United States v. Walker

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-4371
CHRISTOPHER WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Robert E. Payne, District Judge.
(CR-96-123)
Submitted: October 21, 1997
Decided: October 31, 1997
Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
John B. Boatwright, III, BOATWRIGHT & LINKA, Richmond, Vir-
ginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Joan E.
Evans, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Walker was convicted of conspiracy to distribute or to
possess with intent to distribute in excess of fifty grams of cocaine
base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a) (1994) and sentenced to 360
months imprisonment and five years supervised release. He appeals
his sentence, contending that the district court erred by increasing his
base offense level by four levels under USSG § 3B1.1(a)* for his role
as an organizer or leader of criminal activity. Finding no error, we
affirm.
The determination that the defendant was an organizer or leader in
the offense is essentially a factual question reviewable for clear error.
See United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1990). Under
the Sentencing Guidelines, § 3B1.1(a) provides for a four-level
increase in offense level "[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader
of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive." The following factors are to be considered
when distinguishing between a managerial role and an organizational
role: (1) the exercise of decision making authority; (2) the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of
accomplices; (4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime; (5) the degree of participation in planning or organizing the
offense; (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity; and (7) the
degree of control and authority exercised over others. USSG § 3B1.1,
comment. (n.4). We have endorsed enhancements for a defendant's
leadership role in a conspiracy in recruitment and control situations,
such as when the defendant recruited another individual to accom-
pany him on a drug purchasing trip or exercised control over co-
conspirators in the distribution of drugs. See United States v. Kincaid,
964 F.2d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 914 F.2d
565, 569-70 (4th Cir. 1990).
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*U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(a) (1996).
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The record discloses that Walker and his partner of approximately
four years ("Taylor") bought and distributed crack cocaine through a
network of sellers. When Taylor began experiencing problems with
his supplier ("Ashley"), Walker introduced him to his supplier in New
Jersey ("June"). On several occasions, Walker, Taylor, and Ashley
traveled to New Jersey to purchase cocaine from June. Evidence at
trial revealed that several individuals were under Walker's control
during the conspiracy in various ways. Walker supplied at least one
witness with crack cocaine for approximately one year during the
conspiracy; others distributed cocaine at the street level for Walker.
Two witnesses testified they often picked up the cocaine on behalf of
Walker and accompanied Walker at his direction for drug-related
exchanges while others drove for Walker and delivered crack cocaine
to his customers. There was also testimony that at least one person
"cooked" crack at Walker's direction. In addition, at trial Taylor
implicated at least six other individuals in the conspiracy.
We therefore find no clear error in the sentencing court's applica-
tion of § 3B1.1(a) in increasing Walker's offense level. Accordingly,
we affirm Walker's conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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