Farmer v. McBride

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-7713
PAUL FARMER,
Petitioner - Appellee,
versus
THOMAS MCBRIDE, Warden, Mount Olive
Correctional Complex,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, Chief
District Judge. (CA-03-2077-5)
Argued: March 15, 2006 Decided: April 26, 2006
Before MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and James P. JONES, Chief
United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia,
sitting by designation.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Kristen Leigh Keller, RALEIGH COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellant. Geoffrey Jonathan
Michael, ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Sarah M. Brackney, ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P., Washington,
D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Thomas McBride, Warden of the Mount Olive Correctional Complex
in West Virginia, appeals the district court’s order adopting the
findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting
petitioner Paul Farmer a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2005). Because McBride failed
to file objections to the magistrate’s report and recommendation
with the district court, Farmer claims that McBride has waived his
right to appeal to this court. We agree and, accordingly, dismiss
the appeal.1
I.
In June 1992, a West Virginia state court jury convicted
Farmer of first degree murder, kidnaping, and conspiracy, arising
out of the kidnaping and murder of John Maxwell in Raleigh County,
West Virginia. Farmer was sentenced to two consecutive life terms
for the murder and kidnaping convictions, and to a concurrent term
of up to five years for the conspiracy conviction. The convictions
and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Farmer,
445 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1994) (per curiam). Kristen Keller, Chief
1
At oral argument, Farmer challenged the panel as improperly
constituted because it includes a district court judge, who sits by
designation of the Chief Judge of this circuit. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 292 (West 1993). We thereafter afforded Farmer the opportunity
to file a supplemental brief on the issue. We reject the challenge
to the panel and hold that the district judge has been properly and
constitutionally designated to sit by the Chief Judge.
2
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Raleigh County (the “Prosecuting
Attorney”), represented the State of West Virginia at trial, on
direct appeal, and in the following state habeas proceedings.
On August 18, 2003, having unsuccessfully pursued state post-
conviction relief, Farmer filed against McBride a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the district court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254.
Farmer raised several claims for relief, including claims that his
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was
violated by the trial court’s restriction of his access to counsel
during a weekend break in the trial, see Geders v. United States,
425 U.S. 80 (1976), and by his trial counsel’s alleged failure to
properly preserve the Geders claim on direct appeal, see Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Office of the Attorney
General for the State of West Virginia (the “Attorney General”)
entered an appearance on behalf of McBride, and filed an answer,
motion to dismiss, and motion for summary judgment.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2005), the
case was referred to a magistrate judge for proposed findings and
a recommendation. On August 30, 2004, the magistrate judge issued
his Proposed Findings and Recommendation that Farmer’s petition be
granted based on his Geders claim, but that the district court
reject Farmer’s remaining grounds for relief. Contained within the
Proposed Findings and Recommendation was a clear warning to the
parties that their failure to file timely written objections to the
3
magistrate judge’s report “shall constitute a waiver of de novo
review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by
the Circuit Court of Appeals.” J.A. 255. Farmer filed timely
objections to those portions of the Findings and Recommendation
which rejected his additional claims for relief; McBride filed no
objections.
On September 17, 2004, the district court noted the absence of
any objections on the part of McBride, conducted de novo review of
the issues raised by Farmer in his objections, and entered an order
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant habeas
relief. Accordingly, the district court denied McBride’s motion to
dismiss and for summary judgment, granted Farmer habeas relief
under § 2254(d), and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of
Raleigh County.
On October 18, 2004, after the Raleigh County Circuit Court
received notice of the remand, the Prosecuting Attorney filed a
notice of appearance and notice of appeal on behalf of McBride in
this court, seeking to appeal the district court’s grant of habeas
relief. The Attorney General, however, made no effort to appeal
the district court’s decision on behalf of McBride, nor has it
appeared or offered any support of the appeal before this court.
On January 24, 2005, Farmer moved to dismiss the appeal based
on McBride’s failure to object to the magistrate judge’s findings
4
and recommendation. We deferred action on the motion pending
formal briefing and oral argument.2
II.
