Turner v. Kight

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1125
SHERRI A. TURNER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
RAYMOND M. KIGHT; BRUCE P. SHERMAN; RODNEY
BROWN; RICHARD KANE; ROBIN LEWIS; WILLIAM
PECHNICK; ERIC BROWN; BRIAN PHILLIPS;
ARTHUR M. WALLENSTEIN; T. L. HICKS; R.
ANDREWS; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-01-1408-AW-8)
Submitted: October 29, 2004 Decided: January 7, 2005
Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ralph T. Byrd, Laytonsville, Maryland, for Appellant. J. Joseph
Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Cynthia G. Peltzman,
Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland; Charles W.
Thompson, Jr., County Attorney, Sharon V. Burrell, Principal
Counsel for Self-Insurance Appeals, Patricia P. Via, Associate
County Attorney, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Sherri A. Turner appeals the district court’s dismissal
of her complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), on
Defendants’ summary judgment motions. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
Turner’s action named State Defendants Sheriff Raymond M.
Kight, Bruce P. Sherman, Rodney Brown, Richard Kane, Robin Lewis,
William Pechnick, Eric Brown, and Brian Philips, as well as County
Defendants Arthur M. Wallenstein, Theresa L. Hicks, Robert Andrews,
and Montgomery County, Maryland. It alleged various federal
constitutional claims arising out of Turner’s arrest and detention
by employees of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office and the
Montgomery County Department of Correction and Rehabilitation
(“MCDC”). She alleged violations of her civil rights when she was
taken into custody by the Sheriff’s Department, after she failed to
turn herself in, and based on events that occurred after she was
transported to the MCDC. She sought, inter alia, compensatory
damages of $5,000,000 and $10,000,000 in punitive damages.
Review of the record reveals the following facts,
construed in the light most favorable to Turner. Turner suffered
a spinal cord injury in 1997 from an unrelated automobile accident,
and she occasionally uses a neck brace and takes medication to
alleviate pain and muscle spasms. When she failed to appear on an
arrest warrant on a charge of contempt of court, Sergeant Lewis and
Deputy Pechnick of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office went to
Turner’s home on April 19, 2000, to arrest her. Turner asserted
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that Officers Lewis and Pechnick “stormed into [her] residence
while [she] was in bed, terrifying [her] daughters.” She asserted
that Officer Lewis shouted orders to Turner and told her to “stop
talking because she was going to jail” and that she “understood
[Turner] and [Turner’s] game.” After hearing of her disability and
verifying the information Turner provided with regard to previous
calls she had made to the sheriff’s department, the officers left
without arresting her, giving her a third opportunity to turn
herself in, which she did on April 21.
When Turner arrived at the Montgomery County Sheriff’s
Office with her fourteen-year-old daughter, Defendant Pechnick
instructed Turner to leave her pocketbook and accompany him, which
she did. She alleged that she was then “taken to a room,
handcuffed to a table and arrested.” Defendant Pechnick searched
her and required her to surrender all her belongings, including her
medicine and neck brace (which she carried but did not wear),
copies of pleadings she had filed with the court, and documentation
about her medical history. She alleged that Defendant Pechnick
noted her three spinal surgery scars, and commented that the scars
were “nothing, they will go away.” Defendant Pechnick arrested
Turner and transported her to a holding cell in the Montgomery
County District Court.
Turner alleged that when she asked for her neck brace and
medicine to alleviate pain and muscle spasms, Defendant Pechnick
refused her request. She asserted that she was detained for four
hours without any lunch, was in “excruciating pain and suffering
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from muscle spasms and stiffness,” and was once again denied her
medication and neck brace.
Turner asserted that she was taken to a judge who refused
to listen to her explanations and who required her to post a $100
bond, which she was unable to do at the time. She was then
transported by Deputy Sheriffs Brown and Phillips to the MCDC. She
claimed the officers refused to answer her inquiries regarding the
welfare of her child, her right to a telephone call, her medicine,
her tote bag with neck brace, an opportunity to see a doctor, and
how she could be expected to arrange bail. She asserted she was
made to sit without seatbelts facing a steel door and that the risk
of trauma from any sudden stop caused her to suffer “paralyzing
fear.”
