Jackson v. United States

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-7935
CECIL EDWARD JACKSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior
District Judge. (CA-97-261-3)
Submitted: August 3, 2007 Decided: August 17, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cecil Edward Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. James Michael Sullivan,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cecil Edward Jackson appeals a district court order
denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion. We granted a
certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the district
court erred denying the motion as untimely and not vacating that
part of the order dismissing the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion
with prejudice and requiring Appellant receive authorization from
this Court before filing another § 2255 motion. The Government
filed an informal brief in which it admits the court erred. We
vacate the order denying Jackson’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion and remand
for further proceedings.
In April 1997, Jackson filed a § 2255 motion. Before the
Government answered or filed a motion, Jackson moved for voluntary
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i). On June 4, 1997, the
district court granted the motion and dismissed the § 2255 motion
with prejudice and instructed Jackson that he must seek
authorization from this court under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000) before
filed a second such motion.
Nearly seven years later, Jackson filed a motion for
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). The district court
denied the motion, finding the § 2255 motion was filed beyond the
one year limitations period ending April 24, 1997. The court also
found Jackson’s Rule 60(b) motion was not brought within a
reasonable time and dismissed it as untimely.
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We review the denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion de novo.
See Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 107 (4th Cir. 1979).
A voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(i) is “a matter of
unconditional right and is self-executing, i.e., it is effective at
the moment the notice is filed with the clerk and no judicial
approval is required.” In re Matthews, 395 F.3d 477, 480 (4th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A voluntary dismissal
acts of if no action was brought at all. Id. After an action is
voluntarily dismissed, the court “lacks authority to conduct
further proceedings on the merits.” Id. at 480. “[A] judgment on
the merits that is entered after the plaintiff has filed a proper
41(a)(1) notice of dismissal is indeed void.” Marques v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 286 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002).
Thus, the district court’s order granting Jackson’s
motion for voluntarily dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) was in error,
because the case was dismissed with the filing of Jackson’s
motion.1 See, e.g., Long v. Board of Pardons & Paroles of Texas,
725 F.2d 306, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1984) (petitioner’s voluntary
dismissal of habeas petition completely terminated earlier action
without further order of the court). In addition, the district
court’s order dismissing Jackson’s § 2255 motion with prejudice was
1
The fact that Jackson filed a motion for dismissal rather
than a notice of dismissal is not relevant. Williams v. Ezell, 531
F.2d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1976). Jackson cited Rule 41(a)(1) in
his motion and the motion was filed prior to any response by the
Government.
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void. Moreover, that part of the order advising Jackson that he
has to receive authorization from this Court under § 2244 prior to
filing another § 2255 motion was in error because a voluntary
dismissal is not an adjudication on the merits. See United
States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 510 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004).
Jackson’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion challenging the district
court’s June 4, 1997, dismissal order was not untimely. Motions
attacking a judgment as void under Rule 60(b)(4) have no time
limit. See Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 523-24 (5th Cir.
2002). A void judgment does not acquire validity merely by the
passage of time. Id. at 523 n.23; see also Foster v. Arletty 3
Sarl, 278 F.3d 409, 414 (4th Cir. 2002) (while not specifically
adopting this rule, this Court has cited with agreement cases
finding that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion “contains little, if any, time
limit.”).
Thus, the district court order dismissing Jackson’s
§ 2255 motion was void because Jackson’s motion for dismissal under
Rule 41(a)(1)(i) ended the case when the motion was filed. The
district court should have granted Jackson’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion.
The practical result of the district court’s order dismissing his
§ 2255 motion with prejudice is that Jackson may be barred from
raising any of those claims in a subsequent § 2255 motion. In
addition, Jackson must seek authorization from this court to file
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a § 2255 motion despite the fact he has not had one properly
dismissed on the merits.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order denying
the Rule 60(b)(4) motion and remand to the district court. On
remand, the district court should grant the Rule 60(b)(4) motion
and vacate its June 4, 1997, order. Jackson’s § 2255 motion should
be considered dismissed without prejudice as a result of his Rule
41(a)(1)(i) motion seeking a voluntary dismissal.2 We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
2
As a result, Jackson will not need authorization from this
court to file a § 2255 motion. However, this decision will have no
effect on whether any future § 2255 motion filed by Jackson will be
timely.
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