Allied Colloids, Inc v. Jadair, Incorporated

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
ALLIED COLLOIDS, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-2078
JADAIR, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
John A. MacKenzie, Senior District Judge.
(CA-96-256)
Submitted: January 28, 1998
Decided: March 16, 1998
Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Ross R. Kinney, Waukesha, Wisconsin; D. Wayne Hines, Virginia
Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen E. Story, Megan E. Burns,
KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Jadair, Inc., appeals from the district court's order granting a
default judgment in favor of Allied Colloids, Inc., in this diversity
action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Allied Colloids, a New
York corporation, filed suit against Jadair, a Wisconsin corporation,
in March 1996, alleging nonpayment for products sold to Jadair.
Jadair's sole owner and president, David Schmutzler, filed an answer
on behalf of the corporation. By order entered April 4, 1996, the dis-
trict court rejected Schmutzler's answer on the grounds that "a corpo-
ration may not respond except through duly authorized counsel." The
order further stated that "[u]nless [Jadair] files a proper response, it
will be found in default."
Jadair then filed a second answer signed by Ross R. Kinney, an
attorney licensed to practice in Wisconsin. Kinney subsequently filed
a motion requesting that the district court authorize him to appear
before it for purposes of representing Jadair. By order entered May
17, 1996, the district court denied Kinney's motion, and, in a separate
order, granted Jadair an extension of time, until June 1, 1996, to asso-
ciate local counsel and file a proper response.* Jadair failed to comply
with the district court's order, however, and on July 8, 1996, the dis-
trict court entered default judgment in favor of Allied Colloids. Jadair
appeals.
We review the district court's award of default judgment for abuse
of discretion. See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Con-
tracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 810 (4th Cir. 1988). Jadair first claims
that neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor Title 28, United
States Code, expressly require that a corporation's answer be filed by
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*Local Rule 6(F) provides, in part, that "[a]ny counsel presenting
papers, suits or pleadings for filing, or making an appearance, must be
members of the bar of this Court, or must have counsel who are members
of the bar of this Court to join in the pleading by endorsement." See E.D.
Va. Loc. R. 6(F). Kinney is not licensed to practice before the Supreme
Court of Virginia and, therefore, is ineligible for admission to practice
before the district court. See E.D. Va. Loc. R. 6(A).
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an attorney. However, almost every court to address this issue has
held that a corporation may not appear pro se but must be represented
only by duly licensed counsel. See Rowland v. California Men's
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) ("It has been the law for the better
part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal
courts only through licensed counsel." (citations omitted)).
Nor do we find merit in Jadair's second contention that requiring
it to associate local counsel violates the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and its rights to due process and equal protection. Cf. Martin
v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 26 (1961); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326
U.S. 207, 210-11 (corporations are not citizens protected by Privi-
leges and Immunities Clauses); Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of
Virginia, 766 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1985) (similar rule was rational and
did not violate due process). Accordingly, we find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment in favor
of Allied Colloids. Therefore, we affirm. We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately repre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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