Turner claimed that when she arrived at the MCDC, she was
again denied her medication and medical attention and was subjected
to a “prolonged period of processing.” She further asserted that
she was strip searched1 by Officer Hicks and then placed in a cell
1
Turner was given an opportunity to use the bathroom, and
while in the bathroom, Officer Hicks, a female, opened the door and
told Turner that she was going to have to take a shower and put on
jail clothes. Turner testified that she stood in a small area
where she removed her clothes, with Officer Hicks standing nearby
examining Turner’s clothes and shoes as she removed them. Officer
Hicks told Turner to “hurry up” and take her clothes off so she
could shower. According to Turner, as she stood there naked,
Officer Hicks said to her, “show me your breasts.” While Turner
was in the shower with the curtain closed, Officer Hicks brought
her a towel, throwing it over the railing. No one other than
Officer Hicks was present when Turner went into the shower stall,
and when Turner exited the shower stall, no one else was in the
room. Turner put on a jump suit that had been given to her, along
with her shoes and socks. When Turner was unable to tell Officer
Hicks whether she was wearing an underwire bra, Officer Hicks
checked the bra by touching it to determine whether it had an
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for six hours, during which time Defendants Hicks, Andrews, and
Phillips “repeatedly taunted and mocked and denied [Turner] medical
attention.” Turner claimed she continued to experience
uncontrolled pain, muscle spasms, and medication withdrawal
symptoms,2 and was taunted by Defendant Phillips, and finally
released from MCDC at 9:30 p.m. when her daughter posted the $100
bail, approximately twelve and a half hours after she first arrived
at the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office.
Finally, Turner contended that subsequent to her release,
she wrote several letters complaining of the events. She asserted
that Defendant R. Brown contacted her and “taunted, mocked and
belittled” her. She stated that she received a letter from
Defendant Sherman which stated that the matter would be
investigated, but claimed that no corrective action was taken. She
also claimed that she received a copy of a memorandum from a
Montgomery County Council member to Defendant Wallenstein
expressing concern about Turner’s experience, but she was unaware
whether any response was received from Defendant Wallenstein.
In her original and amended complaints, Turner asserted
due process violations as a result of the policies, directives, and
training condoned by Defendants Kight, Sherman, R. Brown, Kane,
underwire, and then ordered Turner to remove it for security
reasons.
2
Officer Hicks called the medical department to alert them to
Turner’s complaints, but Turner was released before she could be
evaluated. Defendants asserted that Turner did not appear to be in
any life-threatening medical situation warranting the immediate
response of medical staff to the holding room.
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Lewis, and Wallenstein and executed by their respective employees.
She claimed that Defendants Pechnick, E. Brown, Phillips, Hicks,
and Andrews violated her due process rights by arresting her
without an opportunity to be heard, denying her medical attention,
and causing her physical and emotional suffering. She further
asserted that Montgomery County is liable for ratifying Defendants’
acts and omissions in violating her constitutional rights.
Finally, she asserted a number of state law claims.
The district court initially granted summary judgment for
all Defendants, holding that Defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on the issues of whether Turner was subjected to an
unconstitutional strip search and denied necessary medical care,
and further held that Turner failed to state a claim as to
Defendants Wallenstein and Montgomery County. The district court
then granted Turner’s motion for reconsideration on the sole issue
of the constitutionality of the alleged strip search and the
constitutionality of Officer Hicks’ conduct. Following review of
the record, the pleadings, and the counter motions for summary
judgment filed by Turner and Hicks, together with the supporting
affidavits, the district court granted judgment in favor of
Defendant Hicks. The district court later denied Turner’s motion
for reconsideration. Turner filed the present appeal.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact that could lead a trier of fact to find for
the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986). “In determining whether to grant summary
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judgment, all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the
non-movant.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 852 (4th Cir. 1990)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). This Court reviews de novo a
district court’s grant of summary judgment. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). To raise a
genuine issue of material fact, the petitioner may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e). Rather, she must present evidence supporting her position
through “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with . . . affidavits, if any.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Turner’s first two claims on appeal are that the district
court erred when it ruled that her pain did not rise to the level
of a serious medical need, and further erred in finding that, even
if it did, Defendants did not deliberately disregard her serious
medical need. She asserts these findings are not supported by the
record that demonstrates that she told Defendants of her spinal
injuries, used a cane, carried a neck brace, used handicapped
transportation, carried prescription pain medication, and
repeatedly requested her neck brace and medical accommodation, and
Defendants refused her requests.
A serious medical need is one that poses a substantial
risk of serious injury to health and safety. Young v. City of
Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2001). This Circuit has
further defined “serious medical need” as a medical need
“sufficiently serious . . . to require medical treatment.”
