United States v. Williamson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4774
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MAURICE ALEXANDER WILLIAMSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00136-NCT)
Submitted: March 31, 2008 Decided: June 16, 2008
Before TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Lisa B.
Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Alexander Williamson appeals the district court’s
order revoking his supervised release and imposing a twelve-month
term of imprisonment. On appeal, Williamson’s attorney has filed
a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), certifying there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
suggesting that there was insufficient evidence that Williamson
violated the terms of his supervised release and that his sentence
was not reasonable. Although advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, Williamson has not done so. The Government
filed a responding brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
Williamson was originally convicted for mailing
threatening communications and received a 41-month sentence. He
was released from custody on December 1, 2004. On September 30,
2005, a petition for warrant or summons was filed by Williamson’s
probation officer alleging that Williamson violated a condition of
his supervision that prohibited him from committing another
federal, state, or local crime. Specifically, Williamson pled
guilty to misdemeanor breaking and entering charges on August 8,
2005, in Rockingham County, North Carolina, Superior Court. At the
supervised release hearing, Williamson was committed to the custody
of the Bureau of Prisons for twelve months, to be followed by a
period of twenty-four months of supervised release. As a special
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condition, the court ordered that Williamson reside in a
residential reentry center (RRC) for 120 days.
Williamson was released from prison on January 12, 2007,
and began serving his second term of supervised release. The
probation office arranged for Williamson to reside in the Dismas
Charities facility, which Williamson entered on March 12, 2007. On
March 16, 2007, Williamson signed himself out of the RRC for an
appointment and did not return.
On April 26, 2007, the probation office filed a petition
for warrant or summons, alleging two violations of the terms of
supervised release: unsuccessful termination from Dismas
Charities-the RRC, and failure to work regularly. The court held
a hearing on July 2, 2007. Counsel for Williamson admitted the
violations. Williamson testified that he reported to the RRC,
stayed for five days, and voluntarily left to reside with his
mother. Williamson told the court that he left the RRC because
there was too much freedom and stress for it to be a successful
placement for him. He testified that he informed his probation
officer that he was leaving the placement.
The district court determined that Williamson
“voluntarily and willfully” violated the terms of his supervised
release. The court then imposed a twelve-month term of
imprisonment with no additional supervised release ordered.
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This court reviews a district court’s revocation of
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the court fails or refuses to exercise its discretion
or when its exercise of discretion is flawed by an erroneous legal
or factual premise. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir.
1993). The district court need only find a violation of a
condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). We conclude
that there was sufficient evidence, in light of Williamson’s
admission, to support the revocation of supervised release.
Next, Williamson suggests that the sentence imposed by
the district court after revoking his supervised release was not
reasonable. Williamson does not assert any error in the district
court’s application of the Guidelines in determining the advisory
sentencing range. In United States v. Crudup, this court held that
“revocation sentences should be reviewed to determine whether they
are ‘plainly unreasonable’ with regard to those § 3553(a) factors
applicable to supervised release revocation sentences.” 461 F.3d
433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). Applying the analysis articulated in
Crudup, we find that Williamson’s sentence for violating supervised
release is not unreasonable, much less plainly unreasonable.
As correctly noted by the district court, the advisory
Guidelines range for Williamson’s violation was eight to fourteen
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months for a Grade C violation with an original criminal history
category of VI. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a)
(2007). Williamson’s prior conviction for mailing threatening
communications was a Class C felony, so the statutory maximum
sentence on revocation of supervised release was twenty-four
months. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 876, 3559(a)(3), 3583(e) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007). Williamson was sentenced to and served one twelve-month
term on revocation of supervised release, so an additional
twelve-month term was the maximum sentence available. Williamson’s
twelve-month sentence was thus within the statutory maximum.
Moreover, the district court sufficiently articulated its
sentencing deliberations to demonstrate that it did not abuse its
discretion in selecting the term of imprisonment.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s order revoking
Williamson’s supervised release and imposing a twelve-month
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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