United States v. Hicks

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-6956
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
versus
RUDY HICKS,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (CA-99-89-5-BR)
Submitted: January 24, 2005 Decided: March 1, 2005
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jane E. Pearce, Research and
Writing Specialist, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank
D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United
States Attorney, Michelle T. Fuseyamore, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Rudy Hicks appeals from the district court’s order
determining that he still meets the criteria for civil commitment
under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2000). Under § 4246, if, after a hearing,
a district court determines by clear and convincing evidence that
a person is suffering from a mental disease or defect that would
create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or
serious damage to the property of another, the court shall commit
the person to the custody of the Attorney General. Once committed,
an individual may periodically move for a hearing under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4247(h) (2000) to determine whether the committed person should
be discharged from commitment under § 4246. To obtain his release
from commitment, the district court must find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the committed person has recovered from his
mental disease or defect to such an extent that his release would
no longer pose a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
person or serious damage to the property of another. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(e) (2000).
This court will overturn a district court’s finding that
a substantial risk of harm exists only if the finding is clearly
erroneous. United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir.
1992). A finding is clearly erroneous when “the reviewing court is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
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committed.” Faulconer v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 748 F.2d 890,
895 (4th Cir. 1984).
We have thoroughly reviewed the materials submitted by
the parties in this matter and conclude that the district court’s
determination that Hicks still meets the requirements for
commitment under § 4246 was not clearly erroneous. We therefore
affirm the order of the district court continuing Hicks’ commitment
under § 4246. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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