Gresham v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2345
THOMAS W. GRESHAM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
LUMBERMEN’S MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CA-
03-2243-01-JFM)
Submitted: March 6, 2006 Decided: March 24, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Francis J. Collins, KAHN, SMITH & COLLINS, P.A., Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Jessica R. Hughes, Thomas J. Piskorski,
SEYFARTH SHAW, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Thomas W. Gresham appeals an order of the district court
granting summary judgment to Kemper Casualty Company (Kemper)* on
Gresham’s claim under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law
(the “Wage Payment Act”), see Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-501to 3-509 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005). We affirm.
I.
The facts are set forth fully in our previous opinion, see
Gresham v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 404 F.3d 253, 256-57 (4th
Cir. 2005), and need be only briefly summarized here. Gresham was
hired by Kemper to help develop a line of professional liability
insurance. His compensation package included a severance benefit
payable upon “terminat[ion] without cause.” J.A. 7. Gresham
subsequently accepted an offer of employment from The St. Paul
Insurance Companies after that company purchased the professional
liability line from Kemper.
Gresham thereafter sought payment of the severance benefit,
which Kemper refused on the basis of Gresham’s “continued
employment.” Id. at 34. Gresham subsequently filed this action
*
Kemper is a subsidiary of Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty
Company, the named defendant in this action. Although
“Lumbermen’s” has been spelled a variety of ways during the course
of this litigation, we use the spelling adopted in our prior
opinion. See Gresham v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 404 F.3d 253(4th Cir. 2005).
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claiming breach of contract and violation of the Wage Payment Act.
A third count alleged an alternative claim for violation of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), see 29
U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (West 1999), in the event the district
court determined that the employment agreement between Gresham and
Kemper constituted an “employee welfare benefit plan” within the
meaning of ERISA, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (West 1999). The
district court granted summary judgment to Kemper, reasoning that
Kemper had terminated Gresham “for cause” under the terms of his
employment agreement because “a corporate executive cannot be
simultaneously performing effective services to two different
companies at the same time.” J.A. 218.
We reversed based on the rule that “an employee is
‘terminated’ for purposes of a severance agreement when his
employer sells the business in which the employee works.” Gresham,
404 F.3d at 262. In the course of reaching this conclusion, we
determined that Gresham’s claims were not preempted by ERISA,
despite arguably contrary dictum in Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1480 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). See Gresham,
404 F.3d at 257-59. We remanded Gresham’s claim under the Wage
Payment Act for further proceedings. See id. at 263 n.6.
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II.
The Wage Payment Act authorizes an award of up to treble
damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs, if the failure to pay is
not the result of a “bona fide dispute.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. &
Empl. § 3-507.1(b); see Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 745 A.2d
1026, 1030 (Md. 2000). The parties agree that the test for whether
a dispute is bona fide is an objective one.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the decision of the
district court, and the applicable law, we affirm on the reasoning
of the district court. See Gresham v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co.,
2005 WL 3020121, at *3-*6 (D. Md. Nov. 10, 2005). We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before us and oral argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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