The Federal Magistrate’s Act provides that “[w]ithin ten days
after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file
written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as
provided by rules of court.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (providing that “[w]ithin 10 days after being
served with a copy of the [magistrate judge’s] recommended
disposition [of a prisoner petition], a party may serve and file
specific, written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations.”). The district court is only required to review
de novo those portions of the report to which specific objections
have been made, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1),3 and need not conduct
2
Farmer has not filed a cross-appeal contesting the district
court’s denial of relief based upon the issues and objections that
he raised below.
3
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(“A judge of the court shall make
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection
is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.”);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(“The district judge to whom the case
is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or
after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge’s
disposition to which specific written objection has been made in
accordance with this rule. The district judge may accept, reject,
or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.”).
5
de novo review “when a party makes general and conclusory
objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the
magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations,” Orpiano
v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of
objections, the district court is not required to explain its
reasons for adopting the report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,
200 (4th Cir. 1983).
“The law in this circuit is clear. If written objections to
a magistrate judge’s recommendations are not filed with the
district court within ten days, a party waives its right to an
appeal.” Wells v. Shriners Hosp., 109 F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir.
1997); see Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845 (4th Cir. 1985)
(noting the general rule that “a party who fails to object to a
magistrate’s report is barred from appealing the judgment of a
district court adopting the magistrate’s findings”); see also
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985) (holding “that a court of
appeals may adopt a rule conditioning appeal, when taken from a
district court judgment that adopts a magistrate’s recommendation,
upon the filing of objections with the district court identifying
those issues on which further review is desired”). As noted by
this court,
the waiver rule advances the purposes of the Federal
Magistrates Act. It allows district courts to assign
work to magistrate judges while reserving for themselves
final authority over the judgments. The absence of a
waiver rule would impose a serious incongruity on the
district court’s decision-making process – vesting it
6
with the duty to decide issues based on the magistrate’s
findings but depriving it of the opportunity to correct
those findings when the litigant has identified a
possible error. Further, without a waiver rule,
litigants would have no incentive to make objections at
the trial level; in fact they might even be encouraged to
bypass the district court entirely, even though Congress
has lodged the primary responsibility for supervision of
federal magistrates’ functions with that judicial body.
Wells, 109 F.3d at 200 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also Thomas, 474 U.S. at 147, 148 (noting that the
waiver rule “is supported by the sound considerations of judicial
economy” and “prevents a litigant from ‘sandbagging’ the district
judge by failing to object and then appealing”).
McBride acknowledges our waiver rule, and does not dispute
that his failure to object within the time limit would ordinarily
constitute a waiver of his right to appeal. His sole contention is
that we should exercise our discretion to permit the appeal under
the “interests of justice” exception to the waiver rule recognized
by the Supreme Court. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 155 (noting that
“because the rule is a nonjurisdictional waiver provision, the
Court of Appeals may excuse the default in the interests of
justice”).
Although we have recognized that the “the [waiver] rule is not
absolute,” Wright, 766 F.2d at 845, we have thus far recognized an
exception only in the limited context of “procedural ambush.”
United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984).
Specifically, we have held that a pro se litigant’s failure to
7
object will not bar an appeal if the litigant “received no notice
of the consequences of a failure to object to the magistrate’s
report.” Wright, 766 F.2d at 847. We have, however, refused to
extend the exception to parties represented by counsel presumed to
know the applicable rules regarding their procedural obligations.
See Wells, 109 F.3d at 199-200.
In this case, the Prosecuting Attorney urges us to expand the
interests-of-justice exception to the waiver in this case because
McBride believes he had meritorious objections that should have
been raised,4 the West Virginia Attorney General abandoned its
representation of McBride by failing to file those objections, and
the conviction was for a serious crime. In addition, the
Prosecuting Attorney asserts that we should apply the exception
because she (as opposed to McBride) was procedurally ambushed by
the failure to receive notification of the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendation. The confluence of these factors, the
Prosecuting Attorney argues, makes this “just the extraordinary
case which the United States Supreme Court had in mind when it
‘emphasize[d] that . . . the Court of Appeals may excuse the
4
Specifically, McBride asserts that the West Virginia Supreme
Court’s adjudication of Farmer’s Sixth Amendment claim is not
contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent and that the West Virginia Supreme Court’s alternative
decision to reject the claim based upon procedural default should
have precluded the grant of habeas relief.
