Delawder v. American Woodmark Corp.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1471
HELLEN L. DELAWDER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
AMERICAN WOODMARK CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Senior
District Judge. (CA-02-11-2)
Argued: March 15, 2006 Decided: April 25, 2006
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jimmy Lynn Hill, RITCHIE LAW FIRM, P.L.C., Winchester, Virginia,
for Appellant. Daniel R. Schuda, SCHUDA & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Hellen Delawder appeals an order of the district
court granting summary judgment to Appellee American Woodmark
Corporation (“Woodmark”) in this personal injury diversity action.
Delawder contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to Woodmark because she demonstrated a material issue of
fact on each of the five elements of W.V. Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)
necessary to abrogate Woodmark’s immunity as Delawder’s employer
under the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act (“The Act”) and
allow her to proceed against Woodmark in tort. Because Delawder
has not demonstrated that a “statute, rule, regulation or standard
was specifically applicable to the particular work and working
condition involved” in her accident, as required by W.V. Code § 23-
4-2(c)(2)(ii)(C), we affirm the district court order.
I.
On June 28, 2000, Delawder suffered a serious workplace injury
while employed by Woodmark when her hand became trapped in moving
components of a robotic paint spray machine. Woodmark employed
Delawder as an operator of the paint spray machine on one of its
assembly production lines that manufactured kitchen cabinets and
vanities. As pieces of cabinetry moved down this assembly line,
rotating metal bands carried them through the paint spray machine
where the cabinetry was painted. During this process, the metal
2
bands became covered in excess paint. After the metal bands passed
the cabinetry out of the paint spray machine, the bands rotated
under the paint spray machine and passed through a solvent to
remove the excess paint. The metal bands then passed over a felt
roll to remove any additional excess paint before rotating upwards
to begin the process anew.
During the course of a day, this felt roll wore down and lost
its efficacy. Delawder’s job required her to maintain the felt
roll and either realign or replace it as the roll became worn.
Delawder accessed the felt roll through an opening on the underside
of the paint spray machine. This opening also exposed other
internal moving components of the machine.
On the day of her accident, Delawder bent down to check the
status of the felt roll and determine whether she could wait until
the next scheduled break to replace it. Although the paint spray
machine normally has a machine guard that covers the opening in
order to prevent employees from coming into contact with the moving
parts of the machine, the guard was not present on the day of
Delawder’s accident and had been missing for some prior period of
time. Delawder testified, however, that had the guard been
present, she would have removed it to inspect and conduct
maintenance on the felt roll, as this was her common practice. As
Delawder bent down to inspect the felt roll, her supervisor
startled her and she jerked upward. As she did so, her hand came
3
into contact with and became trapped in the internal components of
the paint spray machine, causing significant injury.
Delawder’s employment caused her to be covered by the West
Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act. That statute provides the
exclusive remedy for an employee injured in the line of work,
except where the injury arises from the “deliberate intention” of
the employer. See W.V. Code §§ 23-2-6, 23-4-2(d)(2). Delawder
filed this diversity action seeking to invoke the “deliberate
intention” exception against Woodmark by proving the following five
elements set out in § 24-3-2(d)(2)(ii)(A) - (E):1
(A) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in
the workplace which presented a high degree of risk and
a strong probability of serious injury or death;
(B) That the employer, prior to the injury, had actual
knowledge of the existence of the specific unsafe working
condition and of the high degree of risk and the strong
probability of serious injury or death presented by the
specific unsafe working condition;
(C) That the specific unsafe working condition was a
violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or
regulation, whether cited or not, or of a commonly
accepted and well-known safety standard within the
industry or business of the employer, as demonstrated by
competent evidence of written standards or guidelines
which reflect a consensus safety standard in the industry
or business, which statute, rule, regulation or standard
was specifically applicable to the particular work and
working condition involved, as contrasted with a statute,
1
A plaintiff can also establish “deliberate intention” by
proving that the employer “acted with a consciously, subjectively
and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of
injury or death to an employee.” W.V. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(I).
Delawder does not contend that Woodmark meets this standard.
4
rule, regulation or standard generally requiring safe
workplaces, equipment or working conditions;
(D) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set
forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C), inclusive, of
this paragraph, the employer nevertheless intentionally
thereafter exposed an employee to the specific unsafe
working condition; and
(E) That the employee exposed suffered serious
compensable injury or compensable death as defined in
section one, article four, chapter twenty-three whether
a claim for benefits under this chapter is filed or not
as a direct and proximate result of the specific unsafe
working condition.
W.V. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(A)-(E).
After Delawder filed this action and the parties conducted
discovery, Woodmark filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that Delawder could not establish a material issue of fact on
subsections (A), (B) or (C) of § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii). The district
court granted Woodmark’s motion and held that Delawder created an
issue of fact on subsections (A) and (B), but failed to do so on
subsection (C). On appeal, neither party challenges the district
court’s ruling on subsections (A) and (B). The only issue before
us is whether the district court properly held that Delawder failed
to establish “[t]hat the specific unsafe working condition was a
violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or regulation.
. . .” W.V. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(C).
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 415 (4th Cir. 2006)
5
(en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). For the
reasons that follow, we find no error in the district court’s
conclusion.
II.
In order to protect the integrity of the workers’ compensation
scheme, the West Virginia legislature adopted the “deliberate
intention” exception as a narrow departure from the general rule
that the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy
for employees’ on-the-job injuries. See W.V. Code § 23-4-2(d)(1);
Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265, 269 (4th Cir 1986).
Any analysis of whether an employer acted with deliberate intention
is limited to a consideration of the five statutory elements set
out in § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii), and in order to survive summary
judgment, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of a disputed
fact as to each. See W.V. Code § 23-4-2(d)(1); Deskins v. S.W.
