United States v. Williams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4977
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LAWRENCE MARCELLOUS WILLIAMS, a/k/a Lawrence
Marcell Williams,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (CR-99-6)
Submitted: January 31, 2006 Decided: February 17, 2006
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Larry W. Shelton,
Supervisory Assistant Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia,
for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, James
Ashford Metcalfe, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence Marcellous Williams appeals from the district
court’s order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
three months imprisonment. We affirm.
Williams pled guilty in 2001 to possession of a stolen
firearm and was sentenced to thirty months imprisonment, followed
by three years of supervised release. He began serving his term of
supervised release on March 7, 2003. On May 17, 2005, a petition
to revoke Williams’ supervised release was filed based on three
alleged violations of the terms of his supervised release: (1)
failure to timely submit monthly supervision reports; (2) failure
to submit urine samples as instructed by his probation officer; and
(3) possession of marijuana based on multiple positive urine screen
samples. At the hearing, Williams did not deny that the reports
were received late and admitted using marijuana once, but argued
that the subsequent tests were the result of residual drugs in his
system. In response, the Government presented the testimony of the
probation officer, John Grant, who was qualified as an expert--over
Williams’ objection--to testify as to the length of time marijuana
remains in the body. Based on Grant’s testimony, the district
court concluded that Williams’ multiple positive urine screens
indicated multiple uses.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court
sentenced Williams to three months imprisonment, followed by
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twenty-one months of supervised release, with the following
conditions: (1) three months of home confinement and (2)
suspension of all driving privileges, regardless of the status of
his license in Virginia.
On appeal, Williams argues first that the district court
erred in admitting the testimony of the probation officer as an
expert on the issue of how long marijuana remains detectable in the
body. This court reviews the admission of expert testimony for an
abuse of discretion. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
139 (1997); United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1470-71 (4th
Cir. 1995). Expert testimony is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702
if it concerns: (1) scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge, that (2) will aid the jury or other trier of fact to
understand or resolve a fact at issue. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (extending Daubert’s two-prong
gatekeeping test to all expert testimony). The first prong of this
inquiry examines whether the reasoning and methodology underlying
the expert’s proffered opinion is reliable. See Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 593-95. The second prong of the inquiry requires an analysis of
whether the opinion is relevant to the fact at issue. See id. at
591-92, 595. Thus, an expert’s testimony is admissible under Rule
702 if it “rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant,” Kumho
Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141 (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted), and falls outside the common knowledge of the jury. See
United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 814-15 (4th Cir. 1995).
We find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling Williams’ objection to Grant’s testimony.
Grant detailed his extensive experience and training in drug
testing and analysis--specifically, that he has been in charge of
the in-house drug testing laboratory for investigation and pretrial
services for ten and a half years and received two one-month
training courses in drug testing. Moreover, Williams’ admission as
to a single use of marijuana alone was sufficient to subject him to
a mandatory revocation of his supervised release and exposed him to
a term of confinement of twelve to eighteen months.
Second, Williams argues that the district court erred in
imposing a new special condition upon revocation of his supervised
release that prohibits him from operating a motor vehicle for the
duration of the twenty-one month term of supervised release.
Because Williams did not object below, review is for plain error.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). We find no error.
The condition was imposed as part of Williams’ original sentence.
Williams did not challenge the condition when it was imposed and
may not do so now. See United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 115,
117-18 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that, in appeal from the revocation
of supervised release, this court lacks jurisdiction to examine the
sentencing proceeding in which the term of supervised release was
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imposed). In any event, we find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s decision to impose this special condition of
Williams’ supervised release. See United States v. Dotson, 324
F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 2003) (providing standard of review).
Therefore, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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