Clark v. BASF Corporation

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-2024
RANDY BARRON CLARK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
BASF CORPORATION, Salaried Employees’ Pension
Plan,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (CA-03-213-1)
Submitted: February 23, 2005 Decided: June 15, 2005
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Phyllis A. Palmieri, LAW OFFICE OF PHYLLIS A. PALMIERI, Morganton,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Louis A. Bledsoe, III, Julian H.
Wright, Jr., ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Randy Barron Clark appeals the district court’s order and
judgment dismissing his complaint and first amended complaint with
prejudice and denying his motions for oral argument and for
discovery. Clark argues on appeal that he stated a claim for which
relief can be granted under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a) (2000), and pursuant to
principles of equitable estoppel due to an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty. Clark further argues that the district court erred
(1) in considering the pension plan document (Plan document)
attached to the BASF Corporation, Salaried Employees’ Pension
Plan’s (the Plan) motion to dismiss and in not granting Clark oral
argument on the matter; and (2) in concluding the documents
provided to Clark by the Plan were benefits projections rather than
plan amendments.
The district court generally took judicial notice of all
the documents attached to the Plan’s motion to dismiss,
constituting the various documents given to Clark by the Plan and
the written Plan document, “to the extent that they were part of
the public record from [Clark’s] previous action . . . .” Clark v.
BASF Salaried Employees’ Pension Plan, No. CA-03-213-1, at p. 4-5
(W.D.N.C. July 8, 2004) (District Court’s Mem. and Order). On
appeal, Clark only challenges the district court’s consideration of
the Plan document, apparently conceding that the other documents
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were part of the public record in his prior action. However, an
examination of the district court’s opinion reveals that the
district court did not merely rely upon judicial notice to consider
the Plan document. Rather, the district court considered the Plan
document because there was no dispute as to its authenticity, the
document was referenced in the complaint, and the document was
central to Clark’s claims.
We find the district court properly considered the Plan
document on the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., 5A Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1327
(3d ed. 2004) (“[W]hen the plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent
document as part of her pleading, a significant number of cases
from throughout the federal court system make it clear that the
defendant may introduce the document as an exhibit to a motion
attacking the sufficiency of the pleading; that certainly will be
true if the plaintiff has referred to the item in the complaint and
it is central to the affirmative case.”). Accordingly, we also
find the district court properly denied (a) Clark’s motion for oral
argument regarding the court’s consideration of the Plan document;
and (b) Clark’s motion for discovery, made on the assertion that
the district court would convert the motion into one for summary
judgment if it considered the Plan document.
Clark challenges as impermissible fact-finding the
district court’s reasoning that the documents provided to him by
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the Plan “were not the actual pension plan documents but
projections provided to [Clark] by the Plan about his estimated
pension benefits.” (District Court’s Mem. and Order at 7). On
their face, these various documents purport to be mere projections
of estimated pension benefits and refer to a separate written
pension plan document as controlling Clark’s actual benefits.
Accordingly, we find no error.
The district court assessed the Plan document and the
plan statements given to Clark and reasoned that Clark was not
entitled to the benefits projected in several plan statements. The
district court noted the plan statements erred to varying degrees
in crediting Clark for time that he was not vested in the Plan and
for an eleven-year period in which Clark was not employed by BASF.
The district court noted that the only relief Clark sought in his
complaint and amended complaint was for pension benefits in
accordance with the erroneous pension plan projections. The
district court found that such relief was unavailable under ERISA,
even on an equitable estoppel theory, as the relief would
effectively vary the terms of the formal plan by informal
communications. We find the district court properly concluded
Clark had failed to state a claim under ERISA.
We therefore affirm the district court’s order on the
reasoning of the district court. See Clark v. BASF Salaried
Employees’ Pension Plan, No. CA-03-213-1 (W.D.N.C. July 8, 2004).
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We modify the judgment, however, to reflect that the dismissal is
without prejudice. See Griggs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 385
F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2004).* Thus, we affirm the district court’s
order as modified. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
*
The court expresses no opinion as to the propriety or merits
of any potential claim for recessionary relief under ERISA.
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