Jack Drilling Co., 215 W. Va. 525, 528, 600 S.E.2d 237, 240 (2004).
As subsection (c) is the only element of the analysis at issue
here, Delawder must demonstrate an issue of fact as to whether
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Woodmark violated a statute, rule or regulation that specifically
“applied to the alleged unsafe working condition” underlying her
injury. Tolley v. ACF Indus., Inc., 212 W. Va. 548, 557, 575
S.E.2d 158, 167 (2002). In determining whether she meets that
burden, we bear in mind the stated intent of the West Virginia
legislation “to remove from the common law tort system all disputes
between . . . employers and employees regarding the compensation to
be received for injury . . .” and “to create a legislative standard
for loss of that immunity of more narrow application and containing
more specific mandatory elements than the common law tort system .
. . standard of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct.” W.V.
Code § 23-4-2(d)(1).
Delawder argues that she identified one federal regulation, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.212, and two state statutes, W.V. Code §§ 21-3-2, -4,
that satisfy subsection (C) by imposing machine guarding safety
standards that are “specifically applicable to the particular work
and working condition involved” in her injury. W.V. Code § 23-4-
2(c)(2)(ii)(C). However, even assuming that these provisions are
otherwise sufficiently particularized with respect to Delawder’s
work and working conditions, each contains either limiting language
or an exception that defeats her argument.
7
1. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212 & W.V. Code § 21-3-2
Delawder argues that Woodmark violated W.V. Code § 21-3-2 and
29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(1)-(a)(3)2 by failing to install effective
machine guards on the paint spray machine. Section 21-3-2 of the
West Virginia Code requires machine guarding “where practicable,”
while 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(2) requires such guarding “where
possible.” The record reveals that Woodmark outfitted the paint
spray machine with guards that covered the internal components of
the machine and prevented access thereto. At the time of her
accident, however, Delawder was engaged in work that required the
removal of these guards. Indeed, Delawder testified that she would
have removed the guards had they been present on that day. Given
her acknowledgement, we do not believe that the safety standards
reflected in these two provisions could be “specifically applicable
to the work and working condition involved” in Delawder’s accident;
it would have been neither possible nor practicable to guard
against work that required an operator to access the very areas of
the paint spray machine covered by the guards.
Delawder counters that Woodmark should have installed
interlocked machine guards that stopped the drive mechanism of the
2
For the first time on appeal, Delawder argues that 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.212(a)(4), which imposes heightened regulatory requirements
on revolving drums, barrels and containers, also applies to the
work she was engaged in at the time of her accident. Delawder
waived this argument by failing to raise it in the district court
below. Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
Thus, we do not address it.
8
paint spray machine when removed and that such guards would have
prevented her injury. We disagree. We have carefully reviewed 29
C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(1)-(a)(3) and W.V. Code § 21-3-2, and cannot
find language in either that would impose such a duty.
2. W.V. Code § 21-3-4
Delawder argues that Woodmark violated § 21-3-4 by allowing
employees to remove guards on the paint spray machine without
promptly replacing them. Section 21-3-4 of the West Virginia code
prohibits the removal of machine guards required by § 21-3-2,
“except for the purpose of immediately making repairs thereto . .
. .” W.V. Code § 21-3-4. The record reveals that Delawder was in
the process of inspecting and conducting repairs to the felt roll
at the time of her accident.3 The fact that the guards were
3
Delawder argues that she was not conducting repairs within
the meaning of the statute at the time of her injury.
Unfortunately, the West Virginia legislature did not define the
term “repair” and no West Virginia court has defined the term
within the context of this statute. Therefore, we must predict how
the West Virginia Supreme Court would define this term if it had to
confront this issue. See Doe v. Doe, 973 F.2d 237, 240 (4th Cir.
1992) (federal court sitting in diversity must predict how a state
court would decide an issue).
Although § 21-3-4 does not define “repair,” the West Virginia
Supreme Court has previously adopted a dictionary definition of the
term, albeit in a different context. See Mozingo v. Wellsburg Elc.
Light, Heat & Power Co., 101 W. Va. 79, 81, 131 S.E. 717, 718
(1926). In addition, West Virginia courts routinely refer to
dictionaries to define terms. CSX Hotels, Inc. v. City of White
Sulphur Springs, 217 W. Va. 238, 617 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2005);
Coordinating Council for Ind. Living, Inc. v. Palmer, 209 W. Va.
274, 281, 546 S.E.2d 454, 461 (2001); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v.
Allen, 198 W. Va. 18, 35, 479 S.E.2d 317, 334 (1996). Accordingly,
we believe that the West Virginia courts would apply the common
dictionary definition of the term “repair” if they were presented
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missing on that day is immaterial because the work underlying
Delawder’s injury (repairing the felt roll) allows for such removal
and Delawder testified that she would have removed the guards had
they been present, in any event. Based on these facts, we do not
believe that Delawder demonstrated an issue of fact on whether
Woodmark violated W.V. Code § 21-3-4 for purposes of W.V. Code §
24-3-2(c)(2)(ii)(C).
At bottom, Delawder has not cited any “statute, rule,
regulation or standard [that] was specifically applicable to the
particular work and working condition involved” in her accident
and, therefore, cannot avoid Woodmark’s immunity from suit under
the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act. W.V. Code § 23-4-
2(c)(2)(ii)(C).
III.
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the order of the district
court.
AFFIRMED
with this issue.
The verb “repair” is defined as “to restore to a good or sound
condition after decay or damage.” The Random House Dictionary of
the English Language, 1632 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., Random House
2nd Ed.) (1987). Based on this definition of “repair,” we believe
that Delawder was conducting repairs at the time of her accident
because she was in the process of restoring the felt rolls on the
paint spray machine to a “good or sound condition.” Id.
10