Wolff v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1124
LISA A. WOLFF,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-02-3932-WDQ)
Submitted: August 30, 2004 Decided: September 30, 2004
Before MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronald McGlenn Cherry, LAW OFFICES OF RONALD M. CHERRY, Towson,
Maryland, for Appellant. James J. Kelley, II, Christine B. Cox,
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Lisa A. Wolff appeals the district court’s orders
granting summary judgment to the Defendant and denying her Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration in her Title VII action.
Wolff asserts the district court erred in ruling she failed to show
more than a scintilla of evidence supporting her sexual harassment
claim or that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her
favor. We conclude the district court did not err in this
determination or abuse its discretion in denying Wolff’s motion and
affirm.
This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863
F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is proper “if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). The Court construes the evidence and draws all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
A Rule 59(e) motion should be granted only in one of
three circumstances: “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at
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trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” Pacific Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co.,
148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998). This Court reviews the denial
of a Rule 59(e) motion for an abuse of discretion. Brown v.
French, 147 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1998).
To establish a Title VII claim for sexual harassment, a
plaintiff must prove that the offending conduct (1) was unwelcome,
(2) was based on her sex, (3) was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive
work environment, and (4) was imputable to her employer.
Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir.
2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1406, 1411 (2004).
“[W]orkplace harassment . . . is [not] automatically discrimination
because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations. ‘The critical issue . . . is whether members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.’”
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)).
Wolff alleged that her supervisor’s use of profanity at
a meeting to describe her work and the work of her business unit
evidenced discrimination based on her sex and was sufficiently
severe to alter the conditions of her employment. However, it was
undisputed the supervisor used profanity not only when addressing
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Wolff but also when addressing the men at the meeting and that he
was describing his dissatisfaction on work-related issues. We
agree with the district court that based on Wolff’s evidence, no
reasonable trier of fact could reasonably find discrimination
against Wolff on account of her sex or that her supervisor’s
conduct was sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of her
employment. Accordingly, we affirm both district court orders.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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