United States v. Johnson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4674
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM H. JOHNSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Joseph Robert Goodwin,
District Judge. (CR-04-42)
Submitted: April 6, 2005 Decided: June 21, 2005
Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Edward H. Weis,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate
Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Kasey Warner,
United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
William Harold Johnson pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. The district court sentenced Johnson
under the federal sentencing guidelines to eighteen months
imprisonment. This sentence included an enhancement for possessing
a stolen firearm. The facts underlying this enhancement were found
by the district court by a preponderance of the evidence and were
neither charged in the indictment nor admitted by Johnson at the
guilty plea hearing.
Citing Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004),
Johnson argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because it was
based on facts that were neither charged in the indictment nor
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. He made the same argument in the
district court and was overruled based upon this court’s ruling in
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 125 S. Ct. 1051 (2005). After
Johnson’s sentencing, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and held that the federal sentencing
guidelines scheme, under which courts were required to impose
sentencing enhancements based on facts found by the court by a
preponderance of the evidence, violated the Sixth Amendment because
of its mandatory nature. Id. at 746, 750. The Court remedied the
constitutional violation by making the guidelines advisory through
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the removal of two statutory provisions that had rendered them
mandatory. Id. at 746, 756-57.
In light of Booker, we find that the district court erred
in sentencing Johnson under the mandatory guideline procedure.1
See United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding
that imposition of a sentence under the mandatory guidelines regime
is error). In addition, because the appropriate guideline range
without the firearm enhancement would have permitted a lower
sentence, we find that the error was not harmless. See United
States v. Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that,
on harmless error review, Government bears the burden of showing
that the sentence on remand would not be less than that imposed).
Therefore, we affirm Johnson’s conviction, vacate his sentence and
remand for proceedings consistent with Booker.2 While we express
1
Just as we noted in United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540,
545 n.4 (4th Cir. 2005), “[w]e of course offer no criticism of the
district judge, who followed the law and procedure in effect at the
time” of Johnson’s sentencing. See generally Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (stating that an error is “plain”
if “the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary
to the law at the time of appeal”).
2
Although the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory,
Booker makes clear that a sentencing court must still “consult
[the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 125
S. Ct. at 767. On remand, the district court should first
determine the appropriate sentencing range under the guidelines.
Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The court should consider this sentencing
range along with the other factors described in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), and then impose a sentence. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546.
If that sentence falls outside the guidelines range, the court
should explain its reasons for the departure, as required by 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The sentence must
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no opinion on an appropriate sentence, we do note that, contrary to
Johnson’s argument on appeal, the district court retains the
authority to sentence Johnson to a term of supervised release. We
deny Johnson’s motion to expedite as moot. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
be within the statutorily prescribed range and reasonable. Id. at
547.
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