the time and had an arts program), both would offer
Z.W. a FAPE. The ALJ further concluded that “[t]he weight of the
expert testimony is against the Parents’ position concerning the
adversity of a move upon the Student.” J.A. 697. Only the
Baltimore Lab principal corroborated the parents’ view that a move
to High Road would be detrimental to Z.W., the ALJ noted, and no
testimony showed that such detriment, if any, would otherwise deny
a FAPE at High Road. Thus, the ALJ concluded, “[e]ven if Lab were
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an MSDE approved school at the time of the unilateral placement, I
would be compelled to give weight to the IEP Team’s recommendation
of High Roads [sic].” J.A. 698.
The ALJ’s factual findings, which this Court must presume
correct, are, upon review, fully supported by the record. See
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. The ALJ properly deferred to the views of
educational authorities and searched only for evidence that High
Road could meet the modest IDEA requirement that a state agency’s
placement provide some educational benefit. See A.B., 354 F.3d at
325; MM, 303 F.3d at 526; Tice, 908 F.2d at 1207.
The ALJ did not, as the parents argue, disregard the testimony
of Z.W.’s stepmother and the Baltimore Lab principal. By contrast,
the ALJ considered their testimony and found that the testimony of
AACPS’s expert witnesses outweighed it. Here, as in A.B., 354 F.3d
at 328, “[t]he ALJ correctly recognized that while AACPS and [the
parents’] experts disagreed, IDEA requires great deference to the
views of the school system rather than those of even the most
well-meaning parent.” Deference in this situation was warranted
especially because the testimony by AACPS’s experts shows that
AACPS applied its expertise to Z.W.’s unique situation. Cf.
McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Where
there is no indication that the school officials’ expertise has
been brought to bear on the individual needs of the handicapped
child . . . the deference granted will be commensurately lower.”).
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Perhaps more importantly, allegations like that of Z.W.’s
stepmother that one school “is better than” another “do not state
a meritorious cause of action” under the IDEA. Hessler v. State
Bd. of Educ. of Md., 700 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 1983); see id.(“[B]ecause a given educational placement is allegedly more
appropriate than another, it does not follow that the less
appropriate program is ‘not appropriate’ within the meaning of the
Act.”). Thus we find that the ALJ’s factual findings and ultimate
determination that High Road offered Z.W. a FAPE were correct.
The parents’ arguments to the contrary fail. The parents
argue, for example, that the record is devoid of evidence that High
Road is a better placement for Z.W. or that Baltimore Lab was not
meeting his needs. This argument, however, misunderstands the
standard. Rather, “[t]he FAPE must only be calculated to confer
some educational benefit on a disabled child.” A.B., 354 F.3d at
319 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The ALJ found
that placement at High Road met this burden.
The parents further argue that the ALJ should have decided
that keeping Z.W. at Baltimore Lab was the proper course of action
because courts have held that the IDEA favors maintaining the
status quo when a child is already receiving an appropriate
education. The cases cited by the parents (none of them decisions
of this Court) for this proposition are inapposite. Those cases
involve a court’s determination that a child should not be moved
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during the final year of high school, in the middle of the school
year, or when the court lacks any evidence that the proposed school
could actually meet the child’s needs. See Hale v. Poplar Bluffs,
R-I Sch. Dist., 280 F.3d 831, 833 (8th Cir. 2002); Block v. Dist.
of Columbia, 748 F. Supp. 891, 895 (D.D.C. 1990); Holmes v. Dist.
of Columbia, 680 F. Supp. 40, 41-42 (D.D.C. 1988). These
circumstances do not apply to Z.W.
Lastly, the parents argue that AACPS has not cited any legal,
policy, or educational rationale for moving Z.W. from Baltimore Lab
to High Road for the 2002-2003 school year. The record does not
support this argument. AACPS stated at the IEP meeting, and has
maintained throughout this litigation, that it could not place Z.W.
at Baltimore Lab for the 2002-2003 year because Baltimore Lab was
not yet state-approved. AACPS was able to fund Z.W.’s education at
Baltimore during the 2001-2002 year only because the funding was
pursuant to a settlement agreement, not an IEP team decision.
Outside of settlement, AACPS maintains, it has no authority to
place students in non-approved schools. The parents refute all of
these contentions. Although the ALJ did not reach this issue, we
note that the weight of the evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, supports AACPS’s contentions, as does the caselaw and
the statute itself. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(B)
(providing that when public agencies place children in private
schools, “the State educational agency shall determine whether such
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schools and facilities meet standards that apply to State
educational agencies”); Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four,
950 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993)
(holding that the unilateral placement of a student by the parents
in an unapproved school is not by itself a bar to tuition
reimbursement, but public schools may not place students in
unapproved schools).
In sum, the record fully supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
AACPS’s proposed placement at High Road for the 2002-2003 school
year offered Z.W. a FAPE and therefore precluded the parents’
request for tuition reimbursement. Having decided the case on this
ground, we do not reach the second question presented to this
Court: whether the district court properly denied the parents’
request for tuition reimbursement based on their failure to comply
with the IDEA’s notice requirements.
V.
Because AACPS offered to Z.W. a FAPE at High Road for the
2002-2003 school year, the district court’s decision to grant AACPS
judgment as a matter of law is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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