Lanier v. Norfolk Southern Corp.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1986
MICHAEL B. LANIER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION; NORFOLK SOUTHERN
RAILWAY COMPANY; BENJAMIN AIKEN; MIKE FORD;
JAMES THORNTON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(1:05-cv-03476-MBS)
Argued: September 26, 2007 Decided: December 5, 2007
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and Robert J. CONRAD, Jr.,
Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of
North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Douglas M. Schmidt, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Appellant.
W. Howard Boyd, Jr., GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Daniel B. White, Ronald
G. Tate, Jr., Jennifer E. Johnsen, Thomas E. Vanderbloemen,
GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellees Norfolk Southern Corporation and Norfolk Southern Railway
Company; Gray T. Culbreath, COLLINS & LACY, P.C., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee Benjamin Aiken; Monteith Powell Todd,
SOWELL, GRAY, STEPP & LAFFITTE, L.L.C., Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellee Mike Ford; J. Arthur Davison, FULCHER HAGLER, L.L.P.,
Augusta, Georgia, for Appellee James Thornton.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Michael B. Lanier appeals the district court’s order
dismissing his case and asserts that the district court incorrectly
found that no duty was owed to him under South Carolina tort law.
Lanier also argues for the first time on appeal that jurisdiction
under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) was improper. We find
that jurisdiction was proper under CAFA and affirm the district
court’s order.
I.
On January 5, 2005, three employees of Norfolk Southern
Corporation and Norfolk Southern Railway Company (collectively
referred to as “Norfolk”) took a local train to the Avondale Mills,
Inc. (“Avondale”) facility in Graniteville, South Carolina, to
deliver and pick up railroad cars. In order to deliver and pick up
railroad cars to and from Avondale, the Norfolk employees had to
open a rail switch located on the main railroad line to a side rail
that leads directly into the Avondale facility. While performing
these tasks, the employees realized that they could not finish
their work at Avondale without violating the 12-hour work rule
mandated by federal law. As a result, the employees parked the
train at the Avondale facility until they could resume their work
the following morning. Because the train was too long to fit
inside the Avondale facility, the employees placed a locomotive and
3
a couple of railroad cars on the side rail in close proximity to
the main railroad.
In the early hours of January 6, 2005, another train owned and
operated by Norfolk was traveling toward Graniteville on the main
railroad line. This train consisted of 3 locomotives and 48
railroad cars, some of which contained chlorine. Because the
employees failed to realign the main switch to its proper position,
the train was diverted from the main line to the side rail
colliding with the other railroad cars left on the side rail the
night before.
The impact of the collision caused some of the railroad cars
containing chlorine to rupture and chlorine gas to be released.
The chlorine gas damaged Avondale’s plant and prevented Avondale
from maintaining its production level. Avondale laid off some
employees and eventually decided to close its facilities
permanently. On December 8, 2005, Lanier, an employee of Avondale,
filed a class action complaint for damages against Norfolk in the
South Carolina Court of Common Pleas. Lanier’s putative class
consisted of former Avondale employees who were laid off or
discharged from their employment subsequent to the train
derailment. Lanier contended that Norfolk’s negligence resulted in
the derailment, the release of chlorine gas, and the disruption of
Avondale’s production capacity causing employee layoffs.
4
Norfolk filed a notice of removal on December 13, 2005.
Norfolk argued that removal was proper under CAFA, 28 U.S.C.A. §
1453(b) (West 2006), among other grounds. Norfolk asserted that
the allegations of injuries and damages in Lanier’s complaint met
the $5 million amount in controversy threshold and satisfied the
minimal diversity requirement. Lanier moved to remand on January
11, 2006, but failed to respond to Norfolk’s argument that the
court had jurisdiction under CAFA in his motion.
On July 5, 2006, the district court ordered that Lanier’s
motion to remand be denied and Norfolk’s motion to dismiss be
granted. The district court concluded that Lanier’s proposed class
met the jurisdictional requirements of CAFA and thus removal was
proper. The district court thereafter concluded that Lanier’s
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because Norfolk owed no legal duty to Lanier and the
putative class members.
On July 17, 2006, Lanier filed a motion for new trial, or in
the alternative, for relief from the court’s order. The district
court denied the motion and continued to find that Norfolk did not
owe Lanier and the purported class any duty of care. Lanier
thereafter timely filed his notice of appeal.
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II.
As with all questions implicating subject matter jurisdiction
of federal courts, we review the denial of a motion to remand to
state court de novo. Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir.
2005). CAFA amended Title 28’s provisions on diversity of
citizenship and removal for certain class action cases. Section
1332(d) provides that
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is a class action in which . . . any member
of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
different from any defendant.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (West 2006). For the district court to
have original jurisdiction over a class action under CAFA, the
proponent of removal must show minimal diversity, and it must be
clear from the face of the complaint that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million. See Wiggins v. North Am. Equitable Life Assur.
Co., 644 F.2d 1014, 1016-17 (4th Cir. 1981) (ordinarily determining
the jurisdictional amount from the plaintiff’s complaint but also
recognizing that “if it appears to a legal certainty that the
plaintiff cannot recover the jurisdictional amount, the case will
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction . . . . However, the legal
impossibility of recovery must be so certain as virtually to
negative the plaintiff’s good faith in asserting the claim”
(quoting McDonald v. Patton, 240 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1957));
see also Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448-
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49 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the amount in controversy under CAFA
and explaining that “[t]he question is not what damages the
plaintiff will recover, but what amount is ‘in controversy’ between
the parties . . . . Once the proponent of jurisdiction has set out
the amount in controversy, only a ‘legal certainty’ that the
judgment will be less forecloses federal jurisdiction”).
