United States v. Raynor

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4279
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RACHEL RAYNOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District
Judge. (CR-03-66)
Submitted: August 24, 2005 Decided: September 8, 2005
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles L. Pincus, III, CHARLES L. PINCUS, III, P.C., Virginia
Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Laura Marie Everhart, Assistant
United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Rachel Raynor appeals from the district court’s order
revoking her probation and sentencing her to fifteen months’
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.
Raynor’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), representing that, in his view,
there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Raynor has been
notified of her right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has
not done so.
Raynor does not challenge the district court’s finding
that she violated the terms of her probation. The only issue
Raynor raises on appeal is whether the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing her to a fifteen-month term of
imprisonment upon revocation of probation. The fifteen-month
sentence imposed by the district court is within the statutory
maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 495 (2000) (providing for a ten-year
maximum). Because Raynor’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum, we review the sentence only to determine whether it is
“plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (2000).* The
*
The Sixth Circuit has applied the abuse of discretion
standard when it reviewed a prison sentence following the
revocation of probation. United States v. Bujak, 347 F.3d 607 (6th
Cir. 2003). However, they applied this standard using their
revocation of supervised release precedent, and in that precedent
they use both the abuse of discretion standard and the plainly
unreasonable standard. See United States v. Washington, 147 F.3d
490, 491 (6th Cir. 1998). As we review prison sentences following
the revocation of supervised release under the plainly unreasonable
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fifteen-month sentence was reasonable because Raynor violated her
probation responsibilities in several respects, including failing
to report to her probation officer on numerous occasions and
repeatedly failing to comply with a restitution order.
Pursuant to Anders, we have examined the entire record
and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of her right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If the client
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
standard, we also review sentences following the revocation of
probation only to determine whether they are plainly unreasonable.
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