United States v. Rouse

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4798
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LAJOEL T. ROUSE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (6:05-cr-01173-GRA)
Submitted: March 19, 2007 Decided: April 23, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
C. Rauch Wise, Greenwood, South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth
J. Howard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
LaJoel T. Rouse appeals his conviction and 188-month
sentence for armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), (d) (2000). Rouse’s attorney filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 739 (1967),
certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court erred by failing to notify
Rouse at the plea hearing that he was subject to enhanced
punishment as a career offender and whether his sentence was
reasonable. Rouse was notified of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, and has done so. The Government elected not to
file a reply brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Rouse argues that the district court erred by failing to
inform him at the plea hearing that he was subject to enhanced
punishment as a career offender and if the court had done so, he
may have elected to proceed to trial. This argument lacks merit
because the court at the Rule 11 hearing notified Rouse that he
could be sentenced up to the statutory maximum of twenty-five
years. Rouse agreed that he understood. Moreover, the Government
and the court notified Rouse that he would likely be sentenced
within the 188 to 235-month sentencing range. Rouse pled guilty
with this knowledge. Rouse does not attack the validity of his
guilty plea. Accordingly, Rouse is bound by the agreement that he
could face up to the statutory maximum.
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Rouse’s sentence was reasonable. After United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district court is no longer bound by
the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. However, in
imposing a sentence post-Booker, courts still must calculate the
applicable guidelines range after making the appropriate findings
of fact and consider the range in conjunction with other relevant
factors under the guidelines and § 3553(a). United States v.
Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2054 (2006). This court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it
“is within the statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.”
Id. at 433 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]
sentence within the proper advisory Guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339,
341 (4th Cir. 2006). Further, “[t]he district court need not
discuss each factor set forth in § 3553(a) ‘in checklist fashion;’
‘it is enough to calculate the range accurately and explain why (if
the sentence lies outside it) this defendant deserves more or
less.’” Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432 (quoting United States v. Dean,
414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Here, the district court sentenced Rouse post-Booker and
appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory. The court
sentenced Rouse after considering and examining the sentencing
guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors, as instructed by Booker.
Rouse’s 188-month sentence is at the bottom of the appropriate
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guidelines range and is below the twenty-five year statutory
maximum sentence. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2113(a) and (d). Finally,
neither Rouse nor the record suggests any information so compelling
as to rebut the presumption that a sentence within the properly
calculated guidelines range is reasonable.
We have reviewed Rouse’s pro se supplemental brief and
find the issues he raises are meritless.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Rouse’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Rouse, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Rouse requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Rouse.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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