McLaughlin v. Murphy

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1955
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
KEVIN MURPHY, President of Freedmont Mortgage
Corporation; FREEDMONT MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a
Maryland Corporation,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (CA-
04-767-CCB)
Argued: January 30, 2007 Decided: June 29, 2007
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Howard Benjamin Hoffman, Rockville, Maryland, for
Appellant. Jeffrey Louis Forman, KAUFFMAN & FORMAN, P.A., Towson,
Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Bruce E. Kauffman, KAUFFMAN &
FORMAN, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael McLaughlin appeals a district court order granting
summary judgment to his former employer, Freedmont Mortgage
Corporation (Freedmont), and its president, Kevin Murphy, on
McLaughlin’s claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-19 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006). We
affirm.
I.
McLaughlin was employed by Freedmont as a loan officer from
August 2001 to November 2003. In accordance with his employment
contract, he was paid on a pure commission basis and earned no
regular salary. McLaughlin’s principal job duty was to contact
potential clients regarding Freedmont’s “loan products.” Although
Freedmont preferred loan officers to meet with clients in person,
and provided conference room space for this purpose, loan officers
generally solicited clients by telephone and were allowed to mail
documents to clients for completion. Because Freedmont provided
him with client leads, McLaughlin was required to work one day each
week in the office handling incoming telephone calls from potential
clients responding to Freedmont’s advertisements. McLaughlin
otherwise chose to work from home, where he controlled his daily
schedule and the number of hours he worked. He maintained that he
typically worked an eight hour day. Because he was not required to
report his time to Freedmont, McLaughlin did not keep records of
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the hours he worked or the potential clients he contacted.
Similarly, Freedmont did not supervise his work, maintain records
of the hours he worked, or track individuals he contacted when the
contact failed to result in a completed loan application.
McLaughlin was terminated in November 2003. He subsequently
filed this action, alleging, as is relevant here, violations of the
FLSA. McLaughlin claimed that Freedmont failed to pay him any
wages for his work, including the statutory minimum wage of $5.15
per hour for eight separate bi-weekly pay periods from 2001 to
2003. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1).
Following discovery, the district court granted summary
judgment to Freedmont. The court ruled that McLaughlin was not
exempt from the FLSA as an “outside salesman.” Id. § 213(a)(1).
The court concluded, however, that McLaughlin had failed to prove
that he worked the hours claimed or that he performed work for
which he was not compensated. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87 (1946).
II.
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the applicable law,
and having had the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the
district court correctly granted summary judgment. Accordingly, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
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