United States v. Martinez

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4862
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FERMIN GITERREZ MARTINEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00338-RJC)
Argued: May 14, 2008 Decided: June 24, 2008
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and Jackson L. KISER,
Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: John J. Cacheris, DOZIER, MILLER, POLLARD & MURPHY, LLP,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Fermin Giterrez Martinez appeals from his February
2006 conviction in the Western District of North Carolina for
possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Martinez’s primary contention
on appeal is that the principles of Rovario v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), were
contravened when the prosecution failed to make timely and adequate
disclosure to the defense of identity and impeachment information
concerning its testifying confidential informant. As explained
below, although such disclosure may have been tardy and inadequate,
it was not so prejudicial as to warrant relief. We therefore
affirm.
I.
Martinez left his native Mexico at the age of seventeen and
illegally entered the United States. He thereafter married an
American citizen and was a legal resident in this country for a
short period of time. After divorcing his wife, however,
Martinez’s legal status was revoked, and he remained in this
country illegally. The conviction that he challenges in this
appeal was premised on his possession of a firearm in relation to
a drug transaction with a confidential police informant named
2
Emanuel Barajas. At the time of the offense, Barajas was also an
illegal alien.
A.
On September 27, 2005, a grand jury in the Western District of
North Carolina returned a three-count indictment against Martinez.
It charged him with (1) knowingly and intentionally possessing
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in contravention of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count One); (2) being an illegal alien in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)
(Count Two); and (3) possessing a firearm during and in relation to
a drug trafficking crime, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
(Count Three). Martinez was arraigned in the district court on
October 27, 2005, and his case was scheduled for a docket call on
November 7, 2005. After he filed a motion for a continuance on
November 1, 2005, the docket call was rescheduled for February 6,
2006. As further explained below, his trial (on Count Three only)
began on February 7, 2006, and it concluded with a guilty verdict
the next day.
On November 16, 2005, Martinez’s court-appointed defense
lawyer filed a comprehensive set of pretrial criminal discovery
motions, requesting disclosure from the prosecution of, inter alia,
all Rovario and Brady information and evidence, including the
following: (1) whether it intended to call any confidential police
informants as witnesses at trial; (2) the relevant contact
3
information of such informants; (3) information concerning meetings
between government agents and the informants; (4) information
concerning any payments made to such informants; (5) any
inculpatory information concerning the informants; and (6) all
exculpatory evidence, including contact information, for
prosecution witnesses. Martinez also requested that the
prosecution make its confidential informants available to be
interviewed by the defense.
More than two months later (and six days before trial), the
United States Attorney wrote to Martinez’s lawyer and first
disclosed the name of its informant, Emanuel Barajas; advised that
Barajas had been paid a “sum of money by CMPD [the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department] for his cooperation which led to the
arrest of [Martinez]”; and further advised that he was an alien not
legally in the United States. J.A. 164-A.1 Finally, the letter,
dated February 1, 2006, related that “the Government does not know
the exact amount of money that [the informant] was paid, but that
information will be turned over to you before trial.” Id.2
1
Citations to “J.A. ” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by
the parties in this appeal.
2
The prosecution’s February 1, 2006 disclosure letter to
defense counsel advised as follows:
The Government hereby gives notice of the following
information relating to the trial in the above case:
1. The informant is Emanuel Barajas[.]
4
On either February 2 or 6, 2006, the defense raised with the
district court its contention concerning inadequate disclosure by
the prosecution — particularly as to Barajas — and requested a
trial continuance in order to locate and interview him. Although
the record is somewhat ambiguous, the court apparently denied the
continuance request and directed that the trial proceed as
scheduled. On February 6, 2006, the day before the trial began,
Martinez pleaded guilty to Counts One and Two. The trial then
commenced the following day on Count Three only.3
B.
1.
At trial, the Government called four witnesses — with
Barajas, its informant, being the primary prosecution witness.
According to Barajas, he first met Martinez through a co-worker
known as “El Gordo,” who told Barajas that he knew someone who
2. The informant was paid a sum of money by CMPD
for his cooperation which led to the arrest of
your client [Martinez]. At this time the
Government does not know the exact amount of
money that he was paid, but that information
will be turned over to you before trial.
3. The informant is an alien and not legally in
the United States.
J.A. 164-A.
3
By his guilty pleas on Counts One and Two, Martinez admitted
guilt on the first two counts, but denied, with respect to Count
Three (which carried a consecutive prison term of five years), that
the firearm possession had any relevance to the drug transaction.
