United States v. Freeman

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4387
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
COLUMBUS CRAYTON FREEMAN, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (CR-04-
287)
Submitted: January 4, 2006 Decided: January 25, 2006
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher L. Hamlin, MCNAMEE, HOSEA, JERNIGAN, KIM, GREENAN &
WALKER, P.A., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Daphene R. McFerren, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
On May 28, 2004, federal agents executed a search warrant on
the residence of Columbus Freeman. The agents recovered equipment
for making identification documents, a 9mm handgun, and a magazine
with fifteen rounds of ammunition. Freeman was indicted for
possession of document-making equipment with the intent to produce
false identification documents, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(5) (West
2005), and possession of a firearm by a felon, see 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) (2000). He moved to suppress the fruits of the search,
and the district court denied the motion.
Freeman subsequently pleaded guilty to both charges, reserving
his right to bring this appeal challenging the denial of his
suppression motion. We review de novo legal conclusions regarding
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and review for clear error
the underlying factual findings. United States v. Singh, 363 F.3d
347, 354 (4th Cir. 2004).
Freeman asserts three reasons why the search violated his
rights. First, he contends that the search warrant, which was
issued by a state judge in Maryland, was not supported by probable
cause. Determining the existence of probable cause requires the
judge issuing the warrant “‘to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United
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States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 380 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
The affidavit presented to the state judge in this case met
this standard. It stated that a “Cooperating Defendant” had told
the agents that Freeman was manufacturing false identification
documents at his residence, and that the agents had subsequently
corroborated this tip by monitoring a “Confidential Informant”
entering Freeman’s residence and purchasing such documents.
Freeman makes much of the fact that the state judge may not have
been aware that the “cooperating defendant” and “confidential
informant” were the same person, but this minor referential
discrepancy was immaterial to the determination of probable cause.
See, e.g., United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1123 n.15 (4th
Cir. 1992). Moreover, even if the warrant was improperly issued,
the agents were entitled to rely upon it because the record lacks
evidence of their bad faith or objective unreasonableness in
believing probable cause to be present. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984); United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457,
460-66 (4th Cir. 2004).
Second, Freeman argues that the agents violated his
constitutional and statutory rights by neglecting to knock and
announce their presence when executing the warrant. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109 (2000); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35-36 (2003).
While knocking and announcing is a default requirement of warrant
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execution, officers may dispense with it where they “‘have a
reasonable suspicion’” that under the circumstances it would be
“‘dangerous or futile, . . . or would inhibit the effective
investigation of the crime.’” Id. at 36 (quoting Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)), see also id. at 42-43. Such
reasonable suspicion existed here: the informant told the agents
that Freeman had a gun and had vowed not to be captured by law
enforcement.
Third, Freeman claims that the gun must be excluded from
evidence because the warrant did not authorize a search for
firearms. Shortly after entering, the agents asked Freeman whether
he had any dangerous weapons, and he directed them to a drawer in
a storage unit containing the 9mm handgun. While the warrant did
not authorize the agents to search specifically for a gun, it is
nevertheless admissible because its discovery was inevitable. See
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). The warrant permitted
the agents to look for, inter alia, a variety of paper documents,
and it is inconceivable that they would have failed to eventually
open this drawer of their own accord.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before us and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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