United States v. David Jackson, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4260
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID JACKSON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00401-JMC-1)
Submitted: October 12, 2017 Decided: November 17, 2017
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Beth Drake, United States Attorney, John C. Potterfield, Assistant United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Jackson, Jr., appeals the 140-month sentence imposed upon him after he
pled guilty to one count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012).
Jackson asserts that neither his prior Georgia robbery conviction, nor his prior Georgia
attempted robbery conviction, qualify as a “crime of violence” to support the career
offender enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 4B1.1
(2016). We agree and vacate and remand to the district court for resentencing.
Where, as here, “a party repeats on appeal a claim of procedural sentencing error
. . . which it has made before the district court, we review for abuse of discretion” and
will “reverse unless we conclude that the error was harmless.” United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). “In assessing whether a district court properly calculated
the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, including its application of any sentencing
enhancements, this Court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Horton, 693 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and italics omitted).
Under USSG § 4B1.1(a), a defendant is a career offender if he was older than
eighteen years of age when he committed the instant offense, the instant offense is a
felony that is a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense” as defined by the
Guidelines, and the defendant has two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence”
or a “controlled substance offense[.]” A “crime of violence” for purposes of the career
offender Guideline is any offense under federal or state law that is punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that:
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(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another [the force clause], or
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a
forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful
possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive
material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c) [the enumerated offense clause].
USSG § 4B1.2(a). The application notes indicate that a “‘crime of violence’ include[s]
. . . the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such
offenses.” USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1.
In determining whether an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under either
the force or enumerated offense clauses, this court may employ either the “categorical
approach” or the “modified categorical approach.” The categorical approach applies
when a defendant was convicted of an offense under “an ‘indivisible’ statute—i.e., one
not containing alternative elements[.]” Descamps v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___,
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). Under the categorical approach, courts are directed to
examine only the elements of the state offense and the fact of conviction, not the
defendant’s particular conduct in committing the offense. Id. Moreover, this court must
“focus on the minimum conduct” required to sustain a conviction for the state crime, and
there must be a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that a state would
actually punish particular conduct under the statute. United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d
793, 803 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court looks to state
court decisions to determine the minimum conduct needed to commit a particular offense,
see id., and to identify the elements required by the state offense, see United States v.
Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 2013).
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In contrast, “the modified approach . . . helps effectuate the categorical analysis
when a divisible statute, listing potential offense elements in the alternative, renders
opaque which element played a part in the defendant’s conviction.” Descamps, 133 S.
Ct. at 2283. This approach applies in a “narrow range of cases” where the offense
defined by the relevant statute includes conduct such that some commissions of the
offense constitute crimes of violence, while others do not. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). When conducting the modified categorical approach, a court may “look beyond
the statutory elements” of the offense to the specific conduct underlying that prior
offense. Id. at 2284. In doing so, a sentencing court may consider Shepard 1-approved
sources, such as “the record of conviction, which includes the charging document, the
plea agreement, and the transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual findings
made by the trial court.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 2012).
In Georgia, “robbery” occurs when, “with intent to commit theft,” an individual
“takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another: (1)
[b]y use of force; (2) [b]y intimidation, by the use of threat or coercion, or by placing
such person in fear of immediate serious bodily injury to himself or to another; or (3) [b]y
sudden snatching.” Ga. Code Ann. § 16-8-40(a) (2017). The Supreme Court of Georgia
has acknowledged that “[w]hen the Code speaks of force, it means actual violence” and
“implies actual personal violence, a struggle and a personal outrage.” Nelson v. State, 46
S.E.2d 488, 493-94 (Ga. 1948). Similarly, “[a] conviction for robbery by intimidation
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Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
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requires proof that the theft was attended with such circumstances of terror—such
threatening by word or gesture, as in common experience, are likely to create an
apprehension of danger, and induce a person to part with his property for the safety of his
person.” Smith v. State, 543 S.E.2d 434, 435 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (internal brackets and
ellipses omitted). In contrast, “[r]obbery by sudden snatching is where no other force is
used than is necessary to obtain possession of the property from the owner, who is off his
guard, and where there is no resistance by the owner or injury to his person.” King v.
