Renahan v. Allegheny Power Sys

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER A. RENAHAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM, d/b/a
No. 99-1397
Monongahela Power Company;
SPECTRUM MEDICAL SERVICES,
INCORPORATED; UNITED STATES COAST
GUARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.
Irene M. Keeley, District Judge.
(CA-98-10-1)
Submitted: July 15, 1999
Decided: September 24, 1999
Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Christopher A. Renahan, Appellant Pro Se. Edward Gerwig Kennedy,
MONONGAHELA POWER COMPANY, Fairmont, West Virginia;
Michael Eugene Hoover, DIEFENDERFER, HOOVER, BOYLE &
WOOD, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Daniel W. Dickinson, Jr., OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia,
for Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Christopher A. Renahan appeals the district court's orders dismiss-
ing the United States Coast Guard as a party and granting summary
judgment in favor of the remaining Defendants. We have reviewed
the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error.
We have also considered the district court's request that the matter be
remanded because of a recent discovery by the district judge that her
spouse owns stock in one of the private Defendants. The United
States Code provides that a judge must disqualify herself if she
"knows that . . . [her] spouse . . . has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding." 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(4) (1994). Judge Keeley has acknowledged that she was
unaware of her husband's financial interest at the time she disposed
of the case. Accordingly, despite the district court's commendable
concern, we have no difficulty concluding that the lower court's con-
duct cannot reasonably call her impartiality into question. See in re
Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 515 F. Supp. 1076, 1081-82
(D. Az. 1981) (finding no impropriety regarding orders signed prior
to court's knowledge of financial interest in party). We therefore
affirm the order of the district court on the reasoning expressed
below. See Renahan v. Allegheny Power Sys., No. CA-98-10-1
(N.D.W. Va. Feb. 23, 1999).* We dispense with oral argument
_________________________________________________________________
*Although the district court's judgment or order is marked as "filed"
on February 22, 1999, the district court's records show that it was
entered on the docket sheet on February 23, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58
and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the
judgment or order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the
effective date of the district court's decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806
F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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