Adkins v. Coventry Health Care, Inc.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1713
JENNIFER A. ADKINS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE, INCORPORATED, a Delaware
Corporation; SOUTHERN HEALTH SERVICES,
INCORPORATED, a Virginia Corporation,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (CA-04-825)
Submitted: January 25, 2006 Decided: March 1, 2006
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Thorsen, THORSEN & SCHER, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Vernon E. Inge, Jr., Charles G. Meyer, III, Joan C.
McKenna, LECLAIR RYAN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Jennifer A. Adkins appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Coventry Health Care, Inc. and
Southern Health Services, Inc. (collectively "Coventry") in her
civil action alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Having reviewed the
record and found no reversible error, we affirm.
Adkins's complaint alleged “harassing, discriminatory and
retaliatory employment actions taken against her because of her
sex, female, and assert[ed] common law state claims for breach of
contract and/or quantum meruit.”1 Joint Appendix 145. Adkins
claims that she was sexually stereotyped and discriminated against
because she was a strong, forthright female in a male-dominated
senior management culture. According to Adkins, these
impermissibly gender-based motives led Coventry to eliminate her
position and assign her primary job responsibilities to two male
employees.
Because Adkins did not present direct evidence of
discrimination, the district court properly found that she must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by satisfying the
1
The district court dismissed the breach of contract claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted
summary judgment to Coventry as to the quantum meruit claim.
Adkins challenges neither ruling in her brief on appeal.
Therefore, we deem those issues to be waived. See Tucker v.
Waddell, 83 F.3d 688, 690 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996) (failing to present
argument in appellate brief waives appellate review).
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four-prong, indirect proof scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To do so, Adkins must
show that (I) she is a member of a protected class; (ii) she
suffered an adverse employment action; (iii) at the time of the
adverse employment action, she was performing at a level that met
Coventry's legitimate job expectations; and (iv) her position
remained open or was filled by a similarly qualified individual
outside of the protected class. See Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp.,
12 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1993).
We are persuaded by the district court's analysis that Adkins
failed to satisfy either the third or the fourth prong of the
indirect proof scheme. Although the evaluations of Adkins's work,
particularly during her rise to an executive position, were
generally positive, it is undisputed that they referenced poor
leadership and management skills, which became increasingly
significant as she assumed supervisory responsibilities. Further,
Adkins acknowledges that the responsibilities of her position, when
eliminated, were divided among one male and two female employees.2
Therefore, Adkins is unable to establish that she was replaced by
an individual outside of her protected class. She also fails to
establish that proof of the fourth prong is unnecessary in the
2
Although the two female employees who inherited some of her
responsibilities report to a male employee, this fact does not
establish that Adkins was replaced by a male employee. Adkins also
reported to a male employee when she held those responsibilities.
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present case. See Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir.
1998) (identifying exceptions to the need to establish the fourth
prong).
Finally, even if Adkins had established a prima facie case,
she failed to proffer evidence beyond bare allegations of sexual
stereotyping in a male-dominated culture that Coventry's reason for
eliminating her position was a pretext for discrimination.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
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