United States v. Etheredge

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-5101
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JEFFREY MCKINLEY ETHEREDGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-03-268-AW)
Argued: September 28, 2007 Decided: October 19, 2007
Before MOTZ, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and
Raymond A. JACKSON, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Harry Jacques Trainor, Jr., TRAINOR, BILLMAN, BENNETT,
MILKO & MCCABE, L.L.P., Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant.
Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Keith A. Showstack, BRENNAN, TRAINOR, BILLMAN & BENNETT,
L.L.P., Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Chan Park,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Jeffrey McKinley Etheredge of conspiracy to
commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(h)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2007), and money laundering, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Etheredge
appeals his convictions, challenging the exclusion of certain
testimony, the adequacy of the court’s jury instructions, and the
sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
First, Etheredge asserts that the district court should have
allowed him to question defense witnesses about his generosity to
family and friends and about the statements his co-defendant,
Marshall Nicholson, Jr., made concerning the legitimacy of
Nicholson’s businesses. By failing to allow this testimony,
Etheredge contends that the district court hindered his ability to
present a defense. Our careful consideration of Etheredge’s claims
leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding such testimony. See United States v.
Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 709 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating standard of
review); United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir.
2003) (“[A] defendant’s right to present a defense is not absolute:
criminal defendants do not have a right to present evidence that
the district court, in its discretion, deems irrelevant or
immaterial.”); United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 259-60 (5th
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Cir. 1990) (affirming district court’s refusal to admit similar
evidence).
Next, Etheredge contends that the district court erred in
instructing the jury on willful blindness and in failing to give a
good faith instruction. Again we review for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 1999)
(stating standard of review and defining willful blindness).
Although Etheredge asserts that the evidence did not support a
willful blindness instruction, we disagree. The jury could infer
that Etheredge “deliberate[ly] ignor[ed]” the illegal source of
Nicholson’s income and the illegal nature of the transactions
designed to conceal that income in which Etheredge himself
participated. Id. Moreover, the district court properly
instructed the jury not to infer “guilty knowledge from a mere
showing of careless disregard or mistake.” United States v. Guay,
108 F.3d 545, 551 (4th Cir. 1997). We therefore find that the
court did not abuse its discretion in instructing on willful
blindness. Nor do we find an abuse of discretion in the court’s
failure to instruct the jury that good faith is a defense to the
charges, given that the court properly instructed on the knowledge
elements of the offenses. See United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d
306, 317 (4th Cir. 1991) (refusing to require separate good faith
instruction when instruction on specific intent adequate). Thus,
Etheredge is not entitled to relief on these claims.
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Finally, Etheredge asserts that the district court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal filed pursuant to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him on both counts because the Government failed to prove
he knew of Nicholson’s illegal activities. We review the district
court’s decision to deny a Rule 29 motion de novo. United States
v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A jury verdict “must
be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); Smith, 451 F.3d at 216. We have
carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to convict on both counts. See United States v. Alerre,
430 F.3d 681, 693-94 & n.14 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing elements of
conspiracy to launder money); United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d
214, 221 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing elements of money laundering
under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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