United States v. Spivey

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4657
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
REGINALD LARUE SPIVEY, a/k/a Buddy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Malcolm J. Howard,
District Judge. (CR-03-23)
Submitted: February 13, 2006 Decided: March 8, 2006
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
William Lee Davis, III, Lumberton, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Frank DeArmon Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne Margaret Hayes,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Larue Spivey appeals his sentence of 410 months
of imprisonment imposed after a jury trial and conviction of one
count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base and at least five
kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1);
one count of distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (Count 2); one count of possession with intent to
distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base and 500 grams of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 3); and one
count of possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(2). The
jury also found a forfeiture of $1,000,000 in the superseding bill
of indictment. Counsel has filed an Anders1 brief asserting that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Spivey was notified of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, and has done so,
challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress,
and challenging his sentence. Because we conclude that Spivey’s
sentence was based upon facts not charged in the indictment or
admitted to by Spivey, we vacate his sentence and remand.2
1
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2
Just as we noted in Hughes, 401 F.3d at 545 n.4, “[w]e of
course offer no criticism of the district judge, who followed the
law and procedure in effect at the time” of Spivey’s sentencing.
See generally Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)
(stating that an error is ‘plain’ if “the law at the time of trial
- 2 -
In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the
Supreme Court applied the rationale of Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004), to the federal sentencing guidelines and held that
the mandatory guidelines scheme that provided for sentence
enhancements based on facts found by the court by a preponderance
of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
at 746-48, 755-56 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The Court
remedied the constitutional violation by severing and excising the
statutory provisions that mandate sentencing and appellate review
under the guidelines, thus making the guidelines advisory. Id. at
756-57 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). Subsequently, in United
States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005), this court
held that a sentence that was imposed under the pre-Booker
mandatory sentencing scheme and was enhanced based on facts found
by the court, not by a jury (or, in a guilty plea case, not
admitted to by the defendant), constitutes plain error that affects
the defendant’s substantial rights and warrants reversal under
Booker when the record does not disclose what discretionary
sentence the district court would have imposed under an advisory
guidelines scheme. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-56. We directed
sentencing courts to calculate the appropriate guidelines range,
consider that range in conjunction with other relevant factors
was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal”).
- 3 -
under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2004), and impose a sentence. If the district court imposes a
sentence outside the guidelines range, the court should state its
reasons for doing so. Id. at 546.
Spivey timely objected to his sentence, citing Blakely.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Spivey’s base
offense level was not properly determined because it was based on
drug quantities not alleged in the indictment, found by the jury,
or admitted to by Spivey. In addition, Spivey received a two-level
enhancement of his offense level for being a leader or organizer in
the conspiracy, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 3A1.2(b)(1) (2003). We conclude also that the imposition of this
enhancement was error under the Sixth Amendment as applied in
Booker, because the facts supporting this enhancement were not
alleged in the indictment, found beyond a reasonable doubt, or
admitted by Spivey, and because, absent this enhancement and based
upon the additional drug quantities upon which Spivey was sentenced
beyond those set forth in the indictment, Spivey’s guidelines range
would have been below the range in which Spivey was sentenced.
We have further reviewed Spivey’s challenge to the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We pay great
deference to the district court’s findings of probable cause in
relation to warrants. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
While we review the legal determinations underlying the district
- 4 -
court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo, United States v.
Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 671 (4th Cir. 2003), we review for clear
error the factual findings underlying the district court’s
decision, and conduct such review of the facts in the light most
favorable to the Government, giving “due weight to inferences drawn
from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996);
Hamlin, 319 F.3d at 671. Under this standard, we find no merit to
Spivey’s challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress.
As required by Anders, we have examined the entire record
and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm Spivey’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for
resentencing in accordance with Booker and Hughes.3 We deny
Spivey’s motion for general relief, and dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
3
Although the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory,
Booker makes clear that a sentencing court must still “consult
[the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 125
S. Ct. at 767. On remand, the district court should first determine
the appropriate sentencing range under the guidelines, making all
factual findings appropriate for that determination. See Hughes,
401 F.3d at 546. The court should consider this sentencing range
along with the other factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2000), and then impose a sentence. Id. If that sentence falls
outside the guidelines range, the court should explain its reasons
for the departure as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2000).
Id. The sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range
. . . and reasonable.” Id. at 546-47.
- 5 -
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
- 6 -