The district court concluded that the amount in controversy
was satisfied and minimal diversity between Lanier and Norfolk was
present. Because Lanier’s complaint indicated that the purported
class consisted of at least 350 people seeking damages, it would
take a minimum of $15,000 per person to exceed the $5 million
amount in controversy.1 Our review of the record shows that
minimal diversity is present between the parties and there is
nothing in the record that would support a finding to a legal
certainty that the judgment would be less than $5 million.2 Thus,
1
Since Avondale closed the factory, the purported class could
expand to over 2,000 employees. If that were the case, each
plaintiff would need to recover a little over $2,000 per person to
exceed the $5 million requirement. We find that Norfolk has met
its burden of showing the amount in controversy will exceed $5
million.
2
For the first time on appeal, Lanier argues that the local
controversy exception under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4) applies.
Section 1332(d)(4) states that a district court “shall decline to
exercise jurisdiction” over a class action if greater than 2/3 of
the class are from the state in which the action was filed; at
least one defendant from whom significant relief is sought is from
that same state; the principal injuries resulted from conduct
within the same state; and that no other class actions have been
filed asserting the same thing. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4) (West
2006). This court will generally not consider issues raised for
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we conclude that jurisdiction exists under CAFA, and the district
court correctly denied Lanier’s motion to remand.
III.
The standard of review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is de
novo. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 1991).
This Court will construe factual allegations in the nonmoving
party’s favor and will treat them as true, id., but is “not so
bound with respect to [the complaint’s] legal conclusions.” Dist.
28, United Mine Workers, Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d
1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1979). The plaintiff’s “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1965 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it
may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 1969. A complaint attacked
by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 1974.
the first time on appeal. Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250
(4th Cir. 1993). “Exceptions to this general rule are made only in
very limited circumstances, such as where refusal to consider the
newly-raised issue would be plain error or would result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. As Lanier did not raise
this argument to the district court and provides no facts
warranting a finding of exceptional circumstances, we do not
consider this argument. Id.8
In construing South Carolina tort law, the district court held
that Norfolk owed no duty to Lanier or the putative class members
for lost wages and thus Lanier failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Lanier asserts, however, that the
district court failed to consider the fact that Norfolk’s long-
standing supply contract with Avondale created a duty of care from
Norfolk to Avondale and thus derivatively to Avondale’s employees.
Lanier also contends that Norfolk owed a duty to Avondale’s
employees because a factory closing creating loss for Avondale
employees was a foreseeable consequence of negligently carrying
ultrahazardous materials.
Under South Carolina law, “[a] cause of action for negligence
requires: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant
to protect the plaintiff; (2) the failure of the defendant to
discharge the duty; (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the
defendant’s failure to perform.” South Carolina State Ports Auth.
v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1986).
“The key inquiry is what duty, if any, is owed by the tortfeasor to
the third party.” Barker v. Sauls, 345 S.E.2d 244, 244 (S.C.
1986). In order for a duty to exist, the parties must have a
relationship recognized by law. This duty may be derived from the
tortfeasor’s contractual relationship with another.3 See id.3
Lanier asserts that the long-standing supply contract between
Norfolk and Avondale creates a duty to the employees. However,
Lanier failed to allege this contractual relationship in his
9
While the employees’ job losses were arguably foreseeable,
tort law does not stretch so far as to impose liability on Norfolk
for the losses of those with whom it has no direct relationship.
Booz-Allen, 346 S.E.2d at 325 (“Foreseeability of injury, in the
absence of a duty to prevent that injury, is an insufficient basis
on which to rest liability. Foreseeability itself does not give
rise to a duty.” (citations omitted)). To avoid disproportionate
liability, South Carolina courts have cut off recovery for
plaintiffs who suffer economic loss, but have no direct physical
injury and no direct relationship with the defendant. See Hubbard
& Felix, The South Carolina Law of Torts 49 (3d ed. 2004)
(“[P]ersons who suffer indirect economic loss from loss of
employment as a result of injury to the enterprise where they work
cannot usually recover for such loss.”).4 We hold that South
complaint. Our standard of review on a 12(b)(6) motion is to “test
the sufficiency of a complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178
F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). As this fact was not included in
the complaint, we will not consider this argument on appeal.
4
See also Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303(1927) (holding no right to recover for economic loss resulting
from defendant’s injury to a third party with whom plaintiff has
contractual business relationship); Booz-Allen, 346 S.E.2d at 324
(holding no duty was owed to pilots and longshoremen whose work
suffered as a result of a consultant’s opinion that the Charleston
port would not have as much traffic as Savannah); Edens & Avant
Inv. Props., Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 456 S.E.2d 406 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding no liability in negligence for plaintiff’s out-
of-pocket “development costs” allegedly lost as a result of
defendant’s pollution injury to property which plaintiff had option
to purchase); Willis, 314 S.E.2d at 919 (holding no liability for
the loss of eight days of work due to a train derailment).
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Carolina courts would find the nature of Lanier’s indirect economic
loss too remote for recovery in tort. See Booz-Allen, 346 S.E.2d
at 326 (“The concept of duty in tort liability must not be extended
beyond reasonable limits.”); Willis v. Georgia N. Ry. Co., 314
S.E.2d 919, 919 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding in a similar train
derailment case that the “damages sought by appellants have
consistently been held too remote in nature for recovery”). We
conclude that Lanier has failed to plead enough facts to state a
claim that is plausible on its face. Accordingly, we find that the
court properly granted Norfolk’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
district court.
AFFIRMED
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