State, 447 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
Thus, while convictions for robbery “[b]y use of force” under subsection (a)(1)
and “[b]y intimidation” under subsection (a)(2) likely qualify as proper career offender
predicates under the Guidelines’ force clause, see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 280
F.3d 1149, 1158-59 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that Georgia conviction for robbery by
intimidation is a violent felony under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA)), “robbery by sudden snatching” would not. Therefore, if the district court
should have applied the categorical approach to determine the predicate status of
Jackson’s prior Georgia convictions, Jackson’s prior Georgia convictions could not be
classified as proper career offender predicates. See Gardner, 823 F.3d at 803; see also
United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 498 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen a statute defines an
offense using a single, indivisible set of elements that allows for both violent and
nonviolent means of commission, the offense is not a categorical crime of violence.”).
Cf. United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 341–42 (4th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that, because
the Maryland offense of second-degree assault has an indivisible set of elements that may
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be committed by either violent or nonviolent means, it does not qualify categorically as
an ACCA “violent felony”). Accordingly, we must determine whether the Georgia
robbery statute under which Jackson was previously convicted is divisible (i.e., contains
alternative elements), thereby justifying the district court’s application of the modified
categorical approach.
To determine whether the Georgia statute is divisible, thereby allowing for use of
the modified categorical approach, we must determine whether the various circumstances
listed in § 16-8-40(a) are “elements or means” under which Georgia robbery may be
committed. See Mathis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256
(2016). The Supreme Court has explained that “‘[e]lements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of
a crime’s legal definition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a
conviction.’” Id. at 2248 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)). “At a
trial, [elements] are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the
defendant, and at a plea hearing, they are what the defendant necessarily admits when he
pleads guilty[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted).
“Facts, by contrast, are mere real-world things—extraneous to the crime’s legal
requirements.” Id. “They are ‘circumstances’ or ‘events’ having no ‘legal effect or
consequence’: In particular, they need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a
defendant.” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 709) (internal brackets omitted). In other
words, “[a] statute is indivisible when the jury need not agree on anything past the fact
that the statute was violated.” Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 498 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Any statutory phrase that—explicitly or implicitly—refers to multiple,
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alternative means of commission must still be regarded as indivisible if the jurors need
not agree on which method of committing the offense the defendant used.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, “mere use of the disjunctive ‘or’ in the definition of a
crime does not automatically render it divisible.” Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192,
194 (4th Cir. 2014). Rather, “[o]nly when the law requires that in order to convict the
defendant the jury must unanimously agree that he committed a particular substantive
offense contained within the disjunctively worded statute are we able to conclude that the
statute contains alternative elements and not alternative means.” Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 798
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
To decide whether a statute’s alternative items are elements or means, a court must
consult “authoritative sources of state law[.]” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. For example,
the Supreme Court in Mathis relied on a “state court decision [that] definitively
answer[ed] the question” that a burglary statute listed alternative means of satisfying a
single locational element, such that a jury need not agree on which location was involved
in the offense. Id. Mathis also held that “[i]f statutory alternatives carry different
punishments, then . . . they must be elements.” Id. In addition, the Supreme Court
suggested that courts may look to “the record of a prior conviction itself” to see how the
crime is charged, since “an indictment and jury instructions could indicate, by referencing
one alternative term to the exclusion of all others, that the statute contains a list of
elements, each one of which goes toward a separate crime.” Id. at 2257. Based on the
relevant caselaw and Georgia’s jury instructions, we conclude that the methods listed in
§ 16-8-40 are “means” rather than “elements[.]” See Hogan v. State, 343 S.E.2d 770,
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771-72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that “the crime of robbery requires proof that
one, with the intent to commit theft, took property from the person or immediate presence
of another by employment of one of the various alternative means enumerated in . . .
§ 16–8–40(a)” (emphasis in original)); see also Kilpatrick v. State, 618 S.E.2d 719, 720
(Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing that Georgia’s robbery statute “outlines . . . . alternative
ways in which a person can commit the offense of robbery” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, in Gardner, this court found that common law robbery in North
Carolina was an indivisible crime because North Carolina’s Pattern Jury Instructions
define the final element of the offense as “‘the taking . . . by violence or by putting the
person in fear.’” Gardner, 823 F.3d at 802 (citing N.C. Pattern Instructions—Crim.
