United States v. Crystal Goodson-Hudson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4915
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CRYSTAL GOODSON-HUDSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:12-cr-00339-FDW-1)
Submitted: August 29, 2014 Decided: September 9, 2014
Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Melissa L.
Rikard, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Crystal Goodson-Hudson pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to commit offenses against
the United States in connection with a mortgage fraud scheme, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012), and conspiracy to commit
money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2012).
Prior to sentencing, she moved to withdraw her guilty plea.
Following briefing by the parties and an evidentiary hearing,
the district court denied the motion and sentenced her to a
total of seventy months’ imprisonment. Goodson-Hudson appeals,
challenging only the denial of the motion to withdraw. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v.
Dyess, 478 F.3d 224, 237 (4th Cir. 2007). “A district court
abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary manner, when
it fails to consider judicially-recognized factors limiting its
discretion, or when it relies on erroneous factual or legal
premises.” United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A defendant may withdraw her guilty plea prior to
sentencing if she “can show a fair and just reason for
requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see
United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 2003). The
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defendant bears a “heavy burden” in demonstrating the existence
of such a reason. United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d
345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An appropriately conducted Rule 11 colloquy “raise[s]
a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding,” and
thus “leaves a defendant with a very limited basis upon which to
have [her] plea withdrawn.” Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414 (internal
quotation marks omitted). We have articulated a nonexclusive
list of six factors to be considered in evaluating a motion to
withdraw a plea. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th
Cir. 1991). These factors are:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible
evidence that his plea was not knowing or not
voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has
been a delay between the entering of the plea and the
filing of the motion (4) whether defendant has had
close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether
withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government, and
(6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste
judicial resources.
Id. To credibly assert her legal innocence, factor Two, a
defendant need not conclusively prove innocence, but must
“present evidence that (1) has the quality or power of inspiring
belief, and (2) tends to defeat the elements in the government’s
prima facie case or to make out a successful affirmative
defense.” Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d at 353 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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Goodson-Hudson raises two challenges on appeal.
First, she argues that the court placed too high a burden on
her, effectively requiring her to prove her innocence; failed to
adequately consider the evidence of innocence she did provide;
and failed to address her attorney’s offer to present more
evidence. We are not persuaded. As Goodson-Hudson notes,
absent her guilty plea, the Government would have been required
to prove both knowledge and specific intent to defraud to prove
her guilt of the charged mortgage fraud. See United States v.
Deffenbaugh, 709 F.3d 266, 272 (4th Cir. 2013) (mens rea
required for § 371 criminal conspiracy); United States v. Wynn,
684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (mens rea of wire and mail
fraud); United States v. Brandon, 298 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir.
2002) (mens rea of bank fraud); United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d
1145, 1151 (4th Cir. 1995) (mens rea of 18 U.S.C. § 1014mortgage fraud). However, the documentary evidence
Goodson-Hudson provided would not tend to negate these elements
of the offense. Additionally, Goodson-Hudson’s own self-serving
statements are insufficient to overcome the strong presumption
of verity accorded her sworn testimony and admission of guilt at
the plea hearing. We agree with the district court that
Goodson-Hudson presented insufficient evidence to make a
credible showing of innocence under Moore, and she has failed to
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show how her proffered further testimony would have altered the
court’s analysis.
Goodson-Hudson also contends that the district court
failed to give adequate weight to its conclusions that
permitting withdrawal would not prejudice the United States or
waste judicial resources. Again, we disagree. In the face of
the Government’s arguments that both it and the court would be
significantly burdened by Goodson-Hudson’s withdrawal, the
district court evaluated both issues in her favor, specifically
considering whether the Government would be prejudiced by loss
of evidence. We have previously acknowledged that factors One,
Two, and Four of the Moore test “speak most straightforwardly to
the question whether the movant has a fair and just reason to
upset settled systemic expectations by withdrawing her plea,”
whereas the remaining factors “are better understood as
countervailing considerations that establish how heavily the
presumption should weigh in any given case.” Sparks, 67 F.3d at
1154. Thus, “slight prejudice and inconvenience would not, by
themselves, constitute a ‘fair and just’ reason to grant the
motion.” Id. The district court’s determination that factors
Five and Six did not weigh heavily in its analysis was therefore
fully in accord with our precedent. The court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion in light of Goodson-Hudson’s
failure to establish any of the additional factors in her favor.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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