United States v. Meadows

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4396
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIE MEADOWS, a/k/a Chilly Willie,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 04-4498
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
FREDRICK LAMAR SMITH, a/k/a Red Fred,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 04-4514
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ADRIAN LAMONT JETER, a/k/a Man,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(CR-03-1094)
Submitted: January 31, 2006 Decided: March 3, 2006
Before WILLIAMS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hervery B. O. Young, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina; William H. Ehlies, II, Greenville, South Carolina;
Melissa R. Kimbrough, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.
Elizabeth Jean Howard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to written plea agreements, Willie Meadows,
Fredrick Lamar Smith, and Adrian Lamont Jeter each pled guilty to
conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. Meadows was sentenced to
120 months imprisonment, and Smith and Jeter each were sentenced to
360 months. They appeal from their convictions and sentences.
Their attorneys have filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the validity of the
guilty pleas and the propriety of the sentences. At the direction
of the court, counsel and the Defendants filed supplemental briefs
challenging the validity of their sentences under United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Defendants asserted additional
claims in their pro se supplemental briefs. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the Defendants’ convictions and sentences.
We find that the Defendants’ guilty pleas were knowingly
and voluntarily entered after a thorough hearing pursuant to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11. Each Defendant was properly advised of his rights,
the offense charged, the maximum sentence for the offense, and the
mandatory minimum sentences applicable. The court also determined
that there was an independent factual basis for the pleas and that
the pleas were not coerced or influenced by any promises. See
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Next, Smith and Jeter argue that the district court erred
in denying their motions to withdraw their guilty pleas. We review
the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421,
424 (4th Cir. 2000). The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that a “fair and just reason” supports his request to
withdraw his plea. Id. This court closely scrutinizes the Rule 11
colloquy and attaches a strong presumption that the plea is final
and binding if the Rule 11 proceeding is adequate. United States
v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992). We have reviewed the
transcript of Smith’s and Jeter’s Rule 11 colloquies and the record
in light of the relevant factors, see United States v. Moore, 931
F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991), and we find no abuse of discretion
by the district court in denying their motions to withdraw their
guilty pleas. Thus, we affirm Smith’s and Jeter’s convictions.
Each of the Defendants have challenged their sentences
pursuant to United States v. Booker, which was decided while their
appeals were pending. In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the
mandatory guidelines scheme that provided for sentence enhancements
based on facts found by the court violated the Sixth Amendment.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746-48, 755-56. The Court remedied the
constitutional violation by severing and excising the statutory
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provisions that mandate sentencing and appellate review under the
guidelines, thus making the guidelines advisory. Id. at 756-57.
Subsequently, in United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540,
546 (4th Cir. 2005), this court held that a sentence that was
imposed under the pre-Booker mandatory sentencing scheme and was
enhanced based on facts found by the court, not by a jury or
admitted by the defendant, constitutes plain error that affects the
defendant’s substantial rights and warrants reversal under Booker
when the record does not disclose what discretionary sentence the
district court would have imposed under an advisory guideline
scheme. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-56.
Meadows’ sentence
Meadows contends that the district court erred in
enhancing his sentence based on a determination that the drug type
was the crack form of cocaine base. He asserts that, because there
were no stipulations that the drug type was crack, he should be
sentenced pursuant to the powder cocaine guidelines.
Meadows was charged with conspiracy to “distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base
(commonly known as ‘crack’ cocaine).” He pled guilty to the lesser
included offense of conspiracy with respect to five grams or more
of crack and he and the government stipulated that he would be held
accountable for 20 to 35 grams of cocaine base. In light of the
language of the indictment and Meadows’ admissions in his plea
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agreement, we find no judicial factfinding as to drug type, and
thus no potential Booker error.
Meadows also argues that his sentence was erroneously
enhanced in violation of the rule announced in Booker. He argues
that, due to the stipulated drug quantity, the guideline range
applicable to him was 84 to 105 months. However, he was sentenced
to 120 months. This sentence was not the result of judicial
factfinding, but rather was based on the fact that he had a prior
conviction for distribution of cocaine base and the government
filed an information of enhanced sentences pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 851 (2000). Thus, the district court properly sentenced him to
120 months, the applicable mandatory minimum sentence.