217.10). Thus, we concluded that a “jury need not agree unanimously that the felonious
taking was committed by the use of violence or by instilling fear, only that one of the two
means was employed.” Id. at 802-03. “Accordingly, North Carolina common law
robbery may be committed by the alternate means of violence or fear that do not
constitute different elements of distinct crimes [and t]he crime, therefore, is an indivisible
offense, in which the modified categorical approach has no role to play.” Id. at 803
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Similar to North Carolina’s Pattern Jury Instructions upon which we relied in
Gardner, Georgia’s Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions defining § 16-8-40 provide that:
A person commits robbery when, with intent to commit theft, that person
takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of
another (by use of force) (by intimidation) (by use of threat or coercion) (by
placing such person in fear of immediate serious bodily injury to that
person or to another) (by suddenly snatching). The essential elements of
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the offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are that the
taking was done
1) with the purpose to commit theft,
2) against the will of the person robbed, and
3) by force, by intimidation, by the use of threat or coercion, by
placing such person or another in fear of immediate serious bodily
injury to himself/herself or another, or by sudden snatching.
See Georgia Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal, Vol II, 2.60.10 (4th ed. 2017). Under
this instruction, a jury need not agree unanimously that the felonious taking was
committed by the use of force, by intimidation, or by sudden snatching, but only that one
of those means was employed. Accordingly, Georgia’s own Pattern Jury Instructions
supports the conclusion that Georgia’s robbery statute is indivisible, thereby requiring
application of the categorical approach. See Gardner, 823 F.3d at 802-03.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Georgia’s robbery statute is indivisible.
Since only two forms of robbery listed in the statute likely satisfy the career offender
force clause, see supra, a prior Georgia robbery conviction may not categorically be
classified as a career offender predicate under the Guidelines’ force clause. Accordingly,
it was error for the district court to employ the modified categorical approach to
determine if the career offender enhancement should be applied to Jackson’s base offense
level.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the career offender enumerated
offense clause specifically references robbery as a proper career offender predicate. See
USSG § 4B1.1(a)(2). Because Georgia’s robbery statute is indivisible, however, robbery
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in Georgia can only be a “crime of violence” under the Guideline’s enumerated offense
clause if the conduct criminalized by the Georgia statute is no broader than that
criminalized by the generic offense of robbery. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 598 (1990). To determine the career offender predicate status under the enumerated
offense clause, we must first distill a generic definition of the predicate offense based on
how the offense is defined by a majority of the States, learned treatises, and the Model
Penal Code (MPC), and after finding the generic form of the predicate offense, determine
whether the defendant’s prior conviction constituted a conviction of the generic offense.
See United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432, 436 (4th Cir. 2011).
Robbery statutes vary widely from state to state and, thus, we look to the manner
in which the MPC defines robbery. Id. According to the MPC, robbery occurs when a
person, in the course of committing a theft: “(a) inflicts serious bodily injury upon
another; (b) threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate serious
bodily injury; or (c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first
or second degree.” Model Penal Code § 222.1 Robbery (Am. Law Inst. 2016). The MPC
explanatory note further explains that “[r]obbery is distinguished from ordinary larceny
by . . . the use or threat of violence.” Id. Under the MPC’s definition of robbery,
violence must be used or threatened in order for a robbery to occur. Because robbery in
Georgia can be committed both violently and non-violently, see supra, we conclude that
Georgia’s robbery statute is categorically broader than the generic definition and, thus,
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Jackson’s prior Georgia robbery convictions are not “crime[s] of violence” under the
career offender enumerated offense clause. 2
Based on the foregoing, we find that it was error for the district court to classify
Jackson as a career offender based on his prior Georgia robbery and attempted robbery
convictions. Accordingly, we vacate Jackson’s sentence and remand to the district court
for resentencing consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
2
Because Jackson’s Georgia robbery conviction is not a proper career offender
predicate, his Georgia attempted robbery conviction is also not a proper career offender
predicate. See United States v. Dozier, 848 F.3d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that to
determine career offender predicate status of attempt conviction, the Court must
“determine whether the state’s definition of attempt categorically comports with the
generic definition of attempt as that term is used in the career-offender enhancement[,]”
and also “whether the underlying state offense is a categorical match for the Guideline
predicate offense” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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