8
default in the interests of justice.’” Brief of Appellant at 10
(quoting Thomas, 474 U.S. at 155).
First, we are unpersuaded by the argument that McBride’s
default should be excused simply because the Prosecuting Attorney
did not receive notification of the magistrate’s findings and
recommendation in time to file objections. McBride was properly
represented by the Attorney General’s Office in West Virginia,
which possesses clear statutory authority to represent such state
officials in federal habeas proceedings, and there is no dispute
that the Attorney General received notice. See Manchin v.
Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 918 (W. Va. 1982) (noting that the West
Virginia statutes clearly designate the Attorney General as the
legal advisor and representative of state officers sued in their
official capacities, and that the “Attorney General is required to
give legal advice, to prosecute and defend suits and to appear in
court on their behalf”); W. Va. Code § 5-3-1 (providing that “[t]he
attorney general . . . shall prosecute and defend suits, actions,
and other legal proceedings, and generally render and perform all
other legal services, whenever required to do so, in writing, by
the . . . head of any state educational, correctional, penal or
eleemosynary institution”); see also W. Va. Code § 5-3-2 (providing
that “[t]he attorney general shall appear as counsel for the state
in all causes pending in the supreme court of appeals, or in any
9
federal court, in which the state is interested. . . .”).5
Accordingly, the district court had no obligation to notify the
Prosecuting Attorney in addition to the Attorney General of the
pending proceedings or the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendation. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West 1994) (“Prior to the
hearing of a habeas corpus proceeding in behalf of a person in
custody of State officers or by virtue of State laws notice shall
be served on the attorney general or other appropriate officer of
such State as the justice or judge at the time of issuing the writ
shall direct”). Thus, her failure to receive notice is not grounds
for excusing McBride’s default.
There is also no support for the Prosecuting Attorney’s claim
that the Attorney General “abandoned” its representation of
McBride; indeed, the record leads more logically to the conclusion
that the Attorney General simply made a reasonable choice not to
5
The statute also provides that the Attorney General “may
require the several prosecuting attorneys to perform, within the
respective counties in which they are elected, any of the legal
duties required to be performed by the attorney general which are
not inconsistent with the duties of the prosecuting attorneys as
the legal representatives of their respective counties.” Id.(emphasis added). There is no indication that the Attorney General
delegated its representation of McBride to the Prosecuting Attorney
at any point in these proceedings. However, at oral argument, the
Prosecuting Attorney asserted that she and the other local
prosecuting attorneys have such authority in the event the Attorney
General does not proceed further, and neither the parties, nor the
Attorney General, have challenged the Prosecuting Attorney’s
authority to represent McBride in these proceedings. Accordingly,
we assume that such authority was present for purposes of this
case.
10
pursue the issue in the wake of the magistrate judge’s
recommendation. The magistrate judge issued his proposed findings
and recommendation in August 2004. Although not required to do so
for McBride, who was represented by counsel, the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendation specifically notified the parties of
their obligation to file objections in order to preserve any right
to de novo review by the district court or appellate review by the
court of appeals. The district court issued its decision adopting
the recommendation on September 17, 2004. Approximately one week
later, the Circuit Court of Raleigh County received the remanded
file. At no time during this process did the Attorney General seek
an extension from the district court to file objections, offer any
explanation for its decision not to file objections, or seek
reconsideration of the district court’s decision. In the month-
long interim between the issuance of the district court’s order and
the Prosecuting Attorney’s filing of an appeal to this court, the
Attorney General again made no efforts to challenge the district
court’s decision. The Attorney General has not entered an
appearance in this appeal, nor offered any assistance to the
Prosecuting Attorney in her pursuit of this appeal. Thus, while
Farmer argues that the purported “failures” on the part of the
Attorney General should lead us to the conclusion that it
“abandoned” its representation of McBride, we are led to the much
different conclusion that the Attorney General, on behalf of
11
McBride, agreed with the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendation, as well as the district court’s decision, and made
a conscious and voluntary choice not to file objections or pursue
an appeal to this court.
