Dillon v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2221
CYNTHIA DILLON,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING
COMMISSION,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-2309
CYNTHIA DILLON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING
COMMISSION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. William Connelly, Magistrate Judge.
(8:04-cv-00994)
Submitted: November 19, 2007 Decided: December 11, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Adrian Robert Gardner, General Counsel, William C. Dickerson,
Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellant/Cross-appellee. Michael P.
Deeds, KESTELL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C., for Appellee/Cross-
appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated appeals arise from Cynthia Dillon’s
successful action against the Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Commission (“Commission”), alleging that she was
wrongfully terminated in violation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000) (“FMLA”). The Commission
asserts that the district court erred when it denied its motions
for judgment as a matter of law, as well as when it denied in part
its motion in limine and overruled its evidentiary objections to
exclude Dillon’s post-termination evidence regarding her
qualification for FMLA protection. Dillon has cross-appealed and
asserts that the district court erred when it granted, in part, the
Commission’s summary judgment motion and dismissed her liquidated
damages claim, and when it reduced the jury’s backpay award.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We find that the district court,1 in a thorough
memorandum opinion explaining its denial of the Commission’s
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, properly determined
that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict in Dillon’s
favor. See Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536,
543 (4th Cir. 2003). Moreover, because it was Dillon’s burden to
establish that her leave qualified for FMLA protection, see
1
The parties consented to the exercise of the district court’s
jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
(2000).
- 3 -
Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 549 (4th
Cir. 2006), the district court correctly found Dillon’s post-
termination evidence of which the Commission was unaware to be
relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Commission’s assertions to
the contrary, we find that any prejudicial effect that this
evidence may have had was significantly reduced by the district
court’s limiting instruction to the jury to consider the post-
termination evidence only in the context of determining whether
Dillon’s leave qualified for FMLA protection, and not whether the
Commission violated the Act. See United States v. Love, 134 F.3d
595, 603 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that we will not overturn a
district court’s Fed. R. Evid. 403 judgment “except under the most
extraordinary of circumstances, where a trial court’s discretion
has been plainly abused”) (internal brackets and quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Francisco, 35 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir.
1994) (“We generally follow the presumption that the jury obeyed
the limiting instructions of the district court”).2
2
The Commission also summarily asserts that the district court
erred in refusing to answer the jury’s post-instruction question as
to whether violating the Commission’s merit rules constituted
“insubordination.” We find that the district court appropriately
directed the jury to make its own determination by relying on the
district court’s jury instruction defining “insubordination.” See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
(“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge.”).
- 4 -
We also conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in granting the Commission summary judgment on
Dillon’s liquidated damages claim. See Taylor v. Progress Energy,
Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 459-60 (4th Cir. 2007) (analogizing FMLA claims
to Fair Labor Standards Act claims); Mayhew v. Wells, 125 F.3d 216,
218 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that this court reviews the district
court’s denial of liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act for abuse of discretion). The record supports the district
court’s conclusion that the Commission considered the possibility
that Dillon’s request for leave constituted a request for FMLA
leave and gave her several opportunities to clarify her
relationship with her grandmother. Although the jury later found
the Commission’s determination that Dillon’s leave was not FMLA-
protected to be incorrect, the record establishes that the
Commission reasonably believed Dillon’s leave did not qualify for
FMLA protection. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Dillon’s request for
liquidated damages. Cf. Roy v. County of Lexington, SC, 141 F.3d
533, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding district court’s denial of
liquidated damages claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act where
there was no evidence the defendant’s actions were designed to
circumvent the Act).
Last, we find that the district court did not err when it
amended the judgment reducing Dillon’s backpay award to reflect the
- 5 -
evidence presented by Dillon. See State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v.
Barton, 897 F.2d 729, 733 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Neither the existence,
causation nor amount of damages can be left to conjecture, guess or
speculation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s final amended judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 6 -