United States v. Daniels

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4341
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TERRENCE DANIELS, a/k/a Terrance Daniels,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (CR-04-330)
Submitted: March 31, 2006 Decided: April 18, 2006
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew R. Mackenzie, BARRETT MACKENZIE, L.L.C., Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William Kenneth Witherspoon, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Terrence Daniels appeals his convictions and resulting
life sentence for conspiracy to distribute in excess of fifty grams
of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 (2000) and
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A),(B) (2000); possession with intent to
distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, 500 grams or more
of cocaine, 100 grams or more of heroin, and quantities of
marijuana and MDMA (Ecstasy), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(A),(B),(C) (2000); possession with intent to distribute
five grams or more of cocaine base, 500 grams or more of cocaine
powder, and a quantity of heroin, and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (2000) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (2000); possession with intent to distribute five grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B) (2000); felon in possession of stolen firearms that had
been shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (2000); and using
and carrying a firearm during and in relation to, and in
furtherance of, a drug trafficking crime and aiding and abetting,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1),(2) (2000). We affirm.
Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are no non-frivolous grounds
for appeal, but questioning whether: (1) the district court abused
- 2 -
its discretion when it denied Daniels’ motion for recusal; (2) the
district court erred when it denied Daniels’ motion to suppress
seized contraband and other items taken from Daniels; and (3) the
district court erred when it denied Daniels’ motion to suppress all
statements made by him. Daniels was informed of the opportunity to
file a pro se supplemental brief, but did not do so. The
Government has not filed a responding brief.
Daniels first asserts the district court erred when it
denied his motion to recuse based on comments made at the
sentencing of Tracey Pinckney, Daniels’ codefendant, and comments
made at Daniels’ status of counsel hearing. The district court
denied the motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000) and
under 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
Under § 144, a judge shall recuse himself in cases in
which the party seeking recusal files a timely and sufficient
affidavit stating the judge has a personal bias or prejudice either
against the affiant or in favor of any adverse party. The
affidavit must allege a personal bias from an extrajudicial source.
See Sine v. Local No. 992 Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 882 F.2d 913, 914
(4th Cir. 1989).
In United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir.
2003), this court addressed a district court judge’s obligation to
recuse himself pursuant to § 455. The court stated that recusal is
appropriate “if a person with knowledge of the relevant facts might
- 3 -
reasonably question his impartiality.” This court reviews recusal
decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carmichael,
726 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1984). With these standards in mind,
we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Daniels’ recusal motion.
Daniels next attacks the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we
accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous and review the ultimate legal conclusions de
novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). When a
suppression motion has been denied, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government. United States v. Seidman,
156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, and
searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless
there is a valid exception. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973). Voluntary consent to a search is such an
exception. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 396 (4th
Cir. 2002). Whether a defendant’s consent to a search is voluntary
is a factual question determined under the totality of the
circumstances and reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49. We conclude Daniels is not
entitled to relief on this claim because he consented to the search
- 4 -
of his residence that resulted in the seizure of evidence used
against him at trial.
Daniels contests the voluntariness of his statements to
law enforcement officers that resulted in that search on the ground
that they were taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). A statement is voluntary if it is “the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.”
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225. An analysis of the voluntariness of
a statement is derived from the totality of the circumstances. Id.
at 226. The relevant determination regarding voluntariness is
whether government agents have overborne the defendant’s will or
left his “capacity for self-determination critically impaired.”
Id. at 225. We conclude Daniels’ consent to search his residence
was voluntary and that the district court did not err when it
denied his motion to suppress.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Daniels’ convictions and sentence.*
*
This court affirms a sentence imposed after United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), “as long as it is within the
statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” United States v.
White, 405 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 668(2005); see also United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th
Cir. 2006) (discussing factors to be considered in imposing
sentence post-Booker). Here, the district court stated that it
considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000) and
Daniels’ circumstances. (Vol. IV at 593). Accordingly, we find
Daniels’ sentence was reasonable under Booker.
- 5 -
This court requires that counsel inform Daniels, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Daniels requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Daniels. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 6 -