United States v. Stephens

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4183
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LORENZO DESHON STEPHENS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:06-cr-00281)
Submitted: September 10, 2007 Decided: December 10, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David M. Hicks, Whitney C. Tymas, Hicks Tymas, LLC, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney,
Roderick C. Young, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lorenzo Deshon Stephens was convicted by a jury of one
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000).
Stephens was sentenced by the district court to 327 months’
imprisonment. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Stephens contends the district court erred in
denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
Stephens argues the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction. We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 29
motion under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. United States
v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir. 1992). To determine if
there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we consider
whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). We review both
direct and circumstantial evidence, and permit the “government the
benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those
sought to be established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d
1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).
To prove conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
and to distribute a controlled substance, the government must
establish that: (1) two or more persons agreed to possess with
intent to distribute and to distribute the substance; (2) the
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defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily became part of the conspiracy. United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). A defendant
may be convicted of conspiracy without knowing all the conspiracy’s
details, so long as he joins the conspiracy understanding its
unlawful nature and willfully joins in the plan on at least one
occasion. Id. at 858.
The evidence presented at trial established that during
the time in question, a number of individuals, including Stephens,
were involved in selling cocaine base in the Gilpin Court area of
Richmond, Virginia. Lisa Madison testified that she purchased
cocaine base from Stephens for personal use as well as to resell.
Stephens was present during some of the occasions in which Madison
resold the drugs. Madison additionally brought customers to
Stephens in exchange for drugs.
Troy Brockenbrough testified that he on occasion served
as an intermediary between Stephens and the supplier. In such
instances, Brockenbrough would receive money from Stephens,
purchase cocaine base from the supplier, and give the drugs to
Stephens for distribution. Eventually, Brockenbrough introduced
Stephens to the supplier so that Stephens might deal directly with
him. Craig Bullock testified that he supplied Stephens with
distribution quantities of cocaine base on multiple occasions.
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Thus, construing the facts in the light most favorable to
the Government, it appears that Stephens was involved in “‘a
loosely-knit association of members linked . . . by their mutual
interest in sustaining the overall enterprise of catering to the
ultimate demands of a particular drug consumption market’”--the
Gilpin Court area. Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858 (quoting United States
v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993)). We therefore
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict. To the extent Stephens argues the Government’s case
rested almost entirely on the unreliable testimony of the
cooperating witnesses, it is not the province of this court to
second-guess the credibility determinations of the factfinder. See
United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We deny Stephens’s motion for an extension of time to file
a pro se supplemental brief. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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