Hale v. Broadspire Services, Inc.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1117
KATHY L. HALE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
BROADSPIRE SERVICES, INCORPORATED, formerly
known as Kemper National Services; AMERICAN
ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION; AMERICAN
ELECTRIC POWER LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. Glen M. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (1:04-cv-00054-gmw)
Submitted: May 9, 2007 Decided: May 16, 2007
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph E. Wolfe, David S. Bary, WOLFE, WILLIAMS & RUTHERFORD,
Norton, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas M. Winn, III, Frank K.
Friedman, Joshua F. P. Long, WOODS ROGERS, P.L.C., Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kathy L. Hale commenced this action under § 502(a) of ERISA,
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), against American Electric Power Service
Corporation, her employer and ERISA plan sponsor, against the
plan’s day-to-day administrator, Broadspire Services, Inc., and
against the plan itself, claiming long-term disability benefits.
Hale claimed that due to chronic neck, back, and arm pain, as well
as depression, she was permanently disabled according to the terms
of the plan. The district court granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, and Hale now appeals. We affirm.
American Electric Power provided Hale with benefits for 24
months based on her inability to perform her job. After
continuing the payment of benefits for an additional two years,
for a total of over four years, American Electric Power
discontinued the payment of benefits because long-term benefits,
after an initial 24 months of benefits, were available to Hale
only if she became unable to perform “the essential duties of any
occupation for which [she was] qualified by education, training,
or experience.” American Electric Power based its decision to
discontinue the payment of long-term benefits on medical
evaluations made by four different doctors; an independent
functional capacity evaluation conducted by a physical therapist;
and independent peer reviews of Hale’s entire medical history by
five different doctors.
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Hale contends first that American Electric Power’s
determination to deny her long-term disability benefits deserves
reduced deference because American Electric Power’s appeals
committee acted under a conflict of interest. See Ellis v. Metro
Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997). Hale provides
no evidence to support this contention, and we therefore reject it
as meritless. In a situation such as this, where the ERISA plan
entitles decisions made by plan administrators to the “maximum
discretionary authority permitted by law,” courts must review
administrators’ decisions only for an abuse of discretion. See
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989);
Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, the mere fact that American Electric Power funded,
sponsored, and administered the plan itself does not alone create
a conflict of interest that reduces the deference we give to the
decision made by American Electric Power’s appeals committee. See
Colucci v. Agfa Corp. Severance Pay Plan, 431 F.3d 170, 179 (4th
Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we review the plan administrator’s
decision to deny Hale long-term disability benefits under the
fully deferential abuse of discretion standard.
On the merits of her claim, Hale contends that American
Electric Power abused its discretion by concluding that she was
capable of performing jobs that matched her education, training,
or experience. To support this contention, Hale refers to
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evidence consisting primarily of conclusory reports issued by her
personal primary care physician. The great bulk of the medical
evidence, however, suggests that Hale is capable of performing
jobs that match her experience working with and inspecting
machinery. See Elliott v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 606 (4th
Cir. 1999) (holding that it is not an abuse of discretion for a
plan fiduciary to deny disability benefits where conflicting
medical reports are presented). For example, Hale’s independent
functional capacity evaluation revealed that she could push or
pull 30 pounds of force, lift 20 pounds from floor to shoulder
occasionally, and lift 15 pounds on a frequent basis. Hale’s
psychiatrist reported that her psychological and emotional
condition had stabilized and greatly improved. And every
independent professional who reviewed Hale’s medical history
concluded that Hale was not permanently disabled from working.
This evidence provides a reasonable and substantial basis for
American Electric Power’s conclusion that Hale is capable of
working in positions commensurate with her experience. Positions
identified included auxiliary equipment operator, electric meter
reader, and a work dispatcher.
At bottom, when, as here, the administrator’s decision was
“the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process” and was
“supported by substantial evidence,” Bernstein v. Capital Care,
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Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 788 (4th Cir. 1985), we will not disturb the
judgment of the plan administrator.
Because American Electric Power acted within the discretion
conferred on it by its ERISA plan, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED
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