5
wanted to start selling drugs. El Gordo arranged a meeting between
Martinez and Barajas, and they discussed drugs that Martinez might
deliver and sell. Martinez claimed that, for $20,000, he could get
four kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, or “ice,” and five
kilograms of cocaine. Martinez explained that he had to travel to
California to obtain the drugs, and that the cocaine would be from
Columbia and the methamphetamine from Mexico. Martinez also
advised Barajas that he was willing to sell a .45 handgun and a 9-
millimeter handgun. After this meeting, Barajas spoke to Officer
Jesus Rendon with the CMPD and informed him of the meeting, the
possibility of an undercover drug deal, and Martinez’s offer to
sell handguns.
Less than a week later, Martinez met Barajas at a bar in
Charlotte. During this meeting, Martinez agreed to travel to Los
Angeles to obtain drugs for Barajas and phone Barajas upon his
return. Barajas also reported this conversation to Officer Rendon.
Martinez ultimately obtained approximately 3.75 pounds of crystal
methamphetamine (but no cocaine), and, on August 1, 2005, called
Barajas to advise that he (Martinez) was back from California and
ready to complete the drug deal. The next day, Barajas, who was
with Officer Rendon, called Martinez and agreed to meet at his
apartment that morning. After Officer Rendon (who also testified
for the prosecution) checked Barajas’s vehicle to ensure that it
contained no firearms or weapons, the officer followed Barajas to
6
Martinez’s residence. Officer Rendon instructed Barajas to call as
soon as he saw the drugs.
Upon arriving at Martinez’s apartment, Barajas met Martinez
and they proceeded into the apartment. They immediately went into
a back bedroom, and Martinez locked the door behind them. Martinez
then removed some Tupperware containers wrapped in plastic from a
closet, cut the packaging with scissors, and opened the containers.
Barajas observed several pieces of crystal methamphetamine and,
pretending that he was calling an associate to obtain money to
purchase the methamphetamine, called the Charlotte police officers.
Barajas advised Martinez that he needed to pick up the money, and
Martinez decided to accompany him.
According to Barajas, as Martinez was leaving the apartment,
he removed a firearm from his waistband, “a black one, and he put
it on the entertainment center.” J.A. 223. When Barajas and
Martinez exited the apartment, Martinez was immediately arrested
and found to be unarmed. Following the arrest, officers searched
the apartment and seized a loaded Glock .45 handgun from the top of
the entertainment center near the front door. The officers also
seized 3.68 pounds of crystal methamphetamine in Tupperware
containers. The handgun was found twenty to twenty-five feet from
where the methamphetamine was seized.
Barajas admitted on direct examination that he was an illegal
alien from Mexico, and that he had worked as a paid informant for
7
the Charlotte police for approximately a year. Other than the drug
transaction with Martinez, Barajas testified that he had been
involved in three other drug deals for the CMPD. He further
testified that he had been paid a total of approximately $5000 for
his work as a police informant, $3000 of which was for the Martinez
transaction. Prior to his work with the Charlotte police, Barajas
knew nothing about drugs or drug dealing, and he testified that the
CMPD had trained him as their informant. Barajas also testified
that the officers promised to assist him in becoming a legal
resident of the United States in return for his informant work.
The prosecution also called as witness police officers Rendon
and Robson. Rendon, who supervised confidential informants in the
Narcotics Unit of the CMPD, testified that Barajas was a good
informant because he was “very honest,” he “learned fast,” and, to
Rendon’s knowledge, had never lied to the police. J.A. 251-52.
Robson, one of the officers who executed the search warrant for
Martinez’s residence, testified that, upon entering the apartment
immediately after the arrest, he observed a loaded Glock .45
handgun on an entertainment center near the front door. In the
back bedroom twenty to twenty-five feet from the front door, Robson
found a large quantity of methamphetamine in Tupperware
containers.4
4
The prosecution called Officer Rolondo Ortiz as a rebuttal
witness. His testimony related only to the identity of El Gordo.
8
2.
The defense then called two witnesses, seeking to lay the
groundwork for a contention that the Glock .45 handgun had not been
possessed by Martinez in connection with a drug trafficking crime.
Martinez testified in his own defense and asserted that he had not
possessed a firearm during the drug transaction, that he had not
displayed any weapon to Barajas, and that he had never spoken to
Barajas about selling firearms. Although Martinez admitted owning
a firearm (the Glock), he claimed that it was purchased only for
protection of his family. He also acknowledged that he had pleaded
guilty two days earlier to the offenses charged in Counts One and
Two, thus admitting guilt to those drug and firearm offenses.5
C.
On February 8, 2006, at the close of the evidence, Martinez’s
defense lawyer referred the trial court to earlier proceedings in
the case, at the court’s pretrial docket call (which were
apparently off the record). Counsel requested an opportunity to
place into the record the court’s denial, at the docket call, of
his continuance request — a continuance that he sought in order to
locate and interview Barajas. The defense asserted that it was
5
The other defense witness was Marlin Garcia, a co-worker of
Martinez’s. Garcia testified that he was with Martinez when he
purchased the Glock .45 handgun in the spring of 2005. The day
Martinez bought it, he explained to Garcia that he was concerned
that someone would break into his home, and was buying the firearm
to protect himself.