In sum, we are unpersuaded by the Prosecuting Attorney’s claim
that we should excuse the waiver because the West Virginia Attorney
General’s Office failed to file objections and she did not receive
notice of the proceedings in time to file objections herself. The
Attorney General was the appropriate state officer to represent
McBride and the appropriate entity to receive notice from the
court. The magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation clearly
alerted all parties of their procedural obligations. The record
before us indicates nothing other than that the Attorney General’s
decision not to object was knowingly and voluntarily made.
Furthermore, even if we were directed to evidence that the Attorney
General’s office was negligent in its duties, we would not excuse
the default. McBride has pointed us to no case in which the
failure to object has been excused where the party who failed to
object was represented by counsel, and we have previously refused
to excuse such a default in a case where a prisoner who was
represented by counsel failed to timely file objections to a
magistrate’s recommendation. See Wells, 109 F.3d at 199-200; cf.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(I) (providing that ineffectiveness or
incompetence of counsel in a federal collateral post-conviction
12
relief proceeding is not a ground for relief in a § 2254
proceeding). We likewise decline to excuse the default, under an
“interests of justice” exception, simply because a party obtains
substitute counsel who wishes to undo his or her predecessor’s
failure to file objections in order to pursue an appeal.
We are equally unpersuaded by McBride’s assertion that we
should exercise our discretion to excuse the default because he had
meritorious objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendation and because Farmer’s conviction involved the serious
crime of kidnaping and murder.
As an initial premise, we note that McBride has pointed us to
no authority to support his claim that the seriousness of the crime
is a factor to be considered in determining whether a failure to
object should be excused. This court has previously applied the
waiver rule in a case involving a state court conviction for a
serious crime, see Carr v. Hutto, 737 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (holding that state prisoner, who had been convicted of
robbery, rape, abduction, and use of a firearm in the commission of
a felony, waived his right to appeal the district court’s denial of
his petition for writ of habeas corpus because he objected to
magistrate’s report after the deadline), and the Supreme Court did
not seem troubled by the fact that a state murder conviction was
before them when it upheld the circuit court’s authority to impose
13
such a waiver, see Thomas, 474 U.S. at 155 (upholding waiver where
the defendant, convicted of murder, failed to file objections).
McBride’s claim that we should excuse his default under the
“interests of justice” exception because he can demonstrate the
existence of meritorious objections to the magistrate’s
recommendation is similarly unpersuasive. The waiver rule is a
procedural rule designed to allow district courts to “assign work
to magistrate judges while reserving for themselves final authority
over the judgments.” Wells, 109 F.3d at 200. If the “interests of
justice” exception could be invoked whenever an appellant can
demonstrate that he or she has meritorious objections to the
findings and recommendation, the very purpose of the waiver rule
would be eviscerated. “[L]itigants would have no incentive to make
objections at the trial level; in fact they might even be
encouraged to bypass the district court entirely, even though
Congress has lodged the primary responsibility for supervision of
federal magistrates’ functions with that judicial body.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).6
6
To the extent the Prosecuting Attorney attempts to rely upon
the “fundamental error” or “plain error” doctrine discussed in
Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989), that
reliance is misplaced. In Snyder, a case which involved a tort
claim arising from an automobile accident, we rejected the
appellant’s alternative claim that the defendant could appeal under
the “plain error” doctrine applicable to unobjected-to errors in
the district court proceedings even though the defendant failed to
file the requisite objections below. The plain error doctrine does
not apply in appeals from district court adjudications of habeas
petitions brought under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d), and we have never
14
III.
Because McBride did not object to the magistrate’s
recommendation, and no “interests of justice” exception to the
general rule is warranted, McBride waived his right to appeal the
merits of the district court’s order adopting the findings and
recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting habeas relief
to Farmer. Accordingly, McBride’s appeal from the district court’s
decision is hereby dismissed.
DISMISSED
viewed the “plain error” doctrine as an “interests of justice”
exception to the waiver rule.
15