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Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 104 (4th
Cir. 1995).
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 105 (1976). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by
either actual intent or reckless disregard.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896
F.2d at 851. An Eighth Amendment violation occurs where treatment
is “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock
the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Id.
at 851-52. While a pre-trial detainee’s rights with respect to
claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs are
prohibited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than the Eighth Amendment, with respect to such claims, a
pretrial detainee’s due process rights are co-extensive with a
convicted prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. Hill v. Nicodemus,
979 F.2d 987, 990-92 (4th Cir. 1992). Deliberate indifference is
a high standard, requiring more than a showing of mere negligence.
Young, 238 F.3d at 575-76.
We agree with the district court’s dismissal of Turner’s
claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. First,
while Turner alleged that she endured pain and muscle spasms during
her time at the Sheriff’s Office and at MCDC, there is no evidence
that this medical need was sufficiently serious as to require
medical treatment, or that the failure to provide Turner with
medical attention resulted in substantial injury. See generally
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Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994) (in banc) (in
excessive force case, de minimis injury does not state a viable
constitutional claim). Second, there is no showing of deliberate
indifference here which would “shock the conscience.” Miltier v.
Beorn, 896 F.2d at 851. While Turner informed several of the State
Defendants that she was disabled, had been hospitalized for
injuries, walked with a cane, carried a neck brace, notified
Defendants that she had prescribed medication for chronic pain, and
showed her surgical scars, there is no evidence that the Defendants
specifically withheld Turner’s medication and/or neck brace in an
effort to deliberately or recklessly ignore an excessive risk to
Turner’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994).
While Turner subjectively complained to several of the Defendants
of pain, she was able to walk and move about. In addition, Officer
Hicks called the medical department to alert them to Turner’s
complaints, but Turner was released before she could be evaluated.
At best, the failure of the Defendants to provide Turner with her
neck brace and/or pain medication could be construed as negligence,
but such a claim is insufficient to establish liability under
§ 1983. See Young, 238 F.3d at 575-76.
Turner further asserts error in the district court’s
dismissal of her supervisory liability claims. Specifically,
Turner claimed that employees of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s
Office, Deputies E. Brown, Pechnick, and Phillips, in arresting and
detaining Turner, acted “pursuant to policies, directives, and
training” instituted by Sheriff Kight, Assistant Sheriff Sherman,
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and Deputies R. Brown, Kane, and Lewis (the “State Supervisory
Defendants”). She further asserted that the State Supervisory
Defendants had knowledge of their employees’ conduct and were
deliberately indifferent to purported constitutional injuries that
resulted during Turner’s arrest and detention. On appeal, Turner
asserts the district court erred in dismissing these claims of
supervisory liability, particularly because Defendants Pechnick, E.
Brown, and Phillips signed sworn affidavits attesting that their
actions regarding Turner were performed in compliance with
Sheriff’s office directives concerning the detention, care, and
custody of prisoners. She further asserts error in the district
court’s dismissal of her claims against Defendants Wallenstein and
Montgomery County.
Respondeat superior generally is inapplicable to § 1983
lawsuits. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). To establish a viable claim for respondeat superior
liability under § 1983, Turner must demonstrate: (1) actual or
constructive knowledge of a risk of constitutional injury;
(2) deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) an “affirmative
causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular
constitutional injury she suffered. Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d
215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th
Cir. 1994)).
Here, we find that Turner has not provided evidence to
establish a causal connection between a specific Sheriff’s Office
policy and a particular injury she suffered, a requisite proof
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burden to a supervisory liability claim. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d
at 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). As the district court held, Turner
failed to allege facts to indicate actual or constructive knowledge
of a risk of constitutional injury by Defendants Kight, Sherman, R.
Brown, or Kane. While Defendant Lewis accompanied Defendant
Pechnick to Turner’s home lawfully to arrest her, and, while there,
shouted orders to her and told her to “stop talking because she was
going to jail and that she ‘understood’ [Turner’s] game,” the
district court correctly determined that such language did not rise
to the level of a constitutional injury.
Moreover, Turner has offered no evidence, other than her
own, unsubstantiated assertions which are insufficient to overcome
summary judgment,3 that the State Supervisory Defendants had
knowledge of any risk of constitutional injury posed by persons
they supervised. Turner alleged no facts nor presented any
evidence showing that the State Supervisory Defendants gave orders,
set any policy, or failed to adequately train any of the deputies
they supervised so as to lead to a constitutional injury to Turner.