9
error for the prosecution to make incomplete disclosure of
Barajas’s identity — as it had, on February 1, 2006, disclosed his
name only, with no further identifying information. Defense
counsel requested, in the alternative, that the court suppress
Barajas’s testimony. The court denied both requests, and the jury
returned a guilty verdict later that day.
On August 2, 2007, the court sentenced Martinez to 121 months
of imprisonment on Count One, a concurrent term of 120 months on
Count Two, and a consecutive term of 60 months on Count Three.
Judgment was entered on August 30, 2007, and Martinez has timely
appealed. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We review a trial court’s decision regarding the prosecution’s
disclosure of evidence, including witness information, for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 54 (4th
Cir. 1996) (explaining that we have “interpreted Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing discovery and
inspection as placing the decision regarding pre-trial disclosure
of witness lists within the sound discretion of the trial court”).
Of course, an error of law, such as the failure to mandate
disclosure to the defense of evidence or information essential to
the conduct of a fair trial, is by definition an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 251 (4th
10
Cir. 2008) (“By definition, a district court abuses its discretion
when it makes an error of law.”). When a new trial issue is
premised on a Brady claim that presents questions of law as well as
questions of fact, we review the court’s conclusions of law de novo
and any findings of fact for clear error. See United States v.
Bell, No. 06-4648, 2008 WL 2315886, at *1 (3d Cir. June 6, 2008).
If an appellant has timely objected, his appellate assertion of
error is preserved, and we apply the harmless error standard
provided by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
See Fed. Rule Crim. Pro. 52(a) (providing that “[a]ny error . . .
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded”).
III.
A.
By this appeal, Martinez seeks a new trial on Count Three of
his indictment, contending that the district court erred in failing
to require the prosecution to make timely disclosure of contact
information and impeachment evidence concerning its testifying
informant. In that regard, it has long been settled that
“disclosure of [an] informant’s identity is required where the
informant is an actual participant [in the crime], particularly
where he helps set up the criminal occurrence.” McLawhorn v. State
of North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1973) (relying on
Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1957) (concluding
11
that when informant is sole participant in crime [other than
accused], it is reversible error for prosecution to withhold
identity of informant)). In McLawhorn, our Judge Boreman addressed
a due process contention in 1973 concerning the prosecution’s
failure to identify a confidential informant who was a participant
in the charged offenses. Importantly, his opinion clearly stated
the principle that “[o]nly by disclosing all material information,
especially informant’s true name and address . . . does the
prosecution discharge its duty under the due process clause.” 484
F.2d at 8 n.19 (relying on, inter alia, Rovario, 353 U.S. 53(1957); and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (emphasis
added).6 Here, the Government maintains that the Rovario,
McLawhorn, and Brady precedents are distinguishable, and thus not
controlling, because Barajas actually testified at trial. It
maintains that, because Martinez’s lawyer had an opportunity to
fully cross-examine Barajas at trial, the mandate of those
decisions — that an accused should have access to “all material
6
In Rovario, the Supreme Court concluded that, when a
confidential informant is the only participant in a crime, other
than the accused, it is reversible error for the prosecution to
withhold the identity of the informant from the defendant. 353
U.S. at 64-65. In Brady, the Court held that “the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87 The Court has further held that
the Brady duty extends to both impeachment and exculpatory
evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
12
information” concerning a police informant who participated in the
charged offense — is inapplicable.
In this situation, the prosecution disclosed to the defense,
just six days before trial, Barajas’s name only (with no further
identifying information). Martinez thus maintains that the
prosecution failed to satisfy its obligations to disclose the
informant’s “identity,” as well as impeaching and exculpatory
evidence concerning the informant. More specifically, Martinez
asserts that he had no way of knowing, solely on the basis of the
scant and untimely information supplied by the prosecutors, where
the informant was located or how he might be contacted.
In his discovery motions (filed more than two months before
trial), Martinez had requested the informant’s contact information,
including his address and phone number. He had also requested
disclosure of Brady materials, including information that might
impeach the prosecution’s witnesses. After the prosecution failed
to disclose such information in response to the discovery motions,
Martinez unsuccessfully sought a trial continuance at the court’s
docket call the day before the trial began, to allow an opportunity
to interview Barajas. As a result, when Martinez cross-examined
Barajas at trial, he had to do so without an earlier opportunity to
investigate the role of the prosecution’s key witness as a police
informant.