Smith’s sentence
At sentencing, Smith was held accountable for 2840.98
grams of crack. This quantity placed him at base offense level 38.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003) (“1.5 KG or
more of Cocaine Base”). With 14 criminal history points, he was in
criminal history category VI, and his guideline range was 360 to
life. Additionally, Smith had two prior convictions for a
controlled substance offense or a crime of violence, and therefore
he was properly sentenced as a career criminal with a guideline
range of 360 to life, without regard to the drug quantity. See
United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir.) (finding no
plain error under Booker in the district court’s designation of
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Harp as a career offender), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 297 (2005);
see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 233-35
(1998).
Smith contends that the amount of drugs was determined,
in part, by statements he made while cooperating. He asserts that
this is in violation of the plea agreement, which provided that
self-incriminating statements he made under the terms of the plea
agreement would not be used against him in determining his
guideline range.
Smith’s admissions to certain drug quantities were made
prior to the plea agreement and were specifically excluded from the
immunity agreement in the plea bargain. Thus, the district court
correctly used these figures to determine Smith’s offense level.
However, because Smith was sentenced as a career offender, the drug
quantity is irrelevant.
Jeter’s sentence
Jeter also argues that his sentence was increased based
on the quantity of drugs attributed to him. Like Smith, Jeter
asserts that the amount of drugs was determined, in part, by
statements he made while cooperating. Jeter’s plea agreement also
provided that information he provided under the terms of the
agreement would not be used against him. However, the agreement
also specifically excluded information known to the attorneys for
the government prior to the date of the agreement.
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Jeter’s statement to the officials was given before he
signed the plea agreement. Thus, the immunity statement in the
plea agreement does not apply to Jeter’s admissions made prior to
the agreement. The district court correctly used these figures to
determine Jeter’s offense level.
Jeter was attributed with 1701 grams of crack, which
placed him in offense level 38. USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1) (“1.5 KG or
more of Cocaine Base”). This amount was determined only by
reference to the amounts Jeter personally admitted to in his
statement to the officials. Because Jeter admitted to the drug
amounts that resulted in his offense level, there was no
enhancement based on judicial factfinding with respect to his base
offense level, and thus no error under Booker.
Jeter also challenges the determination that he was a
career offender. The career offender guideline applies to persons
who have two prior convictions for either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense. USSG § 4B1.1(a). We find that Jeter
was properly sentenced as career offender. He had two previous
qualifying convictions: one for conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine base and one for attempted burglary.
Although he contends that his burglary conviction was not a crime
of violence, “burglary of a dwelling” is specifically included in
the definition of “crime of violence.” USSG § 4B1.2(a).
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Jeter argues that the career offender enhancement
increased his sentence beyond that to which he pled guilty, in
violation of Booker. The increase in Jeter’s sentence was based on
prior convictions, not factual findings by the judge, and therefore
there was no error. See Harp, 406 F.3d at 247; Almendarez-Torres,
523 U.S. at 233-35.
Jeter and Smith both argue that the district court erred
by declining to adjust their offense levels downward for acceptance
of responsibility. USSG § 3E1.1(a). Smith and Jeter moved to
withdraw their guilty pleas. In support of the motions, the
district court found that they made inconsistent statements and
also attempted to minimize their parts in the conspiracy. We find
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that they
failed to fully accept responsibility for their conduct. See
United States v. Kise, 369 F.3d 766, 771 (4th Cir. 2004); USSG
§ 3E1.1.
Counsel contends that the district court should have
sentenced the Defendants below the guideline range to account for
the 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between powder and crack cocaine
sentences. This court has consistently upheld the validity of this
sentencing disparity. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,
876 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96,
99-100 (4th Cir. 1995). Thus, we do not find the sentences imposed
to be unreasonable. Moreover, “the record as a whole provides no
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nonspeculative basis for concluding that the treatment of the
guidelines as mandatory ‘affect[ed] the district court’s selection
of the sentence imposed.’” United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208,
223 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 668 (2005). Therefore, we
conclude that the Defendants cannot show that their substantial
rights were affected by the district court’s imposition of a
sentence under the mandatory guidelines as they were in effect when
the Defendants were sentenced. Id. at 225.
Finally, the Defendants assert that their attorneys
provided ineffective assistance. Claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record
conclusively establishes ineffective assistance. United States v.
Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). Our review of the
record reveals that the Defendants have failed to meet the high
burden necessary to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims
on direct appeal.
In conclusion, we affirm the Defendants’ convictions and
sentences. We also deny Jeter’s motion for production of
documents, to withdraw Counsel’s appeal brief, and to file a pro se
appeal. This court requires that counsel inform their clients, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
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withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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