United States v. Pomranky

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4309
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH LEROY POMRANKY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (CR-04-44)
Submitted: January 6, 2006 Decided: February 1, 2006
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sue Genrich Berry, BOWEN, BERRY AND POWERS, PLLC, Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney,
Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Leroy Pomranky appeals from his conviction for
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.*
On appeal, he asserts that the district court improperly permitted
Officer Wilkins to testify regarding the use of firearms by drug
dealers. We affirm.
A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 831
(4th Cir. 1998). Pomranky’s discontent with the substance of
Wilkins’ testimony ignores the plain language of Fed. R. Evid. 702,
which allows for an expert to testify as to his specializied
knowledge in a given area if the testimony will “assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Expert testimony about common
practices of drug dealers is routinely admitted in drug cases in
order to help the trier of fact understand the mechanics of drug
trafficking. United States v. Hopkins, 310 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir.
2002) (accepting expert testimony that small caliber weapon was an
indicia of drug dealing); United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582,
589 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding district court properly admitted
testimony regarding tools of the drug trade). Wilkins’ testimony
is comparable to testimony we have already upheld as proper expert
*
Pomranky was also convicted of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, but he does not contest this conviction.
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testimony with regard to drug trafficking. In addition, the
testimony was relevant to show that the drugs and firearm were
likely connected and that Pomranky was involved with drug
distribution. See United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 195 (4th
Cir. 1999) (holding that firearms are well-recognized “tools of the
trade” in the illegal drug business).
In addition, the probative value of the testimony was not
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid.
403. The testimony was presented in a neutral, non-inflammatory
manner. In the portion objected to, Wilkins did not mention
Pomranky and did not offer an opinion as to whether Pomranky’s gun
possession was drug-related. In addition, even if the testimony
was more prejudicial than probative, any error was harmless,
because the challenged evidence amounted to the general principle
that drug dealers often carry guns. Pomranky had ample opportunity
to prove that this general principle did not apply to him, and his
defense focused, not on discrediting this testimony, but on the
fact that the drugs were not his and the firearm was possessed for
target practice. If the jury had accepted Pomranky’s version of
events, the fact that Wilkins had observed that drug dealers often
use firearms would not have swayed their verdict. Thus, admission
of Wilkins’ testimony, designed to aid the jury’s understanding of
the drug business, was not erroneous.
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Accordingly, we affirm Pomranky’s conviction. We
dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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