13
As the prosecution argues, some courts have sought to
distinguish the applicability of the Rovario and Brady precedents,
and find that a lack of timely disclosure is not error if the
informant was called to testify at trial. Other courts have
reasoned that a harmless error analysis should be conducted, and
that, when such an informant testifies at trial and is available
for cross-examination, the prosecution is entitled to show that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the untimely disclosure. See
United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1190-91 (6th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that Rovario is distinguishable, and error is
nonprejudicial, when confidential informant testifies at trial);
United States v. Foster, 815 F.2d 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that court did not err in declining to permit disclosure
of informant’s identity when informant testified at trial); United
States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184, 186-87 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding
no prejudice from the failure to disclose the informant’s identity,
and explaining that “[t]he significant difference between Rovario
and the instant case is that in the former the informer did not
testify at trial, and in our case he did”).
Whether a disclosure error occurred in this case is plainly a
close question —— and the relevant record on the disclosure issue
is, at best, somewhat ambiguous. However, the controlling
precedents — including Rovario, Brady, and McLawhorn — are clear.
The prosecution was thus on notice of — and aware of — its
14
disclosure obligations: When a confidential informant has
participated in the charged offense, and the informant was the only
participant other than the accused, his identity and “all material
information, especially informant’s true name and address,” must be
timely disclosed. See McLawhorn, 484 F.2d at 8 n.19. In these
circumstances, however, rather than undertaking to resolve the
issue of whether the prosecution erroneously withheld discovery
that Martinez was entitled to receive, we will simply assume, for
purposes of this appeal, that such an error occurred. As a result,
we will assess the question of whether such error was harmless.
B.
Assuming that a disclosure error occurred, we must assess
whether it affected Martinez’s substantial rights and was
prejudicial to his right to a fair trial. See Fed. Rule Crim. Pro.
52(a) (providing that “[a]ny error . . . that does not affect
substantial rights must be disregarded”); see also McLawhorn, 484
F.2d at 7 (recognizing error and assessing whether failure to
disclose informant’s identity was prejudicial). Martinez contends,
of course, that not having received timely disclosure with respect
to the informant, he was unable to sufficiently prepare his defense
and effectively cross-examine Barajas. To support this
proposition, Martinez points to several facts that were not
disclosed in a timely manner: (1) that Barajas had assisted the
CMPD with three drug deals in addition to the drug transaction with
15
Martinez; (2) that Barajas had received approximately $5000 for
assisting the Charlotte police, including $3000 for his transaction
with Martinez; (3) that the police officers had advised Barajas
that they would assist him in becoming a legal resident of this
country in return for his help; and (4) that the CMPD had taught
Barajas about the drug trade so that he could work as a paid
informant. As Martinez argues, most of this evidence should have
been timely disclosed to the defense under the principles of
Rovario, McLawhorn, and Brady.
Although the harmlessness issue also presents us with a close
question, the record is insufficient to warrant an award of a new
trial on Count Three. Martinez has not shown how the prosecution’s
failure to timely disclose “all material information” either
altered or impaired his cross-examination of Barajas, or how such
failure otherwise adversely affected the outcome of his trial.
Moreover, when Martinez testified, he admitted that he had pleaded
guilty to the Count One drug offense and the Count Two firearms
offense, leaving the jury to resolve only a single factual issue —
whether the two offenses were sufficiently related to constitute
the crime of possession of a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1) (as
charged in Count Three).
In addition to Barajas’s testimony, the prosecution presented
the jury with witnesses who buttressed Barajas’s credibility.
16
Officer Rendon testified that Barajas was an honest and reliable
informant. Officer Robson, who executed the search warrant for
Martinez’s apartment, testified that he observed a Glock .45
handgun on the entertainment center by the front door immediately
after Martinez was arrested, corroborating Barajas’s testimony on
that point and providing independent evidence of the relationship
between the firearm and the drugs. Furthermore, a substantial
amount of impeachment evidence was presented to the jury by the
prosecutors during Barajas’s direct examination, rendering it more
difficult for Martinez to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the
disclosure error. Thus, although the prosecution should have acted
in a more timely and comprehensive manner with respect to its
disclosure obligations, we are not, in these circumstances,
convinced that its failure to do so was prejudicial to the
substantial rights of Martinez. As a result, we must deny relief
and affirm Martinez’s conviction on Count Three.7
7
Martinez also asserts on appeal that he should be awarded a
new trial because the prosecution fatally erred in making a
prejudicial closing argument. Martinez failed to object to the
argument, however, and we review this contention for plain error
only. See United States v. Moore, 11 F.3d 475, 481 (4th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that when defense counsel failed to object to
prosecution’s closing argument, objection was forfeited and could
only be reviewed for plain error). The prosecution concedes that
it committed error in its closing argument, but argues that
Martinez was not prejudiced by any such error. After closely
examining the record, we agree with the prosecution on this point,
and we are satisfied that this contention is without merit.
17
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the judgment of the district court
is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
18