United States v. Hallman

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4152
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RICHARD HALLMAN, II,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (CR-03-965)
Submitted: March 28, 2007 Decided: May 10, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David B. Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, William K. Witherspoon,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Hallman, II, pled guilty to distribution of fifty
grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2000). He was sentenced to 360 months of
imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the court erred in
refusing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea after the court
rejected the sentencing range stipulated to by the parties in the
plea agreement. We affirm.
In Hallman’s plea agreement, he agreed to cooperate with
and assist the Government by being “fully truthful and forthright”
and submitting to polygraph examinations. In exchange, if Hallman
complied with the agreement, the Government agreed to a stipulated
sentencing range of between 108 to 135 months of imprisonment. The
agreement provided that if the court rejected the plea agreement as
the “appropriate disposition,” Hallman would be allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea. The agreement also provided that, if Hallman
failed to meet his obligations under the agreement, the Government
would not be obligated to recommended the reduced sentencing range
and Hallman would not be entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.
Following a change of plea hearing, the district court accepted
Hallman’s plea as knowing and voluntary.
Prior to sentencing, the Government informed the
probation officer that Hallman had not fulfilled his obligations
under the plea agreement, and therefore, it would not recommend the
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stipulated sentencing range. At sentencing, the district court
agreed that, because Hallman breached the agreement, the stipulated
range no longer applied and Hallman was not entitled to withdraw
his plea. Based on a guideline range of 360 months to life
imprisonment, the court sentenced Hallman to 360 months.
Plea agreements are grounded in contract law, and both
parties should receive the benefit of their bargain. United
States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336, 345 (4th Cir. 2001). Because of
constitutional and supervisory concerns, the Government is held to
a greater degree of responsibility for imprecisions or ambiguities
in plea agreements. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300-01
(4th Cir. 1986). Where an agreement is ambiguous in its terms, the
terms must be construed against the Government. Id. at 303.
However, “[w]hile the government must be held to promises it made,
it will not be bound to those it did not make.” United States v.
Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1986). Factual questions
are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard while principles
of contract interpretation are reviewed de novo. United States v.
Martin, 25 F.3d 211, 217 (4th Cir. 1994).
The plea agreement in this case was expressly made
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(c) and 11(e)(4), now Rule
11(c)(1)(C) and Rule 11(c)(5). Under subsection 11(c)(1)(C), the
government and the defendant may agree that a specific sentence or
range is appropriate and such a recommendation binds the court once
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the court accepts the plea agreement. Rule 11(c)(3) provides that,
“the court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision
until the court has reviewed the presentence report.” The rules
further provide that if the court rejects the plea agreement
containing provisions of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(C),
the court must (1) inform the parties that the court rejects the
plea agreement; (2) advise the defendant that the court is not
required to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw the plea; and (3) advise the defendant that
if the plea is not withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case
less favorably toward the defendant than the plea contemplated.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5). In the event the court rejects the plea
under Rule 11(c)(5), the defendant may withdraw his guilty plea.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(A).
Hallman does not dispute that he materially breached the
plea agreement by failing to take a polygraph test. The gravamen
of Hallman’s appeal is that the district court rejected the plea
agreement when it refused to sentence him within the stipulated
sentencing range and therefore, under the agreement and under Rule
11(d)(2)(A), he was entitled to withdraw his plea. However, even
though Rule 11(d)(2)(A) permits a defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea if the court rejects his guilty plea under Rule 11(c)(5), in
this case, the court expressly stated that it was not rejecting the
plea agreement, but rather, enforcing it.
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Although a stipulated sentence provision may be binding
if the court accepts a plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the
unique element in this case is that the stipulation was
conditional. The agreement explicitly provides that the parties
“stipulate and agree that in the event the defendant complies with
all provisions of this agreement, the appropriate disposition of
this case is a sentence between 108 months and 135 months.”
Hallman indisputably failed to comply with all of the provisions of
the agreement. Furthermore, the agreement also provides that “if
the obligations of the Attorneys for the Government within this
Agreement become null and void due to the lack of truthfulness on
the part of the Defendant, the Defendant understands that . . . the
Defendant will not be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty
. . . .”* Although Hallman relies on language that allows him to
withdraw his plea if the court rejects the stipulated sentence
under the agreement as the appropriate disposition, when read in
the context of the entire plea agreement, it is clear that the
parties agreed that Hallman would be permitted to withdraw his plea
only if he fully complied with his obligations under the agreement
and the court nevertheless determined that the stipulated range was
inappropriate.
*
Although Hallman attempts to differentiate the consequences
under the agreement of failing to be truthful and failing to take
a polygraph, the district court found that Hallman breached the
plea agreement with respect to both truthfulness and the polygraph.
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Finally, Hallman contends that the Rule 11 colloquy was
inadequate because the district court did not inform him that he
would not be permitted to withdraw his plea if he breached the plea
agreement. He argues that this omission, together with the court’s
statement that he could withdraw his plea if the court would not
agree to the stipulated range, suggested that he could withdraw his
plea if the stipulated range was not applicable for any reason.
However, although not discussed during the plea hearing, the
consequences of breaching the plea agreement were clearly set forth
in the plea agreement. See United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389,
400 (4th Cir. 2004)(enforcing appeal waiver contained in plea
agreement but not reviewed during plea hearing); United States v.
Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992)(same). Hallman signed the
agreement and acknowledged at the plea hearing that he discussed
its provisions with his lawyer. None of the court’s statements
suggested Hallman would be entitled to withdraw his plea if he
breached the agreement.
The court’s decision not to apply the stipulated sentence
was in accordance with the plea agreement as it provided for a
stipulated sentence only upon the condition that Hallman fulfilled
his obligations under the agreement. Hallman chose to deliberately
breach the plea agreement, and the consequences of doing so, as
clearly set forth in the agreement, are that he is no longer
entitled to the stipulated sentencing range and he is not entitled
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to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, we affirm Hallman’s
conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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