The fact that they supervised individuals who carried out Turner’s
arrest and detention in compliance with Sheriff’s Office policies
and procedures is insufficient, standing alone, to create liability
under § 1983, absent a constitutional injury.
We further agree with the district court’s dismissal of
Turner’s claims of supervisory liability on the part of Defendants
Wallenstein, Director of the Department of Correction and
3
See Mackey v. Shalala, 360 F.3d 463, 469-70 (4th Cir. 2004).
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Rehabilitation, and Montgomery County. Specifically, Turner failed
to allege that Wallenstein had any personal knowledge or
involvement in Turner’s arrest, and her vague allegations that the
MCDC employees acted under “policies, directives and training” that
were “instituted, condoned, ratified and authorized” by Wallenstein
are insufficient as a matter of law. Her failure to demonstrate
that Wallenstein had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk
of constitutional injury, that he demonstrated deliberate
indifference to that risk, or that his actions were causally
related to injury suffered by Turner is fatal to her claim against
him. See Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999).
Similarly, with regard to her claims against the County, because
Turner failed to allege specific facts related to customs,
policies, or procedures supporting a claim for violation of her
constitutional rights, we find that the district court properly
dismissed the claims. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
Turner’s next three claims of error involve the district
court’s determinations that Defendant Hicks’ two affidavits were
not contradictory, not an attempt to mislead the court, and not
otherwise improper such that it should grant Turner’s motion to
strike the second affidavit. The district court’s determination of
the right to present evidence is entitled to substantial deference
and will not be reversed by this Court absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232, 241 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, the district court expressly considered Turner’s assertions
that the second affidavit was inconsistent with the first and was
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misleading, applied the factors as set forth in Lowery v. Stovall,
92 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1996), and determined that Hicks’ second
affidavit provided clarity on points overlooked by the court, was
not inconsistent with the first affidavit, and was not an attempt
to mislead to court. We find no abuse of discretion shown on this
record relative to the district court’s decision to consider Hicks’
second affidavit, or in its ruling to deny Turner’s motion to
strike Hicks’ second affidavit.
Next, Turner challenges the district court’s rulings as
a matter of law that MCDC’s shower and search policy distinguishes
between temporary detainees and pretrial detainees and is not
unconstitutional. Specifically, the district court held that
“MCDC’s strip search policy is not an indiscriminate search policy
routinely applied to all detainees and is not unconstitutional.”
The district court found noteworthy the explicit provisions of
Policy and Procedure 300-18, which clearly distinguish the search
procedures to be followed for temporary detainees and those to be
followed for pre-trial detainees. The court held that, pursuant to
the provisions of the policy as well as the pleadings and
affidavits of the case, Turner’s status was that of a temporary
detainee, and not a pre-trial detainee.
Turner has offered no evidence to support her position
that the MCDC search policy is indiscriminately applied to all
detainees. Aside from the fact that the policy was incorrectly
applied to Turner, because the MCDC policy provides for explicit
distinctions between search procedures permissible for temporary
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detainees and those permissible for pre-trial detainees, and
establishes parameters for those respective searches, we find that
the district court properly determined that the policy is not
indiscriminately and routinely applied to all detainees and does
not thereby authorize unconstitutional actions.
Turner claims further that the district court erred in
ruling, as a matter of law, that Defendant Hicks made a “reasonable
mistake” when she forced Turner to submit to a search and shower as
a temporary detainee. Following a review of relevant Fourth
Circuit case law, the district court held that the intrusion in
this case was minimal, did not include significant physical
contact, and was conducted in private. The court also held that
Defendant Hicks’ negligence or carelessness in not confirming
Turner’s status prior to requiring Turner to take a shower and put
on an MCDC uniform did not violate Turner’s constitutional rights.
Mere negligence or carelessness by a correctional officer
does not constitute a constitutional violation. See, e.g.,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). Here, there is no
evidence supporting Turner’s claim that the search and shower to
which Hicks subjected her was anything more than an unfortunate
mistake, which occurred when Defendant Hicks failed to confirm
Turner’s status prior to undertaking procedures to process her into
the general population.
Finally, Turner argues that, assuming this Court remands
the case to the district court, the district court should
reconsider its denial of her motions for leave to file a second
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amended complaint to include class action allegations, to certify
class, and for extension of time to complete class action
discovery. Given this court’s disposition of this case on appeal,
this argument is moot.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders
dismissing Turner’s § 1983 complaint. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not
significantly aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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