Hall v. Hipps

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DAVID EUGENE HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHARLES HIPPS, Jackson County
District Attorney, in his Individual
and Official Capacity; HAROLD
MCMAHAN, Town of Sylva Chief of
Police, in his Individual and
No. 96-1899
Official Capacity; MARLENE HYATT,
Thirtieth Judicial District Superior
Court Judge, in Her Official
Capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JACKSON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.
Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge; J. Toliver Davis,
Magistrate Judge.
(CA-95-154-D)
Argued: June 2, 1997
Decided: July 25, 1997
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WILKINS and
MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Pamela Anne White, Sylva, North Carolina, for Appel-
lant. David Roy Blackwell, Special Deputy Attorney General,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellees Hipps and Hyatt; Ellen M. Gregg, WOMBLE,
CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
for Appellee McMahan. ON BRIEF: Zeyland G. McKinney, Jr.,
Robbinsville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley,
Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, Raleigh, North Carolina; James P. Erwin, Jr., Special Deputy
Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees Hipps and Hyatt.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Until December 1992, David Hall was employed as a deputy sher-
iff in Jackson County, North Carolina. From June 1989 to July 1992,
Deputy Hall was detailed to a multi-county drug task force, the
Smoky Mountain United Narcotics Investigative Team (SMUNIT), as
the Officer in Charge.
In July 1992, a SMUNIT Board member, Harold McMahan, pro-
posed an audit of SMUNIT's assets and inventory. Charles Hipps, the
local District Attorney, made an ex parte motion in the local Superior
Court to authorize Hipps to take possession of all SMUNIT property
and conduct the audit. On July 24, 1992, Superior Court Judge Mar-
lene Hyatt issued the requested order. As SMUNIT had been effec-
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tively disbanded, Hall returned to his position at the Jackson County
Sheriff's Department, where he remained until retiring for disability
reasons several months later. The SMUNIT investigation continued
for approximately one year. At its conclusion, Hipps issued a report
that was very critical of Hall's management of SMUNIT. Judge Hyatt
then issued an order, making similar findings. However, no criminal
charges were ever filed against Hall.
In July 1995, Hall initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983against McMahan, Hipps, and Hyatt. Hipps and Hyatt moved to dis-
miss; McMahan answered and then moved for judgment on the plead-
ings. In March 1996, the district court granted all three defendants'
motions, but dismissed Hall's state law claims without prejudice,
enabling him to refile them in state court.
We agree with the district court that injury to reputation alone is
not deprivation of a liberty or property interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Since
Hall did not allege deprivation of any other protected interest,* he
failed to state a claim under § 1983 against any of the defendants.
Accordingly, having carefully considered the briefs and arguments of
counsel, we affirm on this reasoning of the district court. See Hall v.
Hipps, No. 1:95cv154 (W.D.N.C. March 1, 1996); Hall v. McMahan,
No. 1:95cv154 (W.D.N.C. March 1, 1996).
AFFIRMED
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*Hall argues that the district court misunderstood his claim as alleging
defamation; instead, he asserts an invasion of his"right to be free of pro-
secutorial actions . . . in which he is repeatedly named and cited but not
prosecuted, when that prosecutorial action is injurious to the Plaintiff's
name, reputation and livelihood." Brief of Appellant at 18. This court has
never recognized such a right and